James Henderson

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr James Henderson has worked at OIES since 2010 and in that time he has acted as Head of Gas Research and also as Head of Energy Transition Research. He is now focused on global environmental diplomacy, green energy industrial policy, energy geopolitics and the role of CIS energy in the global energy economy. He is also following developments in the nuclear industry.

Dr. Henderson is also an Honorary Professor at Warwick and Dundee Universities, as well being a visiting professor at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic and at the College of Europe, Natolin in Warsaw. He worked in the oil sector for US company Amerada Hess and has also been a consultant and investment banker in the energy sector before moving into academia. He received his PhD from London University in 2010 and has subsequently written three books on developments in CIS energy markets. He has also written numerous papers and book chapters on a wide range of energy issues, has appeared on many podcasts and webinars discussing his views and makes regular appearances at industry conferences and seminars.

Non OIES publications >>

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                    [post_content] => Oxford Energy Forum article
                    [post_title] => Present status and future plans for the nuclear sector in Ukraine
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                    [post_content] => Following the Russia-Ukraine war, the issue of energy security has once again surged to the forefront of global discussions. The disruption and threats to global energy security caused by the war have starkly exposed the vulnerability of energy supply chains, accentuating the pressing need for robust and secure energy sources. In this context, different countries, notably in the European Union, have emphasized the pivotal role of nuclear power generation in addressing these concerns and ensuring energy security. The recently signed global stocktake agreement at COP28 also emphasizes the significance of nuclear energy in the broader context of the energy transition and the acceleration of zero- and low-emission technologies

As we find ourselves at the vanguard of an unprecedented energy transition towards sustainable, low-carbon, and environmentally responsible energy supplies, nuclear power emerges as a compelling solution to the energy trilemma. Nevertheless, expanding the role of nuclear energy is far from straightforward, characterized by intricate challenges spanning economic viability, cost-effectiveness, fuel supply dynamics, evolving technologies, regulatory frameworks, public acceptance, and the intricate geopolitics intertwined with the expanding role of nuclear energy.

This issue of the Oxford Energy Forum explores nuclear energy’s multifaceted role along four key themes:
  1. The cases for and against nuclear power : The initial section presents articles that provide compelling arguments both for and against nuclear power generation, facilitating a balanced discourse on its merits and limitations.
  2. Technological advancements in nuclear energy: This section delves into the latest technological advancements in the field of nuclear energy including SMRs and nuclear fusion, shedding light on innovations poised to enhance safety and efficiency.
  3. Country and regional experiences:  The third section casts a discerning eye on the geographical expansion of nuclear energy, examining its adoption across various regions and the unique challenges and opportunities presented by this global diversification.
  4. Geopolitics of nuclear energy and medical isotopes: The final section delves into the geopolitics of nuclear energy and recognizes the interconnectedness between the growth of the nuclear industry and the geopolitics of nuclear medical isotopes.
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Prior to COP28, which took place in Dubai between 30 November - 13 December 2023, we highlighted ten key issues which we believed would shape the outcome of the conference. This Energy Insight considers the topics which dominated the meeting, provides an overview of the most important outcomes, and discusses the debates that went on as the final conclusions were agreed and published. From the historic inclusion of fossil fuels in the final communique for the first time to other vital issues such as the global stocktake, climate finance, transition technologies, adaptation measures, methane emissions, and the loss and damage fund, COP28 generated significant debate, controversy and important decisions, although the language left room for multiple interpretations in a number of cases. This Insight attempts to disentangle the key issues,  to understand the different viewpoints of the many participants and to analyse the implications for the future of the global energy economy.

[post_title] => Ten key conclusions from COP28: a farewell to fossil fuels? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ten-key-conclusions-from-cop28-a-farewell-to-fossil-fuels [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-01-10 10:58:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-01-10 10:58:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46889 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46717 [post_author] => 974 [post_date] => 2023-11-14 10:13:04 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-11-14 10:13:04 [post_content] => The UN Climate Change Conference (COP 27), held in Sharm El-Sheikh in November 2022, ended on a downbeat note as the final communique was rushed through at the last minute and was regarded as unsatisfactory by many participating delegates, government officials and observers, who had been hoping for a more aggressive stance on the phase out of fossil fuels and a more proactive statement of intent concerning the provision of finance to the developing world. One positive note was an agreement to set up a Loss & Damage Fund to help compensate developing countries for the impact of climate change that they have suffered, but even this achievement was undermined by the fact that no actual pledges were made and no methodology for its use was established. Perhaps more importantly, though, there seemed to be little sign that the Conference had catalysed active steps to increase mitigation efforts and encourage firmer commitments to ratchet up pledges on emission reduction and decarbonisation of the global energy sector. As a result, many of the key issues were left for discussion at COP 28, which is to be held in Dubai from 30th November to 12th December 2023. Financing for the developing world will again be at the forefront of discussions.  A critical focus will also be on the findings of the Global Stocktake and the political reaction to them, as COP 28 will set a foundation for work on the new nationally determined contributions (NDCs) which countries will need to prepare over the next two years ahead of COP 30. In addition, there will be much discussion on the future of hydrocarbons and the phasing out of unabated fossil fuels. Beyond the specific energy transition debate, geopolitics will also cast a shadow over the COP, as many of the key actors are currently distracted by conflicts and tensions around the world, both military and economic. It will be critical to see whether Parties can separate their current political disagreements from the global challenge of emissions reduction and decarbonisation. The indications from pre-COP meetings are mixed. The Bonn Intersessional, which took place in June, struggled to set an agreed agenda for its own meeting, never mind the COP, with the debate on financing and the mitigation work programme being key stumbling blocks. However, subsequent discussions at the G7, the MENA and New York Climate Weeks and at the Pre-COP meeting in Abu Dhabi have struck a more conciliatory and progressive note, providing hope that COP28 may produce some positive results. Having said that, securing agreement amongst the 197 parties who participate in the process is always a difficult process, especially as unanimity is required for the signing of the final communique. As such, achievement of the four main goals set out by COP President Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber; to fast track the transition away from fossil fuels; to transform climate finance; to focus on the role of people and nature in the transition; and to ensure inclusivity for all participants, may be a struggle. The best hope of results from the COP process may again come from the multilateral agreements that were a key part of COP 26 and COP 27 and which brought issues such as methane emissions, net zero emission vehicles, deforestation and just energy transition partnerships to greater prominence even as the main conference was struggling to reach overall consensus. We have identified 10 key themes which we believe will be the main topics of conversation at COP 28 and which will drive the progress of the negotiations. [post_title] => 10 Key Issues for COP 28 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => 10-key-issues-for-cop-28 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-11-14 10:13:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-11-14 10:13:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46717 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46358 [post_author] => 974 [post_date] => 2023-07-11 10:58:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-07-11 09:58:00 [post_content] => During 2022, a key concern within the EU and the global gas market was how the market might cope with a complete shut-off of Russian gas pipeline exports to Europe if a ban was implemented on Gazprom sales. For most of the year, it appeared that the market was very stretched and that gas demand rationing in Europe might be needed if Russian gas disappeared completely or if a cold winter caused a spike in demand. In addition, the economic impact of higher gas prices, which peaked at over $90/mmbtu in August 2022 and averaged over $40/mmbtu for the year as a whole, also prompted the question as to whether European politicians and companies might be tempted to concede to some of Gazprom’s demands (for example on rouble payments) in order to increase imports and lower prices. The politics of the situation suggested that while the Ukraine war continued this would not be an acceptable outcome, but questions were being asked about how long the EU, or individual member states, would be prepared to take the economic pain. Six months into 2023, a completely different set of questions can now be asked: is Russian gas that important to the EU and wider Europe anymore? Would it matter if volumes went to zero sooner rather than later, either by Russian or EU design? Will Russian gas ever have a significant role in western markets again? This Energy Insight investigates these questions, looking at available infrastructure for Russian exports, the relevance of Gazprom's long-term contracts with European customers, the importance of Russian LNG and also whether the removal of all pipeline exports from Russia, or their gradual recovery, would have much impact on European and global gas prices. [post_title] => Do future Russian gas pipeline exports to Europe matter anymore? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => do-future-russian-gas-pipeline-exports-to-europe-matter-anymore [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-07-21 09:50:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-07-21 08:50:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46358 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45510 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-12-06 11:28:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-12-06 11:28:50 [post_content] => In this Energy Insight James Henderson reviews the key conclusions from COP27, which was held during November 2022 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. The COP was framed as a "COP for Africa" and "An Implementation COP", and the focus was very much on issues which concern the Global South. Top of the list was climate finance, with the major achievement of the conference being the establishment of a Fund for Loss & Damage. However, other issues, in particular Mitigation and the setting of more ambitious climate targets, got less attention than many delegates would have liked, leading to the Final Communique being regarded as unsatisfactory by many of the key participants. Having said this, there were some positive steps taken. The issue of methane emissions was high on the agenda, with more countries signing the Global Methane Pledge; the world's largest emitters, the US and China, started talking again; the role of Multilateral Lending Banks and the provision of lower cost finance to the Global South was discussed at length. However, although these successes were important, they were not enough to leave those present at the COP feeling that the conference had achieved enough progress to keep the world on track to restrict the global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. Indeed, one of the key messages from the conference was that much more work needs to be done ahead of COP28. [post_title] => COP27 – Achievements and Disappointments [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => cop27-achievements-and-disappointments [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-12-06 11:28:50 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-12-06 11:28:50 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45510 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45346 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-10-19 11:45:19 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-10-19 10:45:19 [post_content] => In this latest edition of the Oxford Energy Forum we include a series of 18 articles on issues relevant to the upcoming discussions at COP27, which will be held in Egypt in November 2022. The articles cover a wide range of issues, starting with the current state of environmental diplomacy in the wake of the global geopolitical turbulence caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We then address the perspectives of multiple actors ahead of the conference, focussing in particular on the divergent views between countries from the developed and developing world. In particular we reflect the emerging dissatisfaction of countries from the Global South and the need for countries from the developed world to provide the finance and technology that have been promised before but not delivered. We also look at various other important topics such as the development of new technologies, the global methane pledge, green finance, the prospects for nuclear power and hydrogen, and the development of carbon markets and consider how they will be discussed as part of the COP process. The overall aim is for this edition of the OEF to be an important primer ahead of COP27, to provide readers with an overview of the key issues which will determine the success or failure of the negotiations in Sharm El-Sheikh. [post_title] => CO27: Refocusing the world on the energy transition agenda - Issue 133 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => co27-refocusing-the-world-on-the-energy-transition-agenda-issue-133 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-04 10:26:21 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-04 09:26:21 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45346 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44739 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-03-29 14:55:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-29 13:55:08 [post_content] => Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has catalysed a chorus of dismay and outrage from western companies with investments in Russia and has led some to announce their withdrawal from the country. Furthermore, it has also caused the US and the EU to impose sanctions on individuals and companies involved in the energy sector and to announce restrictions on investment in key industries, including oil and gas. These sanctions build on those which had already been imposed in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Together with the withdrawal of some major IOCs they are likely to undermine both the current operation, but more especially the future development, of the Russian oil and gas sector. This Insight aims to review the involvement of international companies in the Russian oil and gas sector since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and to assess the likely impact of the key withdrawals announced to date and the possible further withdrawals which may occur if the situation in Ukraine continues or deteriorates. It will also assess the possible impact of the sanctions announced so far and will consider the potential outcome for Russian oil and gas production and exports over the short to medium term. [post_title] => Thoughts on the impact of foreign companies exiting the Russian oil and gas industry [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => thoughts-on-the-impact-of-foreign-companies-exiting-the-russian-oil-and-gas-industry [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-29 14:59:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-29 13:59:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44739 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44610 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-03-04 16:36:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-04 16:36:07 [post_content] =>
  • The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces has led to sharp rises in gas prices in Europe and around the world with real concerns about the possible curtailment of gas flows from Russia to Europe.
  • Pipeline imports from Russia began falling in the last quarter of 2021 and declined even further in January and most of February 2022. Gazprom are seemingly only meeting the nominations under long-term contracts and not offering any volumes on their Electronic Sales Platforms. European buyers significantly reduced their nominations in January and most of February as the monthly prices under their contracts with Gazprom were much higher than the day-ahead hub prices, reducing the incentive to take contract volumes. As soon as the invasion began, day-ahead prices jumped sharply making the price under the monthly contracts look very attractive. As a consequence, European buyers increased their nominations, especially on the Ukraine route.
  • LNG imports into Europe have surged in the last three months, but they largely offset the lower Russian flows in the same period so overall supply to the market was relatively stable, hence the firm prices in the market.
  • As a consequence, pressure on gas storage stocks was maintained and the poor injection rates in the summer of 2021 meant that stocks are at historically low levels, although not as low as they might have been if we had had a cold winter.
  • Under a scenario where Russian flows on Nord Stream 1, the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and the Ukraine routes are stopped for the period between April 1 2022 and March 31 2023, the ability of Europe to refill its storage is severely compromised. Europe might just about be able to get through the summer by emptying what remains of its stocks in storage, but that would lead to significant demand destruction in the winter. In the absence of any mitigation measure some 40 per cent of Central and Western Europe winter demand could be lost.
  • There is the potential for some mitigation, through diversions of LNG to Europe from other countries, more production from Groningen in the Netherlands and additional pipeline imports from Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan. Together with some demand side responses, including more nuclear power, as suggested in the IEA’s Ten Point Plan, these could maybe reduce the impact by half, but this still leaves a substantial amount of unmet demand in the power and industrial sectors, if the heating load is to be protected.
  • While the impact of shortages would mainly be felt in Central and Western Europe, gas prices would clearly be extremely high, leading to further large increases in end-consumers’ bills all over Europe and in many other countries around the world who rely on imported gas.
    [post_title] => Ukraine Invasion: What This Means for the European Gas Market [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-invasion-what-this-means-for-the-european-gas-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-08 12:10:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-08 12:10:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44610 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44163 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-09-28 11:11:29 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-09-28 10:11:29 [post_content] => COP26, which is to be held in Glasgow in the first two weeks of November, is set to be a defining moment in global climate negotiations as almost 200 countries come together to review their environmental performance since 2015 and to set new emissions targets for 2030. In this special edition of the Oxford Energy Forum we have gathered the thoughts of many leading researchers in the field of energy and the environment to review both the overall expectations for the COP and the challenges which are likely to be faced in reaching global agreement on a series of very complex issues. We have also gathered views from a number of the key countries involved in the negotiations, including major energy exporters and importers, in order to provide a variety of different perspectives on the negotiations. Articles on China, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Russia the EU and Brazil, as well as thoughts from the UK, which holds the presidency of COP26, underline the broad range of bargaining positions that will be taken into this vital meeting, while the Forum also provides insights into a number of key issues that are likely to feature in the negotiations such as climate justice, the role of net zero targets, the potential of CCUS and the role of nuclear power in the energy transition. [post_title] => Oxford Energy Forum - COP 26—Examining the balance between ambitious pledges and realistic expectations - Issue 129 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => oxford-energy-forum-cop-26-examining-the-balance-between-ambitious-pledges-and-realistic-expectations-issue-129 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-04 10:33:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-04 09:33:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44163 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44115 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-09-07 10:59:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-09-07 09:59:58 [post_content] => The IPCC report on climate change published in August 2021 has provided a stark reminder that human activity is unequivocally responsible for global warming and changing environmental conditions on Earth. At the same time, the growing commitment of governments and companies across the world to net zero emissions targets is an encouraging sign that the reality of the world’s climate crisis is now being understood while also being a sharp reminder that actions, not just words, will be needed if the rise in global temperatures is to be limited to 1.5o C this century. While the overall goal of the energy transition is clear, the pathways to efficient decarbonisation are not obvious, and could be varied, based on different contexts. This paper attempts to synthesize the key challenges and consequences of the energy transition, both for incumbent actors and new entrants, and for the countries in which they operate. Building on and extending previous and ongoing OIES research on the Energy Transition, the paper aims to conceptualise a framework upon which further research can be undertaken on these pathways, and lays out some of the key consequences of them for the overall energy system. It explores the potential impact on the energy value chain, looking at the future of networks, the consequences for and interactions with consumers, and the implications for corporate business models. It then considers the evolution and development of markets, both for existing and future energy products, before looking at the changes from the perspectives of different regions and sectors, acknowledging that many countries and industries are embarking on the energy transition from very different starting points and that any attempts to reach a global consensus must take this into account in order to provide a “just and inclusive transition”. It then looks at potential sectoral developments for energy-consuming sectors such as heating and transport, and finally, it considers the consequences of the adjustments to the global energy economy on geopolitics and energy security. [post_title] => The Energy Transition: Key challenges for incumbent and new players in the global energy system [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-energy-transition-key-challenges-for-incumbent-and-new-players-in-the-global-energy-system [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-09-07 14:06:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-09-07 13:06:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44115 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 40863 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-09-10 12:01:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-10 11:01:54 [post_content] =>

Since the birth of the LNG industry, Asia has been the key market, providing high value, reliable demand. The 3 foundation markets of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been joined more recently by China and India to form the “big 5” which is often the focus for much analysis and comment. However, it would be wrong to ignore the smaller, emerging Asian LNG markets. By considering the 10 most significant emerging Asian markets, this report demonstrates that when combined, they have potential LNG demand over the next 2 decades as the combination of India and China. Like all demand forecasts, whether that potential is achievable is, however, depends on overcoming some significant challenges, as discussed in the report.

In addition, these smaller countries offer a diversity of analytical interest.  Malaysia and Indonesia are LNG exporters, now looking to become significant importers. Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines all see LNG as needed to supplement declining domestic gas production. Myanmar started LNG imports to address a power crisis, and Hong Kong and Singapore are largely driven by environmental and security of supply concerns.

With a chapter on each country and detailed breakdown of the forecasts generated by our World Gas Model, the document provides a useful reference of current perceptions of future prospects in those emerging LNG markets.

[post_title] => Emerging Asia LNG Demand [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => emerging-asia-lng-demand [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-09-10 12:01:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-09-10 11:01:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=40863 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 39425 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-07-16 10:28:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-07-16 09:28:11 [post_content] => In this latest OIES Gas Quarterly our objective is to continue our review of the impact of COVID 19 on global gas markets by examining various key indicators and also by updating our global gas model and extending the range of our forecasts to 2025. We start, as usual, with a look at various price indicators which demonstrate what we believe are some key market trends and then present four key-note articles. The first updates our analysis of the storage situation in Europe and the impact of LNG flows. It notes that storage injections have slowed recently and LNG imports in June have also declined sharply, and concludes that these outcomes relate to some extent to more robust gas demand in Europe than had been expected but has mainly been caused by LNG shut-ins that have reduced supply. The second reviews physical flows of Russian gas, a key balancing source of gas supply in Europe, via various transit routes in the first half of 2020. It notes the overall decline in Russian exports which occurred in January and then discusses the changing balance of export routes following the new transit agreement with Ukraine and the ending of the long-term arrangement with Poland. The third article updates our forecasts for global gas supply and demand, with a focus on the LNG market, in the wake of the COVID 19 crisis and extends the analysis to 2025. Its overall conclusion is that global gas demand can rebound to 2019 levels in 2021, but that it will be 2025 before the full impact of the COVID 19 crisis has unwound as it will take five years before our previous pre-COVID base case forecasts can be met. Finally, we return to the theme of Russian gas exports and look at Gazprom’s developing Asian plans, which were the focus of the company’s recent AGM. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 10 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-10 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-07-16 11:16:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-07-16 10:16:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=39425 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 37558 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-05-07 12:23:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-05-07 11:23:48 [post_content] => This Quarterly Review examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent global economic crisis on the global gas market. In a series of articles we examine the link between gas demand and GDP overall, before analysing the immediate impact of the crisis on gas consumption in various key regions, including Europe, China, India and the US. We then discuss the consequences for gas supply and trade, in particular highlighting the increased flows of LNG to Europe and its impact on storage levels. We conclude that if current trends continue, storage in Europe could be full by mid-summer, potentially catalysing a further decline in prices or the need for supply shut-ins. We conclude the report by looking at the potential longer-term consequences for the gas sector, asking eight critical questions about its role in the future global energy economy. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 9 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-9 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-05-07 14:22:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-05-07 13:22:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=37558 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 36913 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-04-13 10:33:30 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-04-13 09:33:30 [post_content] => Russia and Saudi Arabia have approved a production cut of 2.5 mb/d each from an agreed level of 11mb/d. However, there is some uncertainty about what this means exactly for Russia. Recent production of total liquids has been 11.3 mb/d, implying that the cut could actually be 2.8mb/d. However, this includes a significant amount of gas condensate, which was specifically excluded from Russian quotas in an agreement with OPEC in December 2019. Russia’s recent crude oil production has been around 10.5 mb/d, meaning that the reduction could be only 2mb/d if it applies to crude oil only. The agreement is something of a surprise given previous Russian arguments for a more considered response to the current collapse in demand caused by the Covid-19 epidemic. However, it may well reflect three facts: firstly, that a production cut may have been inevitable as soon as oil storage reached its limit, secondly that responsible action was required to alleviate a global crisis and thirdly that political gains may also be anticipated given the involvement of the US and G20. In addition, the cut may be easier to implement now that we are approaching the summer months when operating (and shutting in) West Siberian wells becomes easier. In addition, it is clear that the Kremlin and Russian oil companies have been surprised by the rapidity and depth of the recent oil price fall, which may have been another catalyst for the latest agreement. Nevertheless, it would appear that if low oil prices are here for an extended period then Russia can survive the crisis thanks to the flexible exchange rate, large financial reserves, low levels of debt and a low cost of oil production. As such, although Russia may have taken a tactical decision to cut oil production in the short-term for both oil market and geo-political reasons, its long-term strategy of attempting to enhance its competitive position as a robust low cost producer is likely to remain intact. [post_title] => The New Deal for Oil Markets: implications for Russia's short-term tactics and long-term strategy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-new-deal-for-oil-markets-implications-for-russias-short-term-tactics-and-long-term-strategy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-04-13 10:33:30 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-04-13 09:33:30 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=36913 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 34928 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_content] => The OIES Natural Gas Quarterly aims to provide a regular insight into the thoughts of Research Fellows on topical issues as well as providing a different angle on trends in global gas pricing. In the pricing section, the Quarterly reviews the LNG Tightness measure, looks at the Russian gas export price to Europe versus the marginal cost of US LNG and also reviews prices on Gazprom’s Electronic Sales Platform (ESP). In Asia we compare the Japanese LNG import price with the LNG spot price and also look at Chinese domestic prices compared with JKM. The Quarterly also outline our views on the Key Themes for 2020, including thoughts from Mike Fulwood on LNG project FIDs and how developers may need to accelerate plans if they are not going to miss the next window of opportunity in the mid-2020s. Mike Fulwood and Jack Sharples then question the availability of LNG for Europe and ask whether sufficient storage will be available to take all the possible supply. Anouk Honore then looks at a possible cause for optimism for European gas demand, highlighting key legislation that should be passed in 2020 concerning coal phase out in Germany. Continuing the European theme, Marshall Hall discusses likely further progress this year in the transformation of the Dutch gas market, while James Henderson considers the increasing diversity of Russian gas export flows via pipeline and LNG. Jack Sharples develops the theme of Russian gas exports further, suggesting that the Gazprom ESP can provide further evidence concerning the company’s export strategy in 2020. On a different, but still European, theme Anouk Honoré considers the potential impact of the new EU Green Deal and considers how it could be developed further during the year with potentially long-lasting consequences for the energy system. Martin Lambert then suggests that 2020 could be the year when we start to see more active progress in decarbonisation outside Europe, with Australia, Japan and even the US highlighted as possible sources of technology development and practical action in the decarbonisation of the gas sector. Michal Median then outlines her view on the outlook for the Chinese gas sector in 2020, suggesting that coal to gas switching could regain some momentum and that LNG could benefit as a result. Finally, Patrick Heather looks at the emergence of the JKM price marker as a benchmark for gas prices in Asia and suggests that further progress could be made this year towards it becoming the pre-eminent pricing tool in the region.   [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 8 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-8 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=34928 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 34494 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-01-13 11:47:22 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-01-13 11:47:22 [post_content] => Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gazprom has dominated the Russian gas industry. However, the markets in which it operates have changed dramatically, with the company increasingly being challenged at home and abroad. The Globalization of Russian Gas analyses the involvement of the Russian gas industry in the changing international gas market and the dramatic implications for Russia’s role as a global supplier of gas in the future. The authors explore the link between changes in Russia’s domestic market, where new players have recently emerged, and the development of Russia’s gas export business. In particular, they assess the growing importance of LNG exports and the role of Novatek in developing this new business area for Russia. They also review changes in European gas trade and the development of new EU regulations, analysing the ambiguities in Europe’s position on gas exports from Russia and showing why efforts to limit expansion of Russian gas exports have been unsuccessful. Henderson, J. & Moe, A., (2020) The Globalisation of Russian Gas: Political and Commercial Catalysts, Edward Elgar. James Henderson, in conversation with book hub Readara.com, discusses his new book The Globalisation of Russian Gas in which he and co-author Arild Moe analyse the development of the Russian gas industry and the challenges it faces in a globalising gas market. [post_title] => The Globalisation of Russian Gas: Political and Commercial Catalysts [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-globalisation-of-russian-gas-political-and-commercial-catalysts [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-05-21 08:56:30 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-05-21 07:56:30 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=34494 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 33121 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-11-22 11:56:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-11-22 11:56:15 [post_content] => The successful launch of Novatek’s Yamal LNG project has brought Russia’s plans to develop its LNG industry into the spotlight, and this paper by James Henderson and Vitaly Yermakov examines the prospects for the next decade and more. The Russian government has laid out some aggressive expansion plans, with both commercial and geo-political consequences, and Novatek seems to have taken on the role of “Russia’s LNG champion” as the country seeks to become one of the top four global exporters by 2030. Gazprom and Rosneft also have important plans, and this paper analyses how LNG is now becoming a core part of Russian export strategy as well as a significant catalyst of domestic economic and industrial growth. [post_title] => Russian LNG: Becoming a Global Force [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russian-lng-becoming-a-global-force [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-11-22 12:20:00 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-11-22 12:20:00 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=33121 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31894 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-09-11 10:28:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-09-11 09:28:36 [post_content] => This paper analyses the history of oil production in Russia since 2016, including the impact of the OPEC+ agreements, and then looks at the short-term outlook for the period to 2025 from existing assets and known new fields. It then assesses the potential of a number of new areas for production growth, namely enhanced production from existing assets using secondary and tertiary recovery techniques; opportunities in new regions of Russia outside the heartlands of West Siberia and European Russia; the upside from hard-to-recover oil, including shale, tight oil, and heavy oil deposits; the potential for increased output from Russia’s offshore areas; and the development of the huge resources in the Russian Arctic. We also consider the possible changes in the tax regime that might encourage development in all these areas, before providing conclusions on the likely drivers of Russian oil production through the next decade and beyond. [post_title] => The Future of Russian Oil Production in the Short, Medium, and Long Term [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-future-of-russian-oil-production-in-the-short-medium-and-long-term [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-09-11 10:28:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-09-11 09:28:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31894 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31748 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-07-11 11:35:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-07-11 10:35:28 [post_content] => Gazprom has traditionally sold gas to its European customers under long-term, oil-indexed contracts. However, in recent years it has been forced to adapt to changing market rules in Europe and an increasingly competitive global gas market. As part of this adaptation, Gazprom launched its Electronic Sales Platform (ESP) on the 20th of September 2018. From this platform, Gazprom has been selling spot volumes to new and existing counterparties, for delivery to ten destinations in central and NW Europe. This Energy Insight examines the volumetric and pricing outcomes of the first 9 months of trading on the exchange and attempts to draw some initial conclusions about the Gazprom strategy linked to it. Monthly sales volumes now exceed 1 bcm - the equivalent of 8% of Gazprom’s monthly long-term contract sales in Europe, and so are clearly non-negligible. Furthermore, the weighted average price of transactions on the ESP has been below the average price of Gazprom’s LTC sales to Europe since February 2019 and has been between the average hub prices at TTF-Gaspool (floor) and Austria-Slovakia VTPs (ceiling) since April 2019. As a result, it is clear that the new trading platform could be set to play a significant role in Gazprom’s export strategy to Europe and is worthy of increased analytical attention for anyone interested in the development of the European gas market and the role of Russian gas within it. [post_title] => Gazprom’s Gas Sales via its Electronic Sales Platform (ESP) [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gazproms-gas-sales-via-its-electronic-sales-platform-esp [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-07-11 11:35:28 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-07-11 10:35:28 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31748 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44619 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-04-10 15:53:06 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-04-10 14:53:06 [post_content] => The Russian refining system still has a significant legacy from its Soviet past, when refineries were located in relatively remote regions to serve the military and industrial complex and output of fuel oil was encouraged to supply heavy industry. However, this focus on the lower end of the barrel left a significant need for upgrading as Russia entered the post-Soviet era and demand for lighter products increased. The government has tried to provide a series of incentives to encourage Russia’s major oil companies to invest in upgrading. Differentiated tax rates, adjust of export tariffs, re-alignment of upstream and downstream taxes and even a command by the then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that the industry must act to improve its performance have produced some results, particularly since 2015. Since then fuel oil output has declined rapidly, but with demand also falling Russia continues to produce a surplus. Plans for further additions of more complex refining units have been made, thanks to yet more tax incentives, but it would still appear that not all the players will respond as the government hopes. A number of small players may continue to focus on the simpler and less expensive processes, and companies that are the subject of international sanctions have also been given an effective dispensation to slow their upgrading efforts. Many independent refineries are likely to continue using the tactics of selling surrogate refined products without paying excise taxes, to remain afloat. Lower margins for those refineries that are part of Russian vertically integrated companies are likely to be cross-subsidized by profitable upstream operations. Also, the adjustment could take longer than expected due to the social risks of shutting down inefficient facilities.  As a result, it would seem that the planned decline in Russian fuel oil output will be at the slow end of the planned range. This is a concern because the global market for fuel oil is set to be further constrained by the introduction of tighter IMO rules on the use of high sulphur fuel oil in the maritime sector from 2020. As shipping companies are forced to use more environmentally friendly fuel and reduce emission, Russian refiners which produce excess fuel oil could find their margins significantly squeezed. [post_title] => Russia’s heavy fuel oil exports: challenges and changing rules abroad and at home [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russias-heavy-fuel-oil-exports-challenges-and-changing-rules-abroad-and-at-home [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-07 15:57:06 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-07 15:57:06 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44619 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31268 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-11-14 10:17:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-11-14 10:17:34 [post_content] => Russia’s pivot to Asia has taken a long time to mature in the gas sector, but 2019 is set to be an important year as the Kremlin seeks to diversify its sources of export revenues. The Power of Siberia pipeline is due to come onstream at the end of the year, and before then agreements on two further export routes may also have been signed. The history of energy negotiations between the two countries suggests that caution is needed, but it would appear that both political and economic reasons could catalyse action on the Power of Siberia 2 (Altai) and Far East pipeline export schemes. In addition, Russia-China cooperation over LNG projects in the Russian Arctic could also develop further, with commercial and geo-political consequences. This Energy Insight addresses the latest developments in this emerging story and considers the consequences for European consumers and the global LNG market. [post_title] => Russia's gas pivot to Asia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russias-gas-pivot-asia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-11-14 10:17:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-11-14 10:17:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31268 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30892 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-03-05 12:22:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-03-05 12:22:25 [post_content] => Gazprom has confounded many expectations by enjoying two record years of gas sales in Europe in 2016 and 2017. External factors have certainly played a role in its success, with overall European demand rebounding, indigenous production continuing to fall and alternative sources of imports failing to deliver at the expected levels (especially LNG). In addition, Gazprom has demonstrated  a level of flexibility in its pricing strategy that has kept its gas very competitive, with the result that its market share in Europe has grown to 35%. However, the anticipation that this figure could rise towards 40% and above has led EU politicians and policy-makers to become concerned about over-dependence on Russian gas, and many now wish to ensure that Gazprom’s future options are limited by obstructing potential new pipelines. In addition the politics surrounding Ukraine, the imposition of stricter US sanctions, questions surrounding  the DG COMP investigation into Gazprom’s activities and the Stockholm arbitration ruling over contracts with Ukraine add further layers of complexity. This paper therefore explores whether Gazprom’s two anni mirabiles in 2016 and 2017 can be repeated or whether Russian gas faces a more challenging environment in the rest of the decade. [post_title] => Gazprom in Europe – two “Anni Mirabiles”, but can it continue? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gazprom-europe-two-anni-mirabiles-can-continue [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-07 11:27:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-07 11:27:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30892 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30828 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-01-22 11:25:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-01-22 11:25:03 [post_content] =>

The sale and purchase of Russian gas in the post-Soviet era has been dominated by the need for Gazprom, the dominant player, to sell to consumers at a regulated price. Since 1998 other producers, known in Russian legal terminology as the independents, have been able to sell gas at market prices, but these prices have always been heavily influenced by the regulated price because of the dominance of Gazprom’s volumes. Initially independent producers sold gas at a premium to Gazprom, due to the fact that the regulated price was set at a low level to provide a boost to industry and a subsidy to residential consumers, with the result that their sales volumes were limited and only went to customers with a need for extra gas to cover surplus demand, even at premium prices. However, during the past two decades regulated prices have risen significantly (see figure 2 below), largely due to pressure from Gazprom which asserted its need for higher revenues to underpin investments in new fields. The consequence has been that by 2012 independent producers were able to compete with Gazprom on price and win customers who historically had wanted to only pay low, regulated prices. Indeed, since 2012 independents have won significant market share from Gazprom and now account for around half of all gas sold on the domestic Russian market. This increasing price competition has underlined that the regulated gas price has effectively reached an equilibrium, at least partially reflecting the balance of supply and demand in Russia. However, the search for a market mechanism to reflect this situation has continued, with almost all transactions to date being bilateral deals between buyer and seller, largely on the basis of long-term contracts. Various means to relate gas prices in Russia to market reality have been tried since 2000, with varying degrees of success, but in 2014 the launch of a gas exchange in St Petersburg by SPIMEX, the St Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange, has offered the latest, and most serious, opportunity for a true market price to be established. This can have important consequences in Russia, where the SPIMEX price could eventually provide a benchmark for the domestic wholesale gas price and could also provide a foundation for further liberalisation of the gas market. Given the location of the exchange at one end of the Nord Stream pipeline, it could also impact the trading of gas exports to Europe. This latter opportunity remains some way from realisation, but nevertheless the development of more active gas trading in St Petersburg is a growing reality and deserves the attention of the wider gas community given its potential to connect two major gas markets and the possibility that it could play a role in easing relations between Russia and its gas customers to the west.

[post_title] => The SPIMEX Gas Exchange: Russian Gas Trading Possibilities [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => spimex-gas-exchange-russian-gas-trading-possibilities [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-01-22 11:25:03 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-01-22 11:25:03 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30828 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 33502 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-09-06 12:43:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-09-06 11:43:53 [post_content] => The growth strategies of the two largest so-called independent Russian gas producers—Novatek and Rosneft—as well as developments in international markets and changing domestic energy needs have put pressure on the present Russian gas sector model, dominated by Gazprom. The three companies are involved in a struggle over export liberalization as well as the conditions in the domestic market. Liquefied natural gas is top priority for Novatek, and Rosneft’s main gas focus is on eastern Russia and Asia, but there is still room for considerable tension with Gazprom. The government wants to both improve Russia’s position in export markets and maintain stable domestic supplies, including to socially disadvantaged regions and institutions. Gazprom is insisting that if further access to export markets is granted to the independents, then they must take greater responsibility for domestic market obligations. On the other hand, the key independents seem intent on stopping or slowing down their expansion in the domestic market in order to prioritize export sales, and will certainly not take broader domestic supply responsibilities without better access to export markets. The balancing of policies involves strong players on the Russian economic and political scene, all with ties to the Kremlin. Henderson, J. and Moe, A. (2017). ‘Russia’s gas “triopoly”: implications of a changing gas sector structure’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 58(4), 442–468. [post_title] => Russia’s gas “triopoly”: implications of a changing gas sector structure [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russias-gas-triopoly-implications-of-a-changing-gas-sector-structure [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-12-18 10:14:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-12-18 10:14:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=33502 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 33504 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-06-06 12:51:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-06-06 11:51:36 [post_content] => Although officially Russian state-owned energy companies operate as independent entities, their actions often lead to suspicion that they are acting as a tool of Russian state foreign policy. Countries on the southeastern borders of Europe, Bulgaria and Greece, are prime examples of where this might be the case, since they not only have a central position in Russia’s plans to penetrate European markets through new transport infrastructure but are also part of competing plans for routing non-Russian gas to Western markets. The natural gas and oil sectors are the traditional foundation of Russian energy exports to Europe. The aim of this article is to provide an objective, evidence-based analysis of Russian activities in these sectors in Greece and Bulgaria in order to establish whether its actions have been implicitly or explicitly politicized and have served to strengthen Russian influence in the region. Jirušek, M., Vlček, T., and Henderson, J. (2017). ‘Russia’s energy relations in southeastern Europe: an analysis of motives in Bulgaria and Greece’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(5), 335–355. [post_title] => Russia’s energy relations in southeastern Europe: an analysis of motives in Bulgaria and Greece [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russias-energy-relations-in-southeastern-europe-an-analysis-of-motives-in-bulgaria-and-greece [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-12-18 10:16:10 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-12-18 10:16:10 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=33504 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 33501 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-06-06 12:41:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-06-06 11:41:42 [post_content] => The Kremlin has turned its foreign policy strategy back to an old Soviet source of geopolitical influence—the Middle East. The United States’ decision to abandon its role as regional underwriter in chief over the course of Barack Obama’s second presidential term, as evidenced by a series of U-turns on Syria and the decision to indirectly support a regional rebalancing of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran following the lifting of nuclear sanctions in 2016, has allowed the Kremlin to claim a stake in the Middle East’s conflict hot spots, as well as to insert its energy sector at the heart of the region’s oil and gas markets. Henderson, J. and Mehdi, A. (2017, June). ‘Russia’s Middle East Energy diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs. [post_title] => Russia’s Middle East Energy diplomacy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russias-middle-east-energy-diplomacy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-12-06 12:43:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-12-06 12:43:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=33501 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30205 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-03-22 10:58:29 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-03-22 10:58:29 [post_content] => 2017 will be a momentous year for Russia’s LNG business, as the Yamal LNG project is due to come online by the end of the year. This will not only be the first Russian-operated LNG development, but will also mark a major shift in the Russian gas sector, as Novatek, rather than Gazprom, has been the instigator and the driving force behind the project. This may well be the start of a trend which could see Novatek become the country’s major LNG player, while Gazprom is also being challenged by Rosneft in both the LNG and pipeline export sectors. This paper discusses the future prospects for Russian LNG and asks whether the events of 2017 will mark a turning point in the development of the Russian gas sector. [post_title] => Russian LNG: Progress and delay in 2017 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russian-lng-progress-delay-2017 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-03-22 10:58:29 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-03-22 10:58:29 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30205 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30127 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-02-21 12:11:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-02-21 12:11:41 [post_content] => This paper, carried out as a joint piece of research by OIES and ERI RAS (the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences) assesses the prospects for Russian oil production to 2020 and beyond, and suggests that the history of steady growth seen over the past decade is set to continue. Brownfield decline is being actively managed, a portfolio of greenfields has and is being developed which can more than compensate for the decline in mature assets and in the longer-term regions such as the offshore, East Siberia and tight oil offer significant upside. The recent agreement to cut overall production in H1 2016 will create a short-term brake on growth, but the average for 2017 should still be almost 2% higher than for 2016. Meanwhile, sanctions are continuing to affect the use of technology for some of Russia’s harder to develop reserves. Nevertheless, our analysis on both a corporate and regional level suggests that, barring another collapse in the oil price or a further tightening of sanctions, the outlook for Russian oil production over the next few years remains positive. Podcast with James Henderson [post_title] => Russian Oil Production Outlook to 2020 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russian-oil-production-outlook-to-2020 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-04-26 14:25:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-04-26 13:25:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30127 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29938 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2016-12-07 11:48:40 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-12-07 11:48:40 [post_content] => Although relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia have improved since the debacle in Doha in April 2016, it is clear that both sides will be watching each other carefully over the next few months. The fact that both have made their own implementation of a production cut dependent on the performance of the other suggests that trust has not been fully restored. Indeed, both sides have reason to be cautious. OPEC’s record of compliance with quotas is weak, and Russia also has a poor record of fulfilling any promises to cooperate with OPEC. Having said this, some form of Russian output restraint is conceivable. It may be the case that Russia is expecting a flattening of output in the first half of 2017 in any case, having pushed very hard to maximise output by the end of 2016. It is even possible that, despite the difficulty of sharing a production cut among the various Russian oil companies, drilling could be slowed and older fields could be allowed to decline slightly more rapidly for a period of time, even as new field developments continue to progress. This could produce a result approximating to a production cut in some form. Furthermore, given Rosneft’s financial constraints after a recent spending spree, it may also be the case that the owner of more than 40% of Russia’s oil production may be keen to ease its upstream spending in the short-term. However, the speed of any decline must be uncertain, and furthermore it must be likely that debates over “technical issues”, the meaning of the phrase “gradual decline”, the need for a “government order” and the allocation of “proportional cuts” will drag the process out well into the first quarter of 2017, and perhaps even to the second quarter. Nevertheless, even if a Russian output cut or freeze only results in production of 11 mb/d for the first half of 2017, this could still provide a result that is below market expectations for the year as a whole and thus could be supportive of the oil price. Indeed, this outcome may be exactly what Russia is aiming for. Enough to suggest that oil market rebalancing is a realistic hope in 2017, but not so much as to undermine the progress of the Russian oil sector in establishing levels of average annual production at a post-Soviet high. [post_title] => Room for cynicism and hope in Russia's deal with OPEC [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => room-cynicism-hope-russias-deal-opec [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-12-08 14:00:52 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-12-08 14:00:52 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=29938 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 33602 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2016-08-09 15:35:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-08-09 14:35:44 [post_content] => Russian exports of gas to Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union provide the Kremlin with a useful political lever, and amid the current crisis in Ukraine, many in the European Union (EU) would describe this lever as a potential weapon. However, this article argues that any threat is based on commercial and contractual issues, which consuming countries can respond to in kind by diversifying their sources of supply and increasing competition in their markets. As the gas market is becoming increasingly global in nature, so dependence on Russian gas can and is being reduced, undermining the potency of any theoretical weapon. Evidence suggests that EU strategy is already working, and Gazprom is being forced to compete in markets where it previously dominated. Henderson, J. (2016). ‘Does Russia have a potent gas weapon?’, in van de Graaf, T. et al. (eds.), Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy, Palgrave Macmillan. [post_title] => Does Russia have a potent gas weapon? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => does-russia-have-a-potent-gas-weapon [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-12-09 15:37:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-12-09 15:37:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=33602 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29415 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2016-08-05 11:42:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-08-05 10:42:39 [post_content] => This paper addresses the expanding energy cooperation between Russia and China in the context of the political and commercial relationship between the two countries. It assesses progress during the post-Soviet era, but focuses especially on the past two years since sanctions were imposed on Russia by the US and the EU. It attempts to analyse the balance of bargaining power between the two countries via a detailed analysis of the various oil, gas, coal and power sector deals that have taken place, and assesses whether Russia's pivot to Asia is moving as smoothly as had been hoped by the Kremlin when the first major gas export deal with China was signed in May 2014. The paper continues the series of analyses of Russia's hydrocarbon export strategy that has been published over the past two years, and also deepens the OIES output on China and its energy import strategy. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to an understanding of the balance of Russia's political and commercial ambitions, which is of vital relevance to any analysis of the country's future relations with the global energy economy. Executive Summary [post_title] => Energy Relations between Russia and China: Playing Chess with the Dragon [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => energy-relations-russia-china-playing-chess-dragon [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-16 13:46:56 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-16 13:46:56 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=29415 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 33600 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2016-06-09 15:31:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-06-09 14:31:36 [post_content] => Gazprom enjoys a dominant and privileged position in the Russian energy sector, and indeed in the economy as a whole. This article analyses the company’s failure to achieve the Russian state’s objectives for the country to become a force in the global LNG (liquefied natural gas) market. Has it weakened the company’s standing relative to other industry players and the authorities, with the possibility that they could unleash broader reforms in the Russian gas sector? Short-term political and economic considerations may slow progress towards a radical outcome, with Gazprom’s importance as a domestic and foreign policy tool providing some protection at a time of uncertainty for the Kremlin; but in the longer term, the liberalization of LNG exports in December 2013 may well come to be seen as the first step in a much broader reorganization of the Russian gas sector. Henderson, J. and Moe, A. (2016). ‘Gazprom’s LNG offensive: a demonstration of monopoly strength or impetus for Russian gas sector reform?’, Post-Communist Economies, 28(3), 281–299. [post_title] => Gazprom’s LNG offensive: a demonstration of monopoly strength or impetus for Russian gas sector reform? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gazproms-lng-offensive-a-demonstration-of-monopoly-strength-or-impetus-for-russian-gas-sector-reform [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-12-09 15:33:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-12-09 15:33:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=33600 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29087 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2016-02-24 09:11:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-02-24 09:11:50 [post_content] => The accord reached by Saudi Arabia and Russia, along with Qatar and Venezuela, in Doha on February 16th has been widely seen as effectively an agreement to do nothing. The four countries have accepted a freeze in production based on January 2016 levels, but for most of them (with the exception of Saudi Arabia) this effectively means the ability to maintain oil output at or near full capacity. The impact on the oil market balance will be minimal, especially in the short term. Furthermore, significant caveats were included in the Doha agreement, in particular that it would only take effect if other OPEC and non-OPEC countries agree to co-operate. Saudi oil minister Al-Naimi also added that his country would ‘continue to satisfy customer demand’ for oil. Indeed, the reaction of the oil market, which saw prices rise by more than 10% in anticipation of the meeting but then fall back by over half that amount after its conclusion, underlined the ostensibly disappointing outcome. However, despite the minimal impact of the deal on market balances, the reaching of an accord between the largest OPEC and non-OPEC producers does suggest some interesting conclusions for the oil market over the next few months, as subtle shifts in negotiating tactics have started to emerge. [post_title] => Saudi-Russia Production Accord - The Freeze Before the Thaw? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => saudi-russia-production-accord-the-freeze-before-the-thaw [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 16:23:03 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 16:23:03 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=29087 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29078 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2016-02-08 14:09:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-02-08 14:09:12 [post_content] => On Wednesday January 27th Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak met with a group of Russian oil companies to discuss the domestic and global energy markets, following which he announced that Russia would be prepared to discuss an output cut of 3-5% at a meeting with OPEC in February. On the face of it this would seem to imply that Russia might reduce production by 300,000-500,000 b/d, and indeed the immediate reaction of the oil market suggested that some credibility had been given to the statement as the oil price surged by 8% in the immediate aftermath of the comments. However, subsequent comments by other Russian and OPEC observers, combined with the history of Russia’s relationship with OPEC, which has achieved little of substance, suggests that an agreement is a long way from being concluded and has limited chances of success. A more interesting conclusion is that Russia, perhaps not surprisingly, has revealed its growing economic and corporate desperation to see oil prices rise. [post_title] => Russia and OPEC - Uneasy Partners [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russia-and-opec-uneasy-partners [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 16:22:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 16:22:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/?post_type=publications&p=29078 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29075 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2016-01-20 14:03:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-01-20 14:03:25 [post_content] => Gazprom's pivot to Asia has stalled and it must now continue to focus on Europe as its key export market. However, stagnant demand and increasing availability of LNG supply are set to put the company's market share under pressure from 2016. To date Gazprom has responded to competitive threats by making reactive adjustments to its pricing methodology and contract structures, but if it is to defend its export volumes in future it may have to take a more proactive stance. This Comment discusses the competitive position of Russian gas in a new lower price environment and examines whether a more actively competitive strategy can benefit both Gazprom and the Russian government in the short and long term. From a number of commercial and political perspectives the logical commercial answer could be yes, but only if Gazprom adopts a new contract model and also commits to trading on European hubs at spot prices in a more wholehearted fashion. Evidence for gradual moves in this direction are emerging and could accelerate in 2016, and although we do not expect Gazprom to actively catalyse a price war we do believe that market forces could lead to this outcome as a logical conclusion for a low-cost producer with significant supply flexibility. [post_title] => Gazprom - Is 2016 the Year for a Change of Pricing Strategy in Europe? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gazprom-is-2016-the-year-for-a-change-of-pricing-strategy-in-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 16:22:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 16:22:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/?post_type=publications&p=29075 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27322 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2015-09-14 10:30:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2015-09-14 09:30:18 [post_content] => Gas exports have historically provided a foundation of economic and political strength for Russia and a source of significant revenues for its leading gas company, Gazprom. However, lower commodity prices, the imposition of sanctions on Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis, lower gas demand in Europe, the EU’s desire to diversify away from Russian gas and increasing competition from new global LNG supply are presenting multiple challenges. A search for new markets in Asia, and especially China, has begun, but is currently not progressing as fast as Russia would have hoped, while domestically Gazprom’s position is being challenged by third parties who are keen to break the company’s export monopoly. This paper, jointly authored by James Henderson and Tatiana Mitrova, examines the emerging trends in Russia’s export strategy, identifying the key political drivers as well as the commercial factors that are influencing policy making. It analyses the catalysts behind Russia’s “pivot to Asia” in the gas sector, assesses the likelihood of this strategy being a success and argues that Europe will remain of vital importance as a major market for Russian gas for the foreseeable future. In light of this, the paper also examines Gazprom’s evolving gas marketing strategy and asks whether the company is adapting to the changes in European regulation and legislation in a positive manner. It considers the competitive position of Russian gas in Europe and Asia, delivered both by pipeline and by potential new LNG projects, and argues that Russian gas can have a pivotal role in both markets as its cost of supply is relatively low. Indeed, although it would currently appear that Gazprom’s strategy is being somewhat improvised in reaction to political and commercial events, the authors’ conclude that the company is gradually edging towards a more market-based outlook that could ultimately allow it to prosper even in a more competitive global gas market. It will need to continue this trend if it is to fend off competition from expanding global LNG supply but also from domestic competitors such as Novatek and Rosneft, who are keen to provide their own solutions to the challenges facing Russia’s gas export business. Executive Summary [post_title] => The Political and Commercial Dynamics of Russia's Gas Export Strategy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-political-and-commercial-dynamics-of-russias-gas-export-strategy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 10:55:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 10:55:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-political-and-commercial-dynamics-of-russias-gas-export-strategy/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27354 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2015-04-20 11:20:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2015-04-20 10:20:58 [post_content] => This paper analyses the fundamental drivers of Russian oil production in the current low oil price environment, highlighting a number of dichotomies currently at work. The low oil price has forced Russian oil companies to cut dollar expenditure and to re-assess their investment strategies, apparently putting oil production and exports at risk. However, the impact of rouble devaluation and changes in the fiscal regime can help to offset these negative factors. US and EU sanctions have restricted access to technology and finance, but import substitution and a search for alternative sources of funding can start to redress these problems. New field developments are being delayed, but a number of projects are already underway that can help to keep production flat in 2015. Arctic and tight oil projects have been undermined by sanctions but this has caused the Russian industry to re-focus on arguably more economic assets in core regions. Finally, even if production does remain flat or even decline slightly, exports may continue to grow as domestic refineries reduce throughput due to recent tax changes that disadvantage production of fuel oil. Executive Summary [post_title] => Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => key-determinants-for-the-future-of-russian-oil-production-and-exports [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 10:37:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 10:37:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/key-determinants-for-the-future-of-russian-oil-production-and-exports/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27384 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-12-05 10:04:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-12-05 10:04:45 [post_content] => During President Putin’s visit to Beijing in November 2014 Gazprom and CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding concerning the export of gas to China via the so-called “western route” via the Russian republic of Altai. The announcement was hailed by Russia as another example of its shift towards Asia as a diversification of its traditional gas export business in the West. This has important implications not only for Russia and China, but also for all the other potential suppliers of gas, and especially LNG, into North-East Asia. Confirmation that China could import up to 68bcma of Russian gas starting from 2019 would create a significant dent in the country’s potential LNG import requirement from 2020, increasing the competition between the planned sources of supply that are being constructed and planned over the next 5-10 years. Despite remaining doubts as to whether both Russia – China pipeline deals proceed to completion, it would appear that LNG suppliers are right to be concerned, as there is real commercial as well as political logic for significant Russian gas to flow south into the world’s fastest growing gas market. From a Chinese perspective, growing gas demand, uncertainty over some of its existing sources of supply, a desire to create more competition with Central Asian gas and the one-off nature of the opportunity to negotiate with Russia from a position of exceptional bargaining strength mean that an Altai deal is also likely to make sense. There may be some concern over the need for more Russian gas, with the possibility that total supply of 68bcma (the combined capacity of the Power of Siberia and Altai pipelines) could account for as much as one third of total Chinese imports by 2030. However, any potential security of supply threat is offset by the fact that the Russian contribution to overall Chinese gas consumption would be much lower, at around 13%, while the share of gas in the China’s total energy balance is estimated to remain below 10% at that date. Overall, then, the potential for a deal on exports via the Altai pipeline appears to have significant commercial and political logic. If a deal is signed, substantial problems will still remain, not the least of which will be Gazprom’s ability to raise the money needed to build the pipeline given its current inability to access western capital markets. Nevertheless, the impact of the signing of an Altai deal alone could have a significant impact on the ambitions of companies planning LNG projects that are also targeting the Chinese market, and as such the continuing discussions will require attentive observation over the next 12 months. [post_title] => The Commercial and Political Logic for the Altai Pipeline [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-commercial-and-political-logic-for-the-altai-pipeline [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 16:04:03 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 16:04:03 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-commercial-and-political-logic-for-the-altai-pipeline/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27387 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-11-04 13:22:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-11-04 13:22:27 [post_content] => The role of the Arctic region in global petroleum supply over the next decades is becoming a subject of increasing interest as the potential of the region’s geology is revealed and the shrinking of the ice cap makes drilling an increasingly feasible activity. Nevertheless, significant concerns remain, not least the potential impact of any hydrocarbon E&P activity in an environmentally sensitive region. In addition, the lack of existing infrastructure and the likely high cost of any development in geographically remote and climatically harsh conditions mean that the economics of any new project will depend to a large extent on the size of discoveries and the oil price, which, in turn, will be impacted by the development of other sources of oil supply (for example, US unconventional oil) and alternative energies. As a result, although increased activity in a number of Arctic countries suggests that the region could become a major source of future oil supply, there are a number of challenges – including the impact of sanctions resulting from the Ukraine crisis – to be met before this potential can be realized. The objective of this paper is to provide an updated overview of offshore oil and gas developments in the Arctic and to discuss the potential for large-scale development of the region as a petroleum province over the next 20-30 years, thereby providing a starting point for future production estimates and for analyzing how relevant such estimates may be for global oil (and gas) markets. The paper argues that the most likely Arctic offshore areas to be developed first are the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea but that various factors – political, commercial, technological and environmental – have the potential to hamper petroleum development, particularly if the conflict between Russia and the international community continues to escalate, as partnership will be critical if the Arctic resources of the country with the largest geography in the region are to be developed successfully. Executive Summary [post_title] => The Prospects and Challenges for Arctic Oil Development [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-prospects-and-challenges-for-arctic-oil-development [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 11:00:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 11:00:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-prospects-and-challenges-for-arctic-oil-development/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [40] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27389 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-10-27 10:57:52 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-10-27 10:57:52 [post_content] => There is limited scope for significantly reducing overall European dependence on Russian gas before the mid-2020s. Countries in the Baltic region and south eastern Europe which are highly dependent on Russian gas, and hence extremely vulnerable to interruptions, could substantially reduce and even eliminate imports of Russian gas by the early 2020s, by a combination of LNG and pipeline gas from Azerbaijan. Similar measures could reduce (but not eliminate) the dependence of central Europe and Turkey on Russian gas. However, Russian gas will be highly competitive with all other pipeline gas and LNG (including US LNG) supplies to Europe, and Gazprom’s market power to impact European hub prices may be considerable. Countries with strong geopolitical fears related to Russian gas dependence will need to either terminate, or not renew on expiry, their long term contracts with Gazprom. [post_title] => Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas - distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => reducing-european-dependence-on-russian-gas-distinguishing-natural-gas-security-from-geopolitics [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 11:01:21 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 11:01:21 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/reducing-european-dependence-on-russian-gas-distinguishing-natural-gas-security-from-geopolitics/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [41] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27403 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-09-01 13:50:04 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-09-01 12:50:04 [post_content] => Executive Summary The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Natural Gas Research Programme has recently published a paper entitled ‘The Future of Australian LNG Exports: Will domestic challenges limit the development of future LNG export capacity?’ With seven the new LNG projects under construction and due for completion in the 2014 – 2018 timeframe amounting in addition to existing facilities, Australia is expected to overtake Qatar as the world’s largest supplier of LNG by the end of the 2010s.  With its plentiful gas reserves, prior track record of LNG project execution and operation and relative proximity to the fast growing Asian LNG markets the degree of comparative advantage would seem to guarantee a benign investment environment. However, several factors, among them competition for skilled labour within Australia, the strength of the Australian dollar and the specific logistical and environmental sensitivities of the project locations have resulted in significant cost escalations and in some cases delays to the original project schedules.  This paper also serves to convey an understanding of the much overlooked Australian gas market and, significantly the impact that the new LNG projects are already having on internal supply/demand – price dynamics and the political challenges raised. Much energy media attention has focused on the problems faced by the current group of new Australian LNG projects. This paper comprehensively addresses the root causes but more importantly conveys the scale of the new wave of Australian LNG supply and integrates this with its impact on the domestic market which until now has been largely isolated from global energy dynamics.  The OIES Natural Gas Research Programme is committed to producing timely and insightful research on both supply and demand side developments and this paper achieves both these objectives. [post_title] => The Future of Australian LNG Exports - Will domestic challenges limit the development of future LNG export capacity? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-future-of-australian-lng-exports-will-domestic-challenges-limit-the-development-of-future-lng-export-capacity [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 11:08:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 11:08:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-future-of-australian-lng-exports-will-domestic-challenges-limit-the-development-of-future-lng-export-capacity/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [42] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27427 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-03-10 12:29:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-03-10 12:29:50 [post_content] => The change of government in Kyiv, the Russian military action in Crimea, the diplomatic reaction by the western powers, and the perceived danger of war, clearly have implications for all economic relations between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, especially in the energy sphere. Russia supplies about 30% of Europe’s natural gas, and more than half of these volumes are still transported via Ukraine. In Ukraine, gas supply issues are combined with the economic upheavals aggravated by political crisis. As of March 10th 2014, the most likely source of supply disruptions is the serious indebtedness of Naftogaz Ukrainy, which, despite clearing some of its $3.3 billion debt to Gazprom in late February, as of 7 March was in arrears to Gazprom by a sum of just under $2 billion.  In previous Russo-Ukrainian gas disputes, such a build-up of debt has led to Gazprom cutting off deliveries to Ukrainian customers and the subsequent diversion of transit gas bound for Europe to consumption in Ukraine. This led in January 2009 to all westward deliveries of Russian gas, both to EU and Ukrainian destinations, being suspended for two weeks. If gas deliveries through Ukraine are halted the impact would be less serious than in 2009, because (i) the Nord Stream pipeline, which transports Russian gas to Germany without crossing Ukraine or Belarus, has been completed, and other interconnections have improved the situation in eastern Europe; and (ii) the economic situation, and the arrival of milder weather means that demand is relatively low. From Europe’s standpoint, commercial logic would suggest that support would be given to diversifying gas transit away from Ukraine, including regulatory support for the South Stream pipeline, which, if completed with four strings, should enable the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to be suspended completely by 2020. However, it is possible that a political move to minimise cooperation with Russia on energy issues in line with European governments’ views of the Russian action in Crimea – may prevail. In this case, the EU-Russian disputes over gas imports and regulation will worsen, with potentially negative consequences for South Stream. Moreover, European efforts to diversify away from Russian gas, the success of which has been limited in the past because of the economic costs, will be revived. [post_title] => What the Ukrainian crisis means for gas markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => what-the-ukrainian-crisis-means-for-gas-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 16:33:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 16:33:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/what-the-ukrainian-crisis-means-for-gas-markets/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [43] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27434 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-02-14 16:09:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-02-14 16:09:00 [post_content] => Russia possesses the potential to produce significant gas from its Eastern Regions, with total proved reserves in East Siberia and the Far East of Russia standing at 5 trillion cubic metres (Tcm) while prospective resources could be as large as 65Tcm. This would appear to give Russia a huge opportunity for export sales into the Asia Pacific region, which contains the world’s largest LNG importing nations and two of the world’s fastest growing gas markets in China and India (also importers of LNG). It is surprising, therefore, that despite the obvious commercial logic of linking enormous gas resources to expanding consumption centres, to date Russia’s only significant exports in the region are from the Sakhalin 2 project, which currently sells 10.8mt (14.6 Bcm) of LNG per annum into the neighbouring Asian markets. However, it is possible this situation could change significantly over the next five to ten years as Russia attempts to re-focus its Asian efforts with plans for potential sales of piped gas and LNG. A number of key uncertainties remain, though: will Russia finally sign a gas export contract with China; will Gazprom as a result remain the dominant player, or will its domestic competitors Rosneft and Novatek take on a more prominent role? If the latter is the case, will Russia’s eastern strategy be driven by LNG alone, implying much lower volumes of exports into Asia; and finally, is it possible that Russia may miss this opportunity altogether, either as a result of political delay or failure to price gas competitively from these new projects? This Energy Comment from James Henderson and Jonathan Stern discuss these issues and assesses the potential consequences for the Asian gas market that new Russian gas supplies could have, as and when they ultimately are exported from the country’s Eastern Regions. [post_title] => The Potential Impact on Asia Gas Markets of Russia's Eastern Gas Strategy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-potential-impact-on-asia-gas-markets-of-russias-eastern-gas-strategy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 15:48:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 15:48:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-potential-impact-on-asia-gas-markets-of-russias-eastern-gas-strategy/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [44] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27463 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2013-10-08 12:14:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2013-10-08 11:14:08 [post_content] => Oil production from Russia's core regions is in decline and the government is keen to encourage the development of fields in new areas in order to keep the country's output above 10mmbpd. A series of joint ventures between state oil company Rosneft and various IOCs offshore in the Arctic has caused much excitement in this regard, but the potential of Russia's unconventional oil resources might provide a shorter term reason to be optimistic. Russia has the largest estimated shale oil resources in the world, with a particular focus on the Bazhenov layer, and this report analyses the oil company work that has been done to date to assess the real potential of this resource and also assesses the potential impact of tax changes that have been introduced to encourage investment activity. It concludes that although the resource base would appear to be enormous, a number of below and above ground issues remain which mean that government targets of 1mmbpd of production win a decade are unlikely to be met. Not the least of the challenges to be faced include the need to increase the horizontal drilling capacity of the service industry in Russia as well as the likely need for further tax incentives once a clearer picture of the real economics of unconventional development in Russia has been formed. Nevertheless Russia's unconventional oil plays can make a significant contribution to the country's longer term production outlook in tandem with other developments in the Arctic and East Siberia. [post_title] => Tight Oil Developments in Russia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => tight-oil-developments-in-russia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 14:27:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 14:27:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/tight-oil-developments-in-russia/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [45] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27499 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2013-01-17 15:27:59 [post_date_gmt] => 2013-01-17 15:27:59 [post_content] => This paper by James Henderson is published in conjunction with an Energy Comment by Simon Pirani. The paper and comment evaluate the development of competition in the Russian gas production sector and the impact of the recession and pricing policies on demand for Russian gas in its main markets. While Gazprom has generally been focused on developing giant, but remote, fields such as Bovanenkovskoye on the Yamal peninsula and Shtokman (postponed during 2012), it has seen the market for these relatively high cost base supplies at best static in Europe and shrinking within Russia as others gain market share.  The rising tide of Russian domestic gas prices has ‘lifted all boats’. Certainly Gazprom has benefitted, but this has provided strong incentives for its domestic upstream competitors who have demonstrated robust production growth over the past few years. James develops this thesis with a wealth of analysis and insight based on his long experience of the sector. Simon Pirani’s Comment provides an update of the analysis in his paper ‘Elusive Potential: Gas Consumption in the CIS and the Quest for Efficiency’, OIES 2011.  The three main markets for Russian gas; namely the domestic market, CIS and European markets have seen consumption levels significantly impacted by a range of factors in the last four years.  These include the impact of the financial crisis and subsequent recession, the growth of renewables (and coal) in Europe, the increasing competition between suppliers of gas as well as the consequences of abrupt changes in gas price levels in specific market geographies. Given the scale of the markets involved (in aggregate some 650 bcma) and the conclusion that such changes have momentum yet to be spent before some form of equilibrium is attained, these studies have resonance beyond the CIS – Europe arena. [post_title] => Competition for Customers in the Evolving Russian Gas Market [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => competition-for-customers-in-the-evolving-russian-gas-market [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 14:54:27 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 14:54:27 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/competition-for-customers-in-the-evolving-russian-gas-market/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [46] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28120 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2012-10-16 15:21:09 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-10-16 14:21:09 [post_content] => This paper by James Henderson assesses the status and possible future impact of the growing list of potential LNG export projects in the US and Canada.It focuses on future North American LNG exports which, while subject to political and production performance uncertainty, have the potential to create considerable impact in the likely destination markets of Asia, and also (through displacement of Middle East or African sourced LNG) Europe.  Whilst it is unlikely that all the identified US and Canadian LNG export projects will proceed, there is the potential that sufficient investment will be forthcoming to allow arbitrage to proceed to its ‘equilibrium’, given favourable policy decisions. [post_title] => The Potential Impact of North American LNG Exports [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-potential-impact-of-north-american-lng-exports [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-12-04 12:28:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-12-04 12:28:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-potential-impact-of-north-american-lng-exports-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [47] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27521 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2012-07-12 10:13:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-07-12 09:13:48 [post_content] => While higher fuel specifications and regulatory changes in the bunkers market are most likely to have a big impact on long-term fuel oil demand, a structural shift of a similar magnitude on the supply side is already taking place, particularly in Russia, the largest exporter of fuel oil. The Russian government’s firmly stated commitment to the regeneration of its country’s refining industry and its determination to ensure that domestic demand for higher quality products is met would suggest that, although the exact timing of a reduction in fuel oil production may be unclear, a sharp decline in fuel oil exports by 2016 seems inevitable. We show that in the past, price relationships between high sulphur and low sulphur fuel oil and between heavy fuel oil and crude oil and diesel have been subject to structural breaks, but price movement did not increase or decrease without bounds as the refining industry continued to adjust to increasing demand for petroleum products and changing global demand patterns towards cleaner products. Looking ahead, as investment in refining capacity expands and as upgrading of refining units accelerates in Russia and elsewhere, price spreads are likely to exhibit similar behaviour to that in the past few years. This does not imply that structural breaks in the price relationships will not occur. For instance, governments’ desire to implement more stringent requirements without ensuring that the refining infrastructure is ready for such a shift or delays in refining projects will most likely destabilise the behaviour of price differentials, though the timing and the nature of such potential breaks (abrupt of gradual) remain highly uncertain. [post_title] => The Impact of Russia's Refinery Upgrade Plans on Global Fuel Oil Markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-impact-of-russias-refinery-upgrade-plans-on-global-fuel-oil-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-21 10:56:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-21 10:56:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-impact-of-russias-refinery-upgrade-plans-on-global-fuel-oil-markets/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [48] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27530 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2012-05-18 12:27:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-05-18 11:27:51 [post_content] => The increasing maturity of Russia’s onshore fields, especially those in West Siberia, and the potential for the country’s production to go into sharp decline over the next decade has prompted the Russian government to promote offshore development as a potential solution. President Putin has encouraged his state oil company to seek international partnership to bring in the requisite technical and management expertise as well as much needed capital to fund what will be very expensive projects. The immediate consequence of this activity has been the formation of three joint venture partnerships between Rosneft and Exxon, ENI and Statoil respectively, with the IOCs finally seizing the chance to exploit their competitive advantages in a region with huge resource potential. However, despite the undoubted benefits which these new partnerships can bring for all parties in terms of technical knowledge exchange, reciprocal asset deals, diversification of risk and potential upside from exploration success, it would appear doubtful whether the results of their activity can be anything other than a long-term solution to Russia’s production issues. Therefore, the Russian government may need to increase the incentives for both domestic and international companies to exploit the country’s more accessible onshore resources if the country’s current levels of oil production are to be maintained in the short to medium term. [post_title] => Joint Ventures in the Russian Offshore – Positive News but only for the Long Term [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => joint-ventures-in-the-russian-offshore-positive-news-but-only-for-the-long-term [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 15:26:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 15:26:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/joint-ventures-in-the-russian-offshore-positive-news-but-only-for-the-long-term/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [49] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28173 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2012-04-16 10:23:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-04-16 09:23:38 [post_content] => In February 2012, during a period of extremely cold weather across Russia and large parts of Europe, Gazprom failed to supply all the gas that was requested from it by its non-CIS customers in countries ranging from Poland in the north to Italy and Greece in the south of Europe. This situation led to concerns over a gas shortage and caused gas prices to spike at all the major hubs on the continent and in the UK. This Comment argues that the supposed supply “crisis” was not caused by any production shortfall in Russia but by a combination of inadequate storage available to Gazprom, excess gas withdrawal by Ukraine and in particular by political considerations in Russia ahead of the Presidential election in early March. However, it does highlight the current constraints to the Russian gas supply machine under certain severe temperature conditions. The paper also argues that, in contradiction to the claims of Alexander Medvedev (the Head of GazpromExport) that “spot markets failed to compensate for the increased demand”, in fact the markets had a logical price reaction to daily supply/demand changes. Although this reaction resulted in sharply higher prices in the short term, this provided a potent commercial signal which in turn led to spot supplies and/or demand management and then, as the situation resolved itself, produced lower prices so that the monthly average was still below the oil-indexed average price. While it is certainly true that the mature hubs at NBP and TTF reacted in a more responsive manner than some of the Continent’s less liquid hubs, it was nevertheless the case that, overall, customers were supplied at a market price and traders were able to arbitrage a short-term supply and demand imbalance. [post_title] => Lessons from the February 2012 European gas “crisis” [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => lessons-from-the-february-2012-european-gas-crisis-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-03-01 14:57:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-03-01 14:57:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/lessons-from-the-february-2012-european-gas-crisis-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [50] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27542 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2012-03-26 16:20:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-03-26 15:20:36 [post_content] => Recent forecasts for gas supply in Russia produced by Novatek and Gazprom highlight the large amount of gas available to meet demand in the next 10 years and also point to contrasting views about which companies’ production may be preferred in a potentially oversupplied market place. In light of this potential oversupply situation, it is becoming clear that a number of Non-Gazprom producers (NGPs), including Novatek and some Russian oil companies, are taking the view that the Russian gas market will soon become much more competitive and that access to end consumers will become essential for any company wishing to maximise its gas sales. Rosneft’s announcement in February 2012 that it is to form a joint venture with Itera provides a prime example of this trend. However, this suggests the possibility that Gazprom, which is becoming more reliant on production from remote and relatively high cost fields, may soon find itself at a competitive disadvantage and facing the possibility that it may fail to meet its own production targets by some distance. As a state-owned company, it may hope to rely on political support to achieve its objectives and maintain its dominant position in the Russian gas market, but the Russian Administration then faces a potentially awkward consequence of a higher domestic gas price than might otherwise be necessary, as the lower cost gas owned by Non-Gazprom Producers is crowded out to leave room for Gazprom’s gas. This comment examines this impending dilemma for the Russian government and suggests that one conclusion is that what is good for Gazprom may no longer be good for Russia. [post_title] => Is a Russian Domestic Gas Bubble Emerging? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => is-a-russian-domestic-gas-bubble-emerging [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 15:25:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 15:25:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/is-a-russian-domestic-gas-bubble-emerging/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [51] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28196 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2012-01-19 10:24:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-01-19 10:24:54 [post_content] => Since the election of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia in 2000 Rosneft has become one of the cornerstones of the strategy for the Russian state to retake control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, and in particular the energy sector.  However, having now established itself as a global-scale oil company, Rosneft faces a number of significant challenges. In common with many NOCs, its global significance is based entirely on its domestic asset base, and despite the size of Russia’s resources Rosneft does face the problem that its existing assets in the core areas of West Siberia and European Russia are going into gradual decline. This decline can be offset by the development of new areas such as East Siberia, the Arctic, and offshore fields, but these regions are remote and their exploitation will require advanced and expensive new technology. In parallel with this issue Rosneft is also facing pressure from its majority owner, the Russian government, to act as a catalyst for establishing a greater role for Russia in the global economy, using its energy resources as an important tool. The company is therefore looking to increase the diversity of its asset base by investing overseas at a time when the competition for global oil reserves is high and when Rosneft itself has limited experience of dealing in the international asset market. This paper explores how Rosneft may be attempting to meet these twin challenges, using the example of two peer NOCs that have experienced similar problems. Petrobras and Statoil are partially privatized, upstream focused NOCs who have established international businesses both as a way of supplementing and diversifying their domestic resource bases and also as a means of acquiring and exploiting technological and operating experience that could be applied across their asset portfolios. Both companies also have a much longer history as corporate entities than Rosneft, and gained listings on an international stock exchange (in New York) in 2000-2001, five to six years before Rosneft’s own privatization. As a result, they can provide a clear analogy for the strategy and tactics that Rosneft may use in the development of its own business model, and indeed it appears that in 2011 Russia’s NOC is already taking a similar path to its ‘Partial NOC’ peers. [post_title] => Rosneft - On the Road to Global NOC Status? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => rosneft-on-the-road-to-global-noc-status-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-12-04 12:29:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-12-04 12:29:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/rosneft-on-the-road-to-global-noc-status-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [52] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28205 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2011-11-04 14:41:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-11-04 14:41:47 [post_content] => This paper, by James Henderson, concludes that Russian domestic gas prices are not likely to reach European netback levels any time soon, but that the momentum of the past five years towards significantly higher domestic prices will continue, leading to an eventual liberalization of the Russian gas market. Over the next decade, this could create fundamental changes in Russia’s relationship with European gas markets with potential competition for available supplies between domestic and European export markets. [post_title] => Domestic Gas Prices in Russia – Towards Export Netback? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => domestic-gas-prices-in-russia-towards-export-netback-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 15:06:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 15:06:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/domestic-gas-prices-in-russia-towards-export-netback-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [53] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28208 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2011-10-03 11:53:57 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-10-03 10:53:57 [post_content] => The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies has recently published a paper which concludes that agreement between Russia and China for pipeline gas exports may not be reached this year or even in 2012. The paper by James Henderson suggests that the Chinese have developed other gas import options from Central Asia, Myanmar and a range of LNG suppliers which mean they are not in a hurry to conclude a contract with Russia. On the other side of the border Gazprom does not want to compromise on the principle of oil-linked pricing on which it is insisting in its European export contracts. Both sides believe themselves to be in a powerful position without the need for compromise, but the paper suggests that if the first pipeline project could be located in Eastern Siberia – instead of the Altai line from Western Siberia which is Gazprom’s priority – then it would be easier to agree a price acceptable to both parties. [post_title] => The Pricing Debate over Russian Gas Exports to China [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-pricing-debate-over-russian-gas-exports-to-china-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-12-02 12:12:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-12-02 12:12:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-pricing-debate-over-russian-gas-exports-to-china-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [54] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27587 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2011-04-05 14:45:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-04-05 13:45:31 [post_content] => Russian oil exports have historically been focused on western markets but the rapid growth of the Asia-Pacific economies over the past two decades has led to a re-focusing of Russia’s strategic and energy interests. The oil and gas resources of East Siberia and the Far East of Russia have long been known about and a number of factors have now led the Russian Administration to increase the priority of their development. Dr. Henderson’s paper examines the renewed interest in investment in the oil resources in East Siberia and the Far East. This paper examines the strategic importance of the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline and the ability of Russia to increase production from its eastern regions to fill the full capacity of the line. It examines the plans of all the companies involved in field development looking in detail at the specific assets that will provide the bulk of Russia’s oil exports to eastern markets. The paper also discusses the fiscal incentives that the Russian State is starting to provide in order to encourage companies to invest, and provides estimates by company of the potential amount and timing of oil production that could possibly emerge as a result. It also analyses the potential for Russia’s eastern territories to produce sufficient oil to balance the gradual decline expected in the west of the country, and explores the opportunity for Russian exports to make a greater contribution to the crude mix supplying demand in the Asia-Pacific region. [post_title] => The Strategic Implications of Russia's Eastern Oil Resources [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-strategic-implications-of-russias-eastern-oil-resources [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-12-02 12:04:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-12-02 12:04:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-strategic-implications-of-russias-eastern-oil-resources/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) ) [post_count] => 55 [current_post] => -1 [before_loop] => 1 [in_the_loop] => [post] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 47084 [post_author] => 974 [post_date] => 2024-03-01 11:05:30 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-03-01 11:05:30 [post_content] => Oxford Energy Forum article [post_title] => Present status and future plans for the nuclear sector in Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => present-status-and-future-plans-for-the-nuclear-sector-in-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-03-01 11:06:50 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-03-01 11:06:50 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=47084 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [comment_count] => 0 [current_comment] => -1 [found_posts] => 55 [max_num_pages] => 0 [max_num_comment_pages] => 0 [is_single] => [is_preview] => [is_page] => [is_archive] => 1 [is_date] => [is_year] => [is_month] => [is_day] => [is_time] => [is_author] => [is_category] => [is_tag] => [is_tax] => [is_search] => [is_feed] => [is_comment_feed] => [is_trackback] => [is_home] => [is_privacy_policy] => [is_404] => [is_embed] => [is_paged] => [is_admin] => [is_attachment] => [is_singular] => [is_robots] => [is_favicon] => [is_posts_page] => [is_post_type_archive] => 1 [query_vars_hash:WP_Query:private] => d32fc57040e2a6b10aaf2d9df49edd75 [query_vars_changed:WP_Query:private] => [thumbnails_cached] => [allow_query_attachment_by_filename:protected] => [stopwords:WP_Query:private] => [compat_fields:WP_Query:private] => Array ( [0] => query_vars_hash [1] => query_vars_changed ) [compat_methods:WP_Query:private] => Array ( [0] => init_query_flags [1] => parse_tax_query ) )

Latest Publications by James Henderson

Books by James Henderson