Jack Sharples

Research Fellow

Jack joined the Institute in January 2018. He holds a PhD and MSc in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Glasgow, and a BA in Politics from the University of York. Prior to joining the Institute, he spent four years as a Lecturer in Energy Politics and International Relations at the European University in St Petersburg. Outside OIES, he has been the author of the ‘Gazprom Monitor’ monthly analytical reports for the European Geopolitical Forum (Brussels) since June 2012.

Beyond his OIES publications, he is also the author of several academic journal articles and book chapters, including: ‘The international political economy of Eastern European energy security: Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union’ (2018); ‘Europe’s largest natural gas producer in an era of climate change: Gazprom’ (2017) ‘Energy transitions in carbon-producing countries: Russia’ (2016); ‘Building the Energy Union: the problem of cross-border gas pipeline interconnections in Baltic, Central, and South-Eastern Europe’ (2016); ‘The importance of gas storage facilities in the European gas and power markets’ (2016); ‘The shifting geopolitics of Russia’s gas exports and the impact on EU Russia gas relations’ (2016); and ‘Russian gas supplies to Europe: the likelihood, and potential impact, of an interruption in gas transit via Ukraine’ (2016).

Areas of Expertise

Political economy of natural gas in Europe and Russia; Supply-demand dynamics on the European gas market; Supply-demand dynamics on the global LNG market

Contact

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                    [post_date] => 2022-05-26 10:00:24
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                    [post_content] => Since our previous edition of the Quarterly Gas Review, the Russian build-up of troops around Ukraine’s border has erupted into a full-scale invasion. European gas prices, which were already high, surged. In response to the invasion, the European Commission and various European governments announced their intention to reduce dependency on Russian gas imports. In response, the Russian government passed new legislation, requiring Gazprom’s European counterparties to pay for their gas supplies in Roubles, rather than Euros. While it remained unclear whether or not the new payment procedure would be in breach of sanctions against Russia, several companies refused to follow the new procedure, and had their supplies cut off by Gazprom. At the same time, Gazprom effectively disowned its European subsidiaries (Gazprom Germania in particular). In this issue of the Quarterly Gas Review, we analyse the flow of Russian gas to Europe in this geopolitical context. In related sections, Mostefa Ouki and Mike Fulwood, respectively, analyse the geopolitics of Algerian gas supply to Europe and dynamics on the global LNG market, with particular focus on the extent to which they can offset lower flows from Russia.
                    [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review: Short- and Medium-Term Outlook for Gas Markets
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                    [post_content] => On 8 March 2022, the European Commission published the outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030, starting with gas, in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Commission noted that EU gas imports from Russia in 2021 (pipeline and LNG combined) totalled 155 billion cubic metres (bcm), and stated that this could be reduced by two-thirds (101.5 bcm) before the end of 2022. At the same time, Commission stated its intention to present by April a legislative proposal requiring underground gas storage across the EU to be filled up to at least 90 per cent of its capacity by 1 October each year.

This OIES Insight analyses the component parts of this plan, and their implications. Specifically, the plan envisages increased non-Russian gas supply by 63.5 bcm through a combination of additional non-Russian LNG and pipeline imports and an increase in biomethane production. This supply increase is to be complemented by a 38 bcm reduction in EU gas demand, to be achieved through a combination of large-scale wind and solar power generation, rooftop solar power generation, heat pumps, and “EU-wide energy saving”. Between the reduction in gas demand and increase in non-Russian supply, the Commission hopes to reduce EU imports of Russian gas by two-thirds by the end of 2022.

We conclude that while some parts of the proposal are eminently achievable, others are more ambitious. On the supply side, an extra 50 bcm per year of LNG imports would not only absorb the forecast growth in global LNG supply in 2022, but also require a redirection of cargoes from Asia to Europe, which implies that European prices need to remain high to attract such cargoes. The increase in non-Russian pipeline imports seems realistic, subject to current import levels being sustained throughout the summer. On the demand side, the proposed reduction in gas demand appears to be feasible on paper, but reaching the target will be challenging. A combination of market drivers, specific measures, favourable external conditions (such as good availability of wind and hydro in the power sector and a warm winter) as well as more coal/nuclear in the generation mix will be needed for any target to be met.

The broader implications of the Commission proposals are their impacts on the global gas market (with prices likely higher than previously forecast for the remainder of the 2020s) and additional impetus provided to the energy transition, given the increased urgency of decreasing European fossil gas demand.
                    [post_title] => The EU plan to reduce Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of 2022: Practical realities and implications
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  • The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces has led to sharp rises in gas prices in Europe and around the world with real concerns about the possible curtailment of gas flows from Russia to Europe.
  • Pipeline imports from Russia began falling in the last quarter of 2021 and declined even further in January and most of February 2022. Gazprom are seemingly only meeting the nominations under long-term contracts and not offering any volumes on their Electronic Sales Platforms. European buyers significantly reduced their nominations in January and most of February as the monthly prices under their contracts with Gazprom were much higher than the day-ahead hub prices, reducing the incentive to take contract volumes. As soon as the invasion began, day-ahead prices jumped sharply making the price under the monthly contracts look very attractive. As a consequence, European buyers increased their nominations, especially on the Ukraine route.
  • LNG imports into Europe have surged in the last three months, but they largely offset the lower Russian flows in the same period so overall supply to the market was relatively stable, hence the firm prices in the market.
  • As a consequence, pressure on gas storage stocks was maintained and the poor injection rates in the summer of 2021 meant that stocks are at historically low levels, although not as low as they might have been if we had had a cold winter.
  • Under a scenario where Russian flows on Nord Stream 1, the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and the Ukraine routes are stopped for the period between April 1 2022 and March 31 2023, the ability of Europe to refill its storage is severely compromised. Europe might just about be able to get through the summer by emptying what remains of its stocks in storage, but that would lead to significant demand destruction in the winter. In the absence of any mitigation measure some 40 per cent of Central and Western Europe winter demand could be lost.
  • There is the potential for some mitigation, through diversions of LNG to Europe from other countries, more production from Groningen in the Netherlands and additional pipeline imports from Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan. Together with some demand side responses, including more nuclear power, as suggested in the IEA’s Ten Point Plan, these could maybe reduce the impact by half, but this still leaves a substantial amount of unmet demand in the power and industrial sectors, if the heating load is to be protected.
  • While the impact of shortages would mainly be felt in Central and Western Europe, gas prices would clearly be extremely high, leading to further large increases in end-consumers’ bills all over Europe and in many other countries around the world who rely on imported gas.
    [post_title] => Ukraine Invasion: What This Means for the European Gas Market [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-invasion-what-this-means-for-the-european-gas-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-08 12:10:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-08 12:10:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44610 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44562 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_content] => The geopolitical tensions between Russia and Europe over the build-up of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border have generated concerns over the extent of Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, and the possible consequences should the flow of Russian gas to Europe be curtailed, either partially or completely. In this paper, we analyse the potential impact on the UK of such a curtailment of Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe. We find that while the UK would be unlikely to face a physical shortage of supplies, the ‘ripple effect’ of price increases at hubs in continental Europe would be quickly replicated on the UK trading hub, the National Balancing Point (NBP). There would also be an impact on physical flows of gas both in and out of the UK, as LNG cargoes would be regasified at spare capacity in UK LNG import terminals, but then re-exported to continental Europe via the two interconnectors with Belgium and the Netherlands. This would render the UK a ‘land bridge’ for LNG arriving into North-Western Europe, given that the three terminals in that part of continental Europe (Dunkerque in France, Zeebrugge in Belgium, and Gate Rotterdam in the Netherlands) would all likely be operating at full capacity. In terms of the existing legal/regulatory frameworks for cooperation and ‘solidarity’ with regard to security of supply, we argue that while the position of the UK relative to neighbouring states remains uncertain with regard to post-Brexit agreements on the application of the solidarity provisions of the EU Security of Supply Regulation, pricing dynamics between the UK and neighbouring continental European markets would be sufficient to cause gas supplies to move from one market to another, albeit with the potential for some infrastructure bottlenecks. Finally, in terms of impact on UK gas demand, the price spikes that would almost certainly accompany any physical disruption in Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe would be quickly felt in the UK, despite the lack of direct UK dependence on Russian pipeline gas supplies. The first part of UK gas demand to be curtailed by such price spikes – beyond the high levels currently seen on the UK wholesale gas market – would be industrial demand. However, the remainder of UK gas demand (for power generation and heating) is far less elastic, and strongly dependent on seasonal and short-term weather factors. For this reason, concerns over an interruption in Russian supply to Europe whose effects would ripple through to the UK will remain heightened until the end of the winter heating season. [post_title] => The Potential Impact on the UK of a Disruption in Russian Gas Supplies to Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-potential-impact-on-the-uk-of-a-disruption-in-russian-gas-supplies-to-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44562 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44534 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-02-01 11:00:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-02-01 11:00:41 [post_content] => The recent geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West over the Russian build-up of troops close to the Ukrainian border have renewed public debate over Europe’s dependence on hydrocarbons imported from Russia, and natural gas in particular. There is particular concern over the security of pipeline gas deliveries to Europe via Ukraine. In this special edition of the Quarterly Gas Review, we begin by explaining the level of European dependence on gas imported by pipeline from Russia, before setting out several scenarios under which supplies from Russia might be disrupted. We then analyse how Europe might substitute those Russian supplies with supplies from other sources. Finally, using the NexantECA World Gas Model, we lay out three scenarios covering – a partial curtailment of supplies from Russia, a complete cessation of supplies from Russia, and the ‘base case’ but with Nord Stream 2 approval being permanently withheld – and how these scenarios would impact Europe’s gas balance in 2022 and 2023. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 16 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-16 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-02-01 11:07:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-02-01 11:07:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44534 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44417 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-12-16 12:31:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-16 12:31:00 [post_content] => The dramatic rise in European, and indeed in global, gas prices over the summer of 2021, leading to unprecedented prices in Q4, has been the subject of much debate. Is it simply a market reflection of stronger than expected demand and weaker than expected supplies? Or is it a step change in the context of the energy transition and uncertainties surrounding the role of gas as a ‘balancing fuel’ in power generation? Is this the price of flexibility and growing exposure to global LNG markets? What role did Russian supplies (or lack thereof) play in the price spike and to what extent did volatility on the traded markets exacerbate the price increases? In this OIES trilogy titled ‘A series of unfortunate events’, Jack Sharples, Anouk Honoré and Patrick Heather look back at 2020 and 2021 to unpack the supply and demand factors that contributed to the spike in European gas prices alongside the trading activity and levels of volatility that accompanied this surge in prices. In this first paper, Jack Sharples discusses the supply side of the equation with a deep dive into European production, pipeline imports, LNG flows and storage movements. While the decline in European production is a long-term trend, in 2021, output was also impacted by temporary maintenance. Meanwhile, LNG imports that were abundant in 2019-2020 were pulled toward the premium Asian market and to a lesser degree to Latin America, just as a number of export plants suffered from unplanned outages. As made clear by events since September, when LNG markets are tight, Europe will need to compete on prices and will become more exposed to global volatility as it is losing the seasonal swing in its own supply. Storage is therefore increasingly important, but as highlighted this year, so are pipelines. The paper looks in depth at pipeline flows from Russia, highlighting the outsized role Gazprom plays in Europe. Until October, Gazprom seems to have faced calls on its production that limited its ability to offer additional volumes into Europe. More recently, there are signs this is no longer the case, suggesting that Russian supplies may not increase significantly until Nord Stream 2 begins operation, most likely after the end of winter. The next two papers in our ‘Series of Unfortunate Events’ trilogy include an analysis by Anouk Honoré of gas demand in 2021 in European countries, looking at the various factors that influenced gas in power generation in the context of rising coal and carbon prices and assessing the price-driven gas demand destruction in the industrial sector and the inelasticity of gas demand for space heating. The final paper, by Patrick Heather, will analyse the role of trading activity in price dynamics in 2021, from the steady growth between March and August, and the extremely rapid growth from late August to the first peak in early October, with prices subsequently remaining high and volatile in Q4. Together, these three papers draw on the gas price spike in 2021 to highlight Europe’s ongoing challenge: Its dependence on imports amidst uncertainties surrounding gas demand in its role of ‘balancing fuel’. Combined with a growing dependence on imports, this will leave Europe even more exposed to the volatility of global LNG markets, and as policy makers continue to focus on decarbonisation, market participants will need to adjust their commercial strategies. [post_title] => A Series of Unfortunate Events - Supply-side factors in the European gas price rally in 2021 and outlook for the rest of winter [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => a-series-of-unfortunate-events-supply-side-factors-in-the-european-gas-price-rally-in-2021-and-outlook-for-the-rest-of-winter [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-16 12:31:00 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-16 12:31:00 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44417 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44157 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-09-27 14:24:02 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-09-27 13:24:02 [post_content] => International gas prices have experienced a roller coaster ride in the past year, from historic lows to unprecedented highs. In this OIES Comment, we analyse the drivers behind this pricing fluctuation, and offer an outlook for the coming winter. In order to avoid the distorting effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, we compare the year to date (January-August) 2021 with the same period in 2019. On the global LNG market, the supply-side increase in nameplate export capacity was offset by outages at a number of export plants. By contrast, LNG demand outside Europe surged. This meant that growth in supply simply did not keep pace with the increase in demand. With Europe as the ‘balancing market’ for global LNG, its role as the absorber of excess volumes in 2019 was reversed in 2021, as European LNG imports declined. On the European market, the decline in LNG imports was accompanied by a decline in European production and pipeline imports from regional suppliers, most notably Russia. Yet demand remained at the same level as 2019, and the gap was met by net storage withdrawals. Therefore, we conclude that with both the global LNG market in general and the European market in particular noticeably tighter, the ongoing price rally is driven by fundamentals, with an added ‘fear premium’ that the forthcoming winter could be as cold as that in 2020/21. If that proves to be the case, the current price levels will persist, and even rise, while a milder winter could see the market turn slightly more bearish. [post_title] => Why are Gas Prices So High? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => why-are-gas-prices-so-high [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-09-27 14:24:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-09-27 13:24:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44157 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43924 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-08-04 10:58:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-08-04 09:58:44 [post_content] => In our latest Gas Quarterly, we review the gas price rally in Europe, supported by rising coal and carbon prices within Europe and LNG prices in Asia. Looking forward, the market sentiment – as expressed in the forward curve - seems to be that the current high prices will continue, as storage injections remain sluggish and Europe looks set to enter the winter with storage stocks well below the levels of recent years. Gazprom, as the largest external supplier to Europe, has dramatically scaled back its spot sales via its own Electronic Sales Platform, and is flowing slightly less gas to Europe via Ukraine than last year, and significantly less than in 2019. We address the question of whether Gazprom is ‘holding back’ volumes from Europe, in support of the current high prices. Finally, we analyse the surge in Chinese gas demand that is drawing LNG cargoes away from Europe and could make China the world’s largest LNG importer by volume in 2021. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 14 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-14 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-08-05 15:36:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-08-05 14:36:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43924 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43899 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-07-26 11:04:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-07-26 10:04:42 [post_content] => Russian gas exports to Europe have traditionally meant one thing: pipeline supplies from Gazprom. But since December 2017, Russian LNG cargoes from the Yamal LNG project led by the private Russian company, Novatek, have increasingly made their mark, especially in North-Western Europe. Despite the original intention that Yamal LNG cargoes would be predominantly shipped to Asia - via the Northern Sea Route in the summer and via transshipment in Europe in the winter - Yamal LNG cargoes have increasingly remained in Europe, prompting debates over possible competition between the two sources of Russian gas. In our analysis, we find although Yamal LNG cargoes may indeed compete with Gazprom’s pipeline supplies in Europe, once the cargoes have left Yamal not only does the Russian government not have the ability to ‘manage’ competition between Gazprom and Yamal LNG, but those Yamal LNG cargoes become (to all intents and purposes) no different to any other LNG cargoes with which Gazprom’s pipeline supplies compete. We conclude that the Russian government has implicitly recognised this, and has chosen to support the expansion of Russia’s LNG export capacity even at the potential expense of competition with Gazprom’s pipeline supplies, as this is preferable to simply ceding market share to other non-Russian LNG suppliers. [post_title] => A Phantom Menace: Is Russian LNG a Threat to Russia’s Pipeline Gas in Europe? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => a-phantom-menace-is-russian-lng-a-threat-to-russias-pipeline-gas-in-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-07-26 11:04:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-07-26 10:04:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43899 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43694 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-05-13 12:35:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-13 11:35:18 [post_content] => After a supply-long 2019 and COVID-impacted 2020, the first quarter of 2021 saw European gas demand surge due to a sharp spell of cold weather. As similarly cold conditions in NE Asia drew away LNG cargoes, European storage stocks were rapidly drawn down to balance the global market. This depleted the substantial stocks that had accumulated over the past two mild winters. Looking forward, the TTF forward curve, and the Asian prices as well, may well be incorporating a “fear” premium based on the events of the winter just gone when Asian buyers were caught by the very cold weather. In the absence of sufficiently strong Asian LNG demand in 2021 and/or a failure of European pipeline imports to materialise, it seems rather more likely that prices during the summer will fall below those of the forward curve. This would prompt both greater injections into European storage and the stimulation of greater LNG imports into the most price-sensitive markets, which could reduce the likelihood of LNG shut-ins this summer [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 13 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-13 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-13 13:47:30 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-13 12:47:30 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43694 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43561 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_content] => In 2020–21, Ukrainian gas storage facilities played a notable role in balancing the market in Central and Eastern Europe. Through the summer of 2020, European traders placed gas in Ukrainian storage as facilities elsewhere in Europe reached full capacity. In the winter of 2020/21, it was expected that this gas would be re-exported to Central Europe. However, in a sign of Ukraine’s increasing integration into the broader European gas market, most of the volumes withdrawn from storage were actually sold into the Ukrainian market. Given the ongoing, long-term decline of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, the storage and trading of gas in Ukraine offers new business opportunities for all market participants, including the Ukrainian TSO (GTSOU), storage system operator (Ukrtransgaz), and a variety of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian traders. While the exceptionally wide seasonal spreads of 2020–21 – and associated storage injections – are unlikely to be repeated regularly, the experience of 2020–21 suggests that Ukraine is making progress in integrating its market with those of its western neighbours. [post_title] => Ukraine-EU Gas Market Integration: Short-Term Progress, Long-Term Challenges [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-eu-gas-market-integration-short-term-progress-long-term-challenges [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43561 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43280 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-12-15 14:36:22 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 14:36:22 [post_content] => Gazprom Export launched its Electronic Sales Platform (ESP) in the context of an increasingly competitive European market. Sales volumes have grown, and have averaged 2 bcm per month since April 2019. As a result of this growth, the ESP is now a key part of Gazprom’s European sales strategy: It generates additional sales revenues, optimises Gazprom’s use of is physical export infrastructure, and provides a constant flow of valuable market data that informs Gazprom’s wider sales strategy. Sales are largely concentrated in four countries, while deliveries are split between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian routes. ESP sales prices closely track European hub prices for comparable products, and the sales volumes show that Gazprom’s counterparties consider the ESP an attractive offering. The operation of the ESP highlights the crucial element of Gazprom’s European sales strategy: The importance of nuanced optimisation, as Gazprom seeks to maximise its sales volumes without placing excessive downward pressure on European hub prices that would impact revenues from its hub-indexed LTC portfolio. Overall, the ESP demonstrates how far Gazprom has evolved in the past decade, as it seeks to retain market share on an increasingly competitive European market. [post_title] => The Role of the ESP in Gazprom's European Sales Strategy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-role-of-the-esp-in-gazproms-european-sales-strategy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-15 14:36:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-15 14:36:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43280 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 40863 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-09-10 12:01:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-10 11:01:54 [post_content] =>

Since the birth of the LNG industry, Asia has been the key market, providing high value, reliable demand. The 3 foundation markets of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been joined more recently by China and India to form the “big 5” which is often the focus for much analysis and comment. However, it would be wrong to ignore the smaller, emerging Asian LNG markets. By considering the 10 most significant emerging Asian markets, this report demonstrates that when combined, they have potential LNG demand over the next 2 decades as the combination of India and China. Like all demand forecasts, whether that potential is achievable is, however, depends on overcoming some significant challenges, as discussed in the report.

In addition, these smaller countries offer a diversity of analytical interest.  Malaysia and Indonesia are LNG exporters, now looking to become significant importers. Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines all see LNG as needed to supplement declining domestic gas production. Myanmar started LNG imports to address a power crisis, and Hong Kong and Singapore are largely driven by environmental and security of supply concerns.

With a chapter on each country and detailed breakdown of the forecasts generated by our World Gas Model, the document provides a useful reference of current perceptions of future prospects in those emerging LNG markets.

[post_title] => Emerging Asia LNG Demand [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => emerging-asia-lng-demand [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-09-10 12:01:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-09-10 11:01:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=40863 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 38622 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-06-16 10:44:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-06-16 09:44:28 [post_content] => Gas prices in Europe have crashed through the $2 range discussed in two previous OIES comments. The June TTF monthly price closed below $2 and, for the next few months, the forward curve suggests this will continue. The amount of gas in storage in Europe has played a crucial role in pricing movements, absorbing a lot of the excess LNG supply in 2019. With COVID-19 impacting globally on gas demand, and LNG export capacity still increasing, it looks increasingly likely that storage could be pretty much full, possibly in early August. The moment of truth will then have arrived in the global gas market. If there is still too much LNG trying to find a home, then there will need to be more supply shut in, from both LNG and pipeline gas, if prices are not to turn negative. Looking forward, the forward curve suggests a more than doubling of TTF prices in the summer of 2021 over 2020. The historic relationship, between storage utilisation and TTF prices, suggests that utilisation would need to be much lower next year than this. LNG flows into Europe would then need to be significantly curtailed, which can only occur if there is a big rebound in Asia LNG demand in the order of 20% year on year. In the absence of this, prices in Europe, and in Asia, may stay at stubbornly low levels through 2021, prompting more LNG shut-ins next year, and making it very difficult to return to the status quo ante COVID-19. [post_title] => $2 Gas in Europe (Part III): Down, Down, Deeper and Down [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => 2-gas-in-europe-part-iii-down-down-deeper-and-down [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-06-16 10:54:52 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-06-16 09:54:52 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=38622 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 37850 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-05-18 11:18:09 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-05-18 10:18:09 [post_content] => With the increasing likelihood of European gas storage hitting 'tank tops' by the end of summer 2020, Ukrainian storage facilities could ease the European storage shortage. A combination of substantial storage capacity, discounted tariffs for transporting gas to the storage facilities, the storage of gas in a 'customs warehouse' free of customs duties, and the increase in Ukrainian import capacity through the addition of backhaul (virtual reverse) capacity are facilitating the injection of gas into Ukrainian storage by European companies and traders. This comment examines the different factors involved, and the amount of gas that is likely to be stored in Ukraine in summer 2020. In doing so, we conclude that not only will Ukrainian storage ease some of the pressure on the European market in Q3 2020, but it is also likely to hasten the integration of Ukraine with the European gas market. [post_title] => European gas storage: backhaul helps open the Ukrainian safety valve [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => european-gas-storage-backhaul-helps-open-the-ukrainian-safety-valve [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-05-18 11:18:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-05-18 10:18:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=37850 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 35732 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_content] => In our previous Insight, The Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal: opening a new chapter, we examined how the recent Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement was reached, and analysed the terms of the deal. This follow-up Insight analyses broader question of Russian gas transit to Europe, and the impact of the Russia-Ukraine deal on other routes that bring Russian gas to Europe. This includes longstanding routes, and two new pipeline projects, TurkStream and Nord Stream 2.  It also examines the impact of the deal on the Ukrainian gas market, and the likely short-term price effects in the European market. In doing so, this Insight analyses the broader context surrounding the Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement. [post_title] => Implications of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal for alternative pipeline routes and the Ukrainian and European markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => implications-of-the-russia-ukraine-gas-transit-deal-for-alternative-pipeline-routes-and-the-ukrainian-and-european-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=35732 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 35610 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_content] => On 30 December 2019, Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy signed agreements covering the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine for the period 2020-24, with transit volumes of 65 bcm in 2020 and 40 bcm per year thereafter. In this Insight, we analyse how the deal was reached, the terms of the deal, and the likely transit flows via Ukraine during the period of the deal. We conclude that the deal will provide Gazprom with sufficient transit capacity in 2020, and from 2022 onwards, by which time we expect Nord Stream 2 and the Bulgarian & Serbian connections to Turk Stream to be operational. This leaves 2021 as a ‘bridge’ period, in which Gazprom may be obliged to book additional transit capacity via Ukraine. [post_title] => The Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal: opening a new chapter [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-russia-ukraine-gas-transit-deal-opening-a-new-chapter [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=35610 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 34928 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_content] => The OIES Natural Gas Quarterly aims to provide a regular insight into the thoughts of Research Fellows on topical issues as well as providing a different angle on trends in global gas pricing. In the pricing section, the Quarterly reviews the LNG Tightness measure, looks at the Russian gas export price to Europe versus the marginal cost of US LNG and also reviews prices on Gazprom’s Electronic Sales Platform (ESP). In Asia we compare the Japanese LNG import price with the LNG spot price and also look at Chinese domestic prices compared with JKM. The Quarterly also outline our views on the Key Themes for 2020, including thoughts from Mike Fulwood on LNG project FIDs and how developers may need to accelerate plans if they are not going to miss the next window of opportunity in the mid-2020s. Mike Fulwood and Jack Sharples then question the availability of LNG for Europe and ask whether sufficient storage will be available to take all the possible supply. Anouk Honore then looks at a possible cause for optimism for European gas demand, highlighting key legislation that should be passed in 2020 concerning coal phase out in Germany. Continuing the European theme, Marshall Hall discusses likely further progress this year in the transformation of the Dutch gas market, while James Henderson considers the increasing diversity of Russian gas export flows via pipeline and LNG. Jack Sharples develops the theme of Russian gas exports further, suggesting that the Gazprom ESP can provide further evidence concerning the company’s export strategy in 2020. On a different, but still European, theme Anouk Honoré considers the potential impact of the new EU Green Deal and considers how it could be developed further during the year with potentially long-lasting consequences for the energy system. Martin Lambert then suggests that 2020 could be the year when we start to see more active progress in decarbonisation outside Europe, with Australia, Japan and even the US highlighted as possible sources of technology development and practical action in the decarbonisation of the gas sector. Michal Median then outlines her view on the outlook for the Chinese gas sector in 2020, suggesting that coal to gas switching could regain some momentum and that LNG could benefit as a result. Finally, Patrick Heather looks at the emergence of the JKM price marker as a benchmark for gas prices in Asia and suggests that further progress could be made this year towards it becoming the pre-eminent pricing tool in the region.   [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 8 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-8 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-01-30 14:11:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=34928 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 32893 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_content] => The trilateral talks between the EU, Russia, and Ukraine regarding the transit of Russian gas via Ukraine beyond the expiry of the existing transit contract, on 31 December 2019, have so far failed to yield a solution. With the deadline fast approaching, the sides remain far apart in their negotiating positions. This Insight assesses the current state of the negotiations, the likelihood of an interruption in Russian gas transit via Ukraine in January 2020, and the potential impact of such a suspension of gas transit. [post_title] => Russia-Ukraine gas transit talks: risks for all sides [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russia-ukraine-gas-transit-talks-risks-for-all-sides [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=32893 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31748 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-07-11 11:35:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-07-11 10:35:28 [post_content] => Gazprom has traditionally sold gas to its European customers under long-term, oil-indexed contracts. However, in recent years it has been forced to adapt to changing market rules in Europe and an increasingly competitive global gas market. As part of this adaptation, Gazprom launched its Electronic Sales Platform (ESP) on the 20th of September 2018. From this platform, Gazprom has been selling spot volumes to new and existing counterparties, for delivery to ten destinations in central and NW Europe. This Energy Insight examines the volumetric and pricing outcomes of the first 9 months of trading on the exchange and attempts to draw some initial conclusions about the Gazprom strategy linked to it. Monthly sales volumes now exceed 1 bcm - the equivalent of 8% of Gazprom’s monthly long-term contract sales in Europe, and so are clearly non-negligible. Furthermore, the weighted average price of transactions on the ESP has been below the average price of Gazprom’s LTC sales to Europe since February 2019 and has been between the average hub prices at TTF-Gaspool (floor) and Austria-Slovakia VTPs (ceiling) since April 2019. As a result, it is clear that the new trading platform could be set to play a significant role in Gazprom’s export strategy to Europe and is worthy of increased analytical attention for anyone interested in the development of the European gas market and the role of Russian gas within it. [post_title] => Gazprom’s Gas Sales via its Electronic Sales Platform (ESP) [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gazproms-gas-sales-via-its-electronic-sales-platform-esp [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-07-11 11:35:28 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-07-11 10:35:28 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31748 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31333 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-01-15 10:01:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-01-15 10:01:38 [post_content] => On the 1st of January 2020, the global shipping sector will face a highly significant shift in the regulation of sulphur emissions from the consumption of shipping fuel. In preparation for that shift, ship owners have several options for achieving regulatory compliance. These include switching to low-sulphur oil-based fuel, installing ‘scrubbers’ to remove sulphur from exhaust gas, and switching to LNG as a bunker fuel. Stringent limits on sulphur emissions from shipping have been in place in northern Europe since 2006–07, and these limits were lowered in 2010 and 2015. This stepwise approach mirrors (and indeed foreshadows) the approach seen at the global level, where limits on sulphur emissions were introduced in 2005 and tightened in 2012. The shift in January 2020 will replicate, at a global level, the regional change experienced in northern Europe in 2015. Northern Europe has seen the most substantial development of LNG as a shipping fuel, in terms of supply (bunkering) infrastructure and the growth of a fleet of vessels powered by LNG. This region therefore represents a valuable case study, through which this paper identifies the main drivers of the uptake of LNG as a shipping fuel, and the extent to which the experience of northern Europe may be repeated at a global level post-2020. The paper concludes that, with the global LNG market expanding and the size of the global LNG-fuelled fleet set to double by 2022, global demand for LNG as a bunker fuel is set to grow significantly. Podcast [post_title] => LNG Supply Chains and the Development of LNG as a Shipping Fuel in Northern Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => lng-supply-chains-development-lng-shipping-fuel-northern-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-02-12 09:45:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-02-12 09:45:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31333 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31034 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-05-09 14:24:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-05-09 13:24:42 [post_content] => With European gas import demand having risen substantially since 2014, Gazprom has dramatically increased its sales on the European market. In Q1 2018, Gazprom reported record daily gas exports to Europe in late February and early March. This Comment addresses the question of how those volumes were delivered to the market, and the extent to which the infrastructure for delivery of those volumes was used,  highlighting that, in times of peak European gas import demand, full utilisation of the Nord Stream and Yamal-Europe pipelines left Ukraine as the only transit route with spare capacity. Until Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream are built, Gazprom will remain dependent on gas transit via Ukraine throughout the year, with Ukraine providing substantial flows in summer as European gas storage facilities are refilled, and a combination of significant flows and additional spare capacity in the winter peak demand period. [post_title] => Ukrainian Gas Transit: Still Vital for Russian Gas Supplies to Europe as Other Routes Reach Full Capacity [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukrainian-gas-transit-still-vital-russian-gas-supplies-europe-routes-reach-full-capacity [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-05-09 14:24:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-05-09 13:24:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31034 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30941 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-03-26 15:05:46 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-03-26 14:05:46 [post_content] => The arrival of the first Russian LNG supplies to the UK coincided with the deterioration of UK-Russia diplomatic relations, triggering debates over the role of Russia in UK hydrocarbon imports. Although Russia is the largest supplier of UK coal imports, coal is being phased out of UK energy consumption. Russia is just one of several substantial suppliers of crude oil and refined oil products to the UK, with levels of UK oil demand being strongly linked to developments in the UK transportation fuel mix. By contrast, natural gas is the largest source of UK heat and power generation, and underpins non-transportation sector energy consumption. UK gas import demand is currently largely met by pipeline imports from Norway and LNG imports from Qatar. However, as the UK seeks to cope with fluctuations in domestic gas demand through increased LNG imports and gas trade with north-western Europe, following the closure of the UK’s only seasonal gas storage facility, the challenge to UK energy security is not dependence on Russian gas supplies but rather increasing exposure to international gas market volatility. [post_title] => UK Dependence on Imported Hydrocarbons: How Important is Russia? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => uk-dependence-imported-hydrocarbons-important-russia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-04-04 11:43:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-04-04 10:43:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30941 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30892 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-03-05 12:22:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-03-05 12:22:25 [post_content] => Gazprom has confounded many expectations by enjoying two record years of gas sales in Europe in 2016 and 2017. External factors have certainly played a role in its success, with overall European demand rebounding, indigenous production continuing to fall and alternative sources of imports failing to deliver at the expected levels (especially LNG). In addition, Gazprom has demonstrated  a level of flexibility in its pricing strategy that has kept its gas very competitive, with the result that its market share in Europe has grown to 35%. However, the anticipation that this figure could rise towards 40% and above has led EU politicians and policy-makers to become concerned about over-dependence on Russian gas, and many now wish to ensure that Gazprom’s future options are limited by obstructing potential new pipelines. In addition the politics surrounding Ukraine, the imposition of stricter US sanctions, questions surrounding  the DG COMP investigation into Gazprom’s activities and the Stockholm arbitration ruling over contracts with Ukraine add further layers of complexity. This paper therefore explores whether Gazprom’s two anni mirabiles in 2016 and 2017 can be repeated or whether Russian gas faces a more challenging environment in the rest of the decade. [post_title] => Gazprom in Europe – two “Anni Mirabiles”, but can it continue? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gazprom-europe-two-anni-mirabiles-can-continue [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-07 11:27:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-07 11:27:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30892 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) ) [post_count] => 24 [current_post] => -1 [in_the_loop] => [post] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44936 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-05-26 10:00:24 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-05-26 09:00:24 [post_content] => Since our previous edition of the Quarterly Gas Review, the Russian build-up of troops around Ukraine’s border has erupted into a full-scale invasion. European gas prices, which were already high, surged. In response to the invasion, the European Commission and various European governments announced their intention to reduce dependency on Russian gas imports. In response, the Russian government passed new legislation, requiring Gazprom’s European counterparties to pay for their gas supplies in Roubles, rather than Euros. While it remained unclear whether or not the new payment procedure would be in breach of sanctions against Russia, several companies refused to follow the new procedure, and had their supplies cut off by Gazprom. At the same time, Gazprom effectively disowned its European subsidiaries (Gazprom Germania in particular). In this issue of the Quarterly Gas Review, we analyse the flow of Russian gas to Europe in this geopolitical context. In related sections, Mostefa Ouki and Mike Fulwood, respectively, analyse the geopolitics of Algerian gas supply to Europe and dynamics on the global LNG market, with particular focus on the extent to which they can offset lower flows from Russia. 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Latest Publications by Jack Sharples

Ongoing research by Jack Sharples