Simon Pirani

Senior Research Fellow

Simon Pirani, Senior Research Fellow on the OIES Gas Research Programme, has published widely on the development of natural gas markets, and changing consumption patterns, in the former Soviet Union. He was editor of, and contributor to, the programme’s multi-author volumes The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets are Driving Change (OUP, 2014) and Russian and CIS Gas Markets and their Impact on Europe (OUP, 2009). He has written and co-written a series of papers and articles on the Ukrainian gas sector and Russo-Ukrainian gas relationships, and on Central Asian and Caspian gas markets.

Simon is honorary professor in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Durham. His most recent book is Burning Up: A Global History of Fossil Fuel Consumption, published by Pluto in 2018. For information please click here.

Prior to joining the Institute in 2007, Simon wrote about Russia and Ukraine as a journalist and historian. He is the author of The Russian Revolution in Retreat (Routledge, 2008) and Change in Putin’s Russia: Power, Money and People (Pluto, 2009).

Areas of Expertise

The Ukrainian gas sector, Russian and CIS energy and economics issues

Contact

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                    [post_date] => 2021-12-07 14:10:01
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In the last ten years, Ukraine has sharply reduced its dependence on gas imports, and stopped direct purchases from Russia. In the next ten years, the gas sector will be shaped by Ukraine's own policy choices. Key issues include the potential role of gas in electricity generation, as coal is phased out. On the consumption side, heat sector reform could produce significant reductions in gas demand. On production, the challenge in the coming years will be to maintain output at around 20 bcm/year, Ukraine is also faced with managing the decline of its gas transportation business, as continued reduction of east-west flows is the most likely prospect.

[post_title] => Ukraine’s energy policy and prospects for the gas sector [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraines-energy-policy-and-prospects-for-the-gas-sector [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-07 14:10:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-07 14:10:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44376 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43764 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-05-27 12:03:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-27 11:03:28 [post_content] => Supplies of gas to Turkey from the first phase of the Shah Deniz project in Azerbaijan were halted on 17 April. A 6.6 bcm/year sales contract expired, without the two sides reaching agreement on extending it. The context is a push by Botas of Turkey to increase imports of spot LNG and reduce dependence on pipeline gas delivered under long term contracts. This Comment considers the implications for Azeri gas production. While Turkish market conditions are changing, the costs of delivery to Europe are high, and prices in the domestic market low. All these factors may further frustrate timely exploration and development in the Caspian. This in turn could undermine prospects for expanding the Southern Gas Corridor to Europe in this decade. [post_title] => Azerbaijan’s gas sales strategy at a crossroads [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => azerbaijans-gas-sales-strategy-at-a-crossroads [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-06-08 12:51:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-06-08 11:51:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43764 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43561 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_content] => In 2020–21, Ukrainian gas storage facilities played a notable role in balancing the market in Central and Eastern Europe. Through the summer of 2020, European traders placed gas in Ukrainian storage as facilities elsewhere in Europe reached full capacity. In the winter of 2020/21, it was expected that this gas would be re-exported to Central Europe. However, in a sign of Ukraine’s increasing integration into the broader European gas market, most of the volumes withdrawn from storage were actually sold into the Ukrainian market. Given the ongoing, long-term decline of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, the storage and trading of gas in Ukraine offers new business opportunities for all market participants, including the Ukrainian TSO (GTSOU), storage system operator (Ukrtransgaz), and a variety of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian traders. While the exceptionally wide seasonal spreads of 2020–21 – and associated storage injections – are unlikely to be repeated regularly, the experience of 2020–21 suggests that Ukraine is making progress in integrating its market with those of its western neighbours. [post_title] => Ukraine-EU Gas Market Integration: Short-Term Progress, Long-Term Challenges [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-eu-gas-market-integration-short-term-progress-long-term-challenges [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-25 12:36:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43561 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 42324 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-11-02 10:40:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-11-02 10:40:28 [post_content] => Domestic gas market reform is moving ahead in Ukraine. The cycle of disputes with Russia on transit has been broken by the deal struck at the new year; the transit business continues to decline, while the storage business is soaring and interconnections with European markets are developing. Market pricing has been adopted for the residential sector, and the largely unreformed heat sector should follow in May 2021. Over the longer term, Ukraine’s integration not only with European gas markets but with European energy policy will determine whether gas demand will fall with coal or find new openings, firstly in the power sector. [post_title] => The market takes shape: The Ukrainian gas sector to 2030 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-market-takes-shape-the-ukrainian-gas-sector-to-2030 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-11-02 10:40:28 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-11-02 10:40:28 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=42324 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 37850 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-05-18 11:18:09 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-05-18 10:18:09 [post_content] => With the increasing likelihood of European gas storage hitting 'tank tops' by the end of summer 2020, Ukrainian storage facilities could ease the European storage shortage. A combination of substantial storage capacity, discounted tariffs for transporting gas to the storage facilities, the storage of gas in a 'customs warehouse' free of customs duties, and the increase in Ukrainian import capacity through the addition of backhaul (virtual reverse) capacity are facilitating the injection of gas into Ukrainian storage by European companies and traders. This comment examines the different factors involved, and the amount of gas that is likely to be stored in Ukraine in summer 2020. In doing so, we conclude that not only will Ukrainian storage ease some of the pressure on the European market in Q3 2020, but it is also likely to hasten the integration of Ukraine with the European gas market. [post_title] => European gas storage: backhaul helps open the Ukrainian safety valve [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => european-gas-storage-backhaul-helps-open-the-ukrainian-safety-valve [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-05-18 11:18:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-05-18 10:18:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=37850 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 35732 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_content] => In our previous Insight, The Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal: opening a new chapter, we examined how the recent Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement was reached, and analysed the terms of the deal. This follow-up Insight analyses broader question of Russian gas transit to Europe, and the impact of the Russia-Ukraine deal on other routes that bring Russian gas to Europe. This includes longstanding routes, and two new pipeline projects, TurkStream and Nord Stream 2.  It also examines the impact of the deal on the Ukrainian gas market, and the likely short-term price effects in the European market. In doing so, this Insight analyses the broader context surrounding the Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement. [post_title] => Implications of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal for alternative pipeline routes and the Ukrainian and European markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => implications-of-the-russia-ukraine-gas-transit-deal-for-alternative-pipeline-routes-and-the-ukrainian-and-european-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=35732 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 35610 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_content] => On 30 December 2019, Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy signed agreements covering the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine for the period 2020-24, with transit volumes of 65 bcm in 2020 and 40 bcm per year thereafter. In this Insight, we analyse how the deal was reached, the terms of the deal, and the likely transit flows via Ukraine during the period of the deal. We conclude that the deal will provide Gazprom with sufficient transit capacity in 2020, and from 2022 onwards, by which time we expect Nord Stream 2 and the Bulgarian & Serbian connections to Turk Stream to be operational. This leaves 2021 as a ‘bridge’ period, in which Gazprom may be obliged to book additional transit capacity via Ukraine. [post_title] => The Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal: opening a new chapter [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-russia-ukraine-gas-transit-deal-opening-a-new-chapter [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-02-26 15:27:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=35610 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 33653 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-12-11 11:04:33 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-12-11 11:04:33 [post_content] => Over the last decade, China has replaced Russia as the main export destination for Central Asian gas. Due to strong gas demand in China, in the early 2020s, the Central Asia-China pipeline corridor will be used close to its 55 Bcm/year capacity. An expansion to 85 Bcm/year is possible, by construction of Line D from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to China, but this is unlikely to go ahead until it is seen as strategically necessary by China - that is, probably not before the late 2020s. Central Asian exports to Russia may continue to decline. Other routes - the proposed TAPI line to India, or westward exports to Europe via a Trans Caspian pipeline - are very unlikely to be opened up. As for supply, Turkmenistan has ample resources but it may take cooperation with Chinese and other foreign companies to develop them effectively. By contrast, both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have supply side constraints. In Kazakhstan, the government expects net exports to fall almost to zero during the 2020s, due both to increased reinjection of gas for oil production, and domestic gasification. In Uzbekistan, most output is committed to domestic consumers: new production from Lukoil, and/or the effects of energy sector reform now in progress, could free up some volumes. The paper considers the prospects for production, domestic markets and export. [post_title] => Central Asian Gas: prospects for the 2020s [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => central-asian-gas-prospects-for-the-2020s [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-12-11 11:04:33 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-12-11 11:04:33 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=33653 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 32893 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_content] => The trilateral talks between the EU, Russia, and Ukraine regarding the transit of Russian gas via Ukraine beyond the expiry of the existing transit contract, on 31 December 2019, have so far failed to yield a solution. With the deadline fast approaching, the sides remain far apart in their negotiating positions. This Insight assesses the current state of the negotiations, the likelihood of an interruption in Russian gas transit via Ukraine in January 2020, and the potential impact of such a suspension of gas transit. [post_title] => Russia-Ukraine gas transit talks: risks for all sides [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russia-ukraine-gas-transit-talks-risks-for-all-sides [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-11-13 12:14:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=32893 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31542 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-05-03 11:18:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-05-03 10:18:25 [post_content] =>

Trilateral talks between the EU, Russia and Ukraine on gas transit through Ukraine after 1 January 2020 – that is, after the expiry of the current transit contract – are due to resume in late May. Gazprom’s transit diversification projects, Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream, will not be operating at full capacity by that time and arrangements must be made. But there is little sign of progress in the talks and political factors could prevent a deal being done. Companies and governments are assessing the risk of a supply interruption. Should one occur, it could have a lasting negative impact on the position of gas in Europe.

[post_title] => Russia-Ukraine transit talks: the risks to gas in Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russia-ukraine-transit-talks-risks-gas-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-05-03 11:18:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-05-03 10:18:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31542 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31286 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-11-29 11:13:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-11-29 11:13:07 [post_content] => Gazprom’s pipeline projects that aim to diversify transit away from Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream, are very unlikely to be operating at full capacity by 31 December 2019, when the current transit contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz expires. New contractual arrangements must therefore be agreed – and are being negotiated in an atmosphere of unprecedented friction between the companies. Failure to reach agreement would result in supply disruptions; this could undermine further gas’s prospects of becoming part of Europe’s energy supply future, which is already being questioned due to the EU’s decarbonisation strategy. The paper reviews the progress of transit diversification, the state of the negotiations and possible outcomes, and the implications of no agreement being reached. It considers the prospects for transit of Russian gas to Europe up to 2025 and the implications for Ukraine, and argues that, even if and when the transit diversification projects are complete, Gazprom will require some Ukrainian pipeline capacity. A close look is taken at projected volumes, transport capacities and seasonal flow factors. Finally the investment requirements of the Ukrainian transport system, and the influence on this of gas market reforms are considered. [post_title] => Russian gas transit through Ukraine after 2019: the options [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russian-gas-transit-ukraine-2019-options [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-11-29 11:53:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-11-29 11:53:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31286 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31131 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-07-30 11:41:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-07-30 10:41:37 [post_content] =>

A new round of political activity to promote the Southern Gas Corridor from the Caspian to Europe has begun. In February, European energy ministers and supplier nation officials met in Baku. In June, first gas entered the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey, and the first substantial source of supply for the Southern Corridor, the Shah Deniz II project in Azerbaijan, started producing. Shah Deniz II will ramp up to peak output of 16 bcm/year by 2021-22. Europe will then receive around 10 bcm, no more than 2 per cent of its overall demand, via the Southern Corridor, compared to the 10-20 per cent that had been envisaged in Brussels. While political leaders continue to paint the corridor’s prospects in very bright colours, the market dynamics – in the Caspian region itself, in the Caucasus and Turkey, and in Europe – are less promising. Commercial conditions for the Southern Corridor’s success have deteriorated as political support for it has grown. This paper argues that, up to 2030, the corridor will most likely remain an insubstantial contributor to Europe’s gas balance. At best, there may be sufficient gas for a second string of TANAP, but only at the end of the 2020s. The paper considers the potential sources of supply for the Southern Corridor (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and others including Iran, Kurdistan, and the East Mediterranean); demand and transport issues; and the conditions under which Southern Corridor gas will compete with other supply in the European market.

[post_title] => Let's not exaggerate - Southern Gas Corridor prospects to 2030 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => lets-not-exaggerate-southern-gas-corridor-prospects-2030 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-07-30 11:41:37 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-07-30 10:41:37 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31131 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30925 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-03-15 14:10:46 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-03-15 14:10:46 [post_content] => The final decision in the commercial arbitration between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy, on multiple disputes over their gas supply and transit contracts for 2009-19, was issued late last month. The total claims in the case, which started in 2014 at the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, were reported to be higher than $70 billion, making it one of the largest cases ever. Gazprom responded by appealing the decisions, initiating proceedings to terminate the contracts and cancelling the planned resumption of direct imports to Ukraine. This Energy Insight argues that hopes for a managed decline of the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade on a commercial basis, despite the political hostility between the two sides, are not being realised. Commerce has been unable to disentangle itself from politics. Prospects for the 2020s, when Ukrainian transit will still be required, in spite of Gazprom's transit diversification projects, are discussed. [post_title] => After the Gazprom-Naftogaz arbitration: commerce still entangled in politics [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gazprom-naftogaz-arbitration-commerce-still-entangled-politics [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-03-15 14:10:46 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-03-15 14:10:46 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30925 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30177 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-03-13 10:31:57 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-03-13 10:31:57 [post_content] => This Energy Insight looks at how far the Ukrainian gas market, one of Europe’s largest, has moved away from a model based on large-scale Russian imports and post-Soviet economic relationships, towards a new set of arrangements underpinned by closer integration with the European market. The transition is taking place against a volatile political and economic background of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine and the economic slump that has accompanied it. This article considers the progress of Ukraine’s efforts to minimise Russian gas imports, and to raise domestic gas production, and of Russia’s transit diversification policy. It surveys the changes in Ukraine’s domestic market. [post_title] => Adversity and reform: Ukrainian gas market prospects [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => adversity-reform-ukrainian-gas-market-prospects [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-03-13 10:31:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-03-13 10:31:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30177 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29368 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2016-07-11 12:01:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-07-11 11:01:03 [post_content] => This paper addresses the gas supply squeeze that has arisen in Azerbaijan. It covers the increase in demand in the domestic market, and Georgia and Turkey, and the unforeseen decline in the legacy state-operated fields, that have combined to produce the problem. It discusses the extent to which the shortage of supply may continue into the 2020s, and reviews previous estimates of Azerbaijan’s output in that decade. In any producing province, predicting the decline rate in post-plateau field production is prone to error – and in the case of Azerbaijan, the reduction in funds available for sustaining investment has exacerbated this issue. In the 1990s, Azerbaijan attracted major upstream companies to participate in the development of existing fields and in the exploration for new oil and gas discoveries. The implementation of the Azeri-Chirag- Gunashli and Shah Deniz projects can be regarded as successful outcomes of this process. In the 2000s Europe, from a policy perspective, intensified its search for alternatives to Russian pipeline gas imports. The ‘Southern Corridor’ was viewed by many as the key element in this strategy for gas supply diversification. Whilst Shah Deniz 2 gas will flow beyond Turkey to South East Europe and Italy, volumes are modest compared with the original Southern Corridor ‘vision’. This paper builds on previous publications by the OIES Natural Gas Research Programme that have addressed the reality of a lack of firm supply available to 2030 for this route. It is especially relevant as part of any assessment of Europe’s supply situation in the 2020s in a post LNG supply surplus era. [post_title] => Azerbaijan's gas supply squeeze and the consequences for the Southern Corridor [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => azerbaijans-gas-supply-squeeze-consequences-southern-corridor [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-16 13:49:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-16 13:49:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=29368 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29150 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2016-02-29 11:43:14 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-02-29 11:43:14 [post_content] => The future of the transportation of Russian gas to Europe is wide open. The role of Ukraine, historically the main transit corridor, will change after the current transit contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy expires on 31 December 2019. Gazprom has already substantially reduced the volumes of gas it transits across Ukraine, and expressed its intention of reducing the level further by means of transit diversification pipelines (Nord Stream, Turkish Stream, etc). While that strategy is broadly supported by the largest purchasers of Russian gas in Europe, in Brussels there is political opposition, in addition to regulatory barriers to the pipeline projects. Tensions over these issues have risen sharply as a result of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2014, the annexation of Crimea, and the resulting deterioration of Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Europe political relations. In contrast to the wealth of commentary that has appeared about the political issues, this paper focuses on the natural gas trade itself. It includes scenarios that allow a comparison of Gazprom’s long-term contractual commitments with possible gas flows in the 2020s through existing and possible future pipeline networks; it considers the regulatory issues and obstacles to building new large scale infrastructure of the kind Gazprom proposes; and it looks at the possible commercial and contractual frameworks for future gas transit across, and gas supply to, Ukraine. [post_title] => Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine Post-2019 - pipeline scenarios, gas flow consequences, and regulatory constraints [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russian-gas-transit-across-ukraine-post-2019-pipeline-scenarios-gas-flow-consequences-and-regulatory-constraints [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-16 14:06:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-16 14:06:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=29150 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27376 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2015-01-21 12:50:05 [post_date_gmt] => 2015-01-21 12:50:05 [post_content] => The cancellation of the South Stream gas pipeline across the Black Sea may signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy. Its replacement by similar pipelines direct to Turkey, and the abandonment of Gazprom’s long time strategy of supplying gas directly to European customers, comes in the wake of financial sanctions and an inability to negotiate the construction of new pipelines within the EU due to Third Energy Package regulation. The signing a first major pipeline export contract with China in 2014, and the possibility of a second contract in 2015, is shifting the emphasis of future Russian gas exports away from Europe and towards Asia. The irony of this change, which has largely been forced on Russia following US and EU measures taken in response to the Ukraine crisis, is that it has pushed Gazprom into a much more logical commercial export strategy and one which it should have adopted some years previously. The principal problem is that financial sanctions may prevent the company from being able to simultaneously finance a number of very large pipeline export projects. [post_title] => Does the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => does-the-cancellation-of-south-stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-russian-gas-export-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-03-01 14:00:24 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-03-01 14:00:24 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/does-the-cancellation-of-south-stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-russian-gas-export-policy/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27389 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-10-27 10:57:52 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-10-27 10:57:52 [post_content] => There is limited scope for significantly reducing overall European dependence on Russian gas before the mid-2020s. Countries in the Baltic region and south eastern Europe which are highly dependent on Russian gas, and hence extremely vulnerable to interruptions, could substantially reduce and even eliminate imports of Russian gas by the early 2020s, by a combination of LNG and pipeline gas from Azerbaijan. Similar measures could reduce (but not eliminate) the dependence of central Europe and Turkey on Russian gas. However, Russian gas will be highly competitive with all other pipeline gas and LNG (including US LNG) supplies to Europe, and Gazprom’s market power to impact European hub prices may be considerable. Countries with strong geopolitical fears related to Russian gas dependence will need to either terminate, or not renew on expiry, their long term contracts with Gazprom. [post_title] => Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas - distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => reducing-european-dependence-on-russian-gas-distinguishing-natural-gas-security-from-geopolitics [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 11:01:21 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 11:01:21 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/reducing-european-dependence-on-russian-gas-distinguishing-natural-gas-security-from-geopolitics/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27409 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-07-18 14:17:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-07-18 13:17:49 [post_content] => The current gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine is potentially the most serious yet. It takes place against the background of the two countries’ deteriorating relations following the collapse of the Yanukovich government, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. In June, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on the pricing of gas imported to Ukraine broke down, gas deliveries were halted, and Gazprom (the exporter) and Naftogaz Ukrainy (the importer) began arbitration proceedings against each other. The main obstacle to agreement on gas issues is political. Throughout the post-Soviet period, commercial agreements between Gazprom and importing companies in Ukraine were underpinned by inter-governmental agreements (IGAs). From 2006, contracts were signed without specific reference to IGAs, but the Russian and Ukrainian governments continued to participate in discussions of gas import and transit, and corporate negotiations were conducted alongside political negotiations. This year, political relationships have come close to breaking down, and the European Commission, concerned at the possible impact of a Russia-Ukraine dispute on the transit of Russian gas to Europe, has joined three-sided negotiations on the unresolved gas issues. By mid-June these had come to a standstill. This comment assesses the commercial and political context of recent times leading up to the current impasse and places the price levels at the core of the commercial dispute in the context of developments in European traded markets, concessions on Russian contract price levels in North West Europe and prevailing prices in other FSU states.  This comment is the latest in a series of publications by the OIES Natural Gas Research Programme focusing on the continuing tension in natural gas matters – commercial and political between Russia and Ukraine. [post_title] => Ukraine's imports of Russian gas - how a deal might be reached [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraines-imports-of-russian-gas-how-a-deal-might-be-reached [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 15:54:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 15:54:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/ukraines-imports-of-russian-gas-how-a-deal-might-be-reached/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27427 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-03-10 12:29:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-03-10 12:29:50 [post_content] => The change of government in Kyiv, the Russian military action in Crimea, the diplomatic reaction by the western powers, and the perceived danger of war, clearly have implications for all economic relations between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, especially in the energy sphere. Russia supplies about 30% of Europe’s natural gas, and more than half of these volumes are still transported via Ukraine. In Ukraine, gas supply issues are combined with the economic upheavals aggravated by political crisis. As of March 10th 2014, the most likely source of supply disruptions is the serious indebtedness of Naftogaz Ukrainy, which, despite clearing some of its $3.3 billion debt to Gazprom in late February, as of 7 March was in arrears to Gazprom by a sum of just under $2 billion.  In previous Russo-Ukrainian gas disputes, such a build-up of debt has led to Gazprom cutting off deliveries to Ukrainian customers and the subsequent diversion of transit gas bound for Europe to consumption in Ukraine. This led in January 2009 to all westward deliveries of Russian gas, both to EU and Ukrainian destinations, being suspended for two weeks. If gas deliveries through Ukraine are halted the impact would be less serious than in 2009, because (i) the Nord Stream pipeline, which transports Russian gas to Germany without crossing Ukraine or Belarus, has been completed, and other interconnections have improved the situation in eastern Europe; and (ii) the economic situation, and the arrival of milder weather means that demand is relatively low. From Europe’s standpoint, commercial logic would suggest that support would be given to diversifying gas transit away from Ukraine, including regulatory support for the South Stream pipeline, which, if completed with four strings, should enable the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to be suspended completely by 2020. However, it is possible that a political move to minimise cooperation with Russia on energy issues in line with European governments’ views of the Russian action in Crimea – may prevail. In this case, the EU-Russian disputes over gas imports and regulation will worsen, with potentially negative consequences for South Stream. Moreover, European efforts to diversify away from Russian gas, the success of which has been limited in the past because of the economic costs, will be revived. [post_title] => What the Ukrainian crisis means for gas markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => what-the-ukrainian-crisis-means-for-gas-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 16:33:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 16:33:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/what-the-ukrainian-crisis-means-for-gas-markets/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27498 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2013-01-17 15:41:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2013-01-17 15:41:38 [post_content] => This energy comment by Simon Pirani is published in conjunction with an paper by James Henderson. The comment and paper evaluate the development of competition in the Russian gas production sector and the impact of the recession and pricing policies on demand for Russian gas in its main markets. While Gazprom has generally been focused on developing giant, but remote, fields such as Bovanenkovskoye on the Yamal peninsula and Shtokman (postponed during 2012), it has seen the market for these relatively high cost base supplies at best static in Europe and shrinking within Russia as others gain market share.  The rising tide of Russian domestic gas prices has ‘lifted all boats’. Certainly Gazprom has benefitted, but this has provided strong incentives for its domestic upstream competitors who have demonstrated robust production growth over the past few years. James develops this thesis with a wealth of analysis and insight based on his long experience of the sector. This comment provides an update of the analysis in his paper ‘Elusive Potential: Gas Consumption in the CIS and the Quest for Efficiency’, OIES 2011.  The three main markets for Russian gas; namely the domestic market, CIS and European markets have seen consumption levels significantly impacted by a range of factors in the last four years.  These include the impact of the financial crisis and subsequent recession, the growth of renewables (and coal) in Europe, the increasing competition between suppliers of gas as well as the consequences of abrupt changes in gas price levels in specific market geographies. [post_title] => Consumers as players in the Russian gas sector [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => consumers-as-players-in-the-russian-gas-sector [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 15:36:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 15:36:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/consumers-as-players-in-the-russian-gas-sector/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27506 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2012-12-12 11:04:57 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-12-12 11:04:57 [post_content] => There has been a great deal of discussion about the Central Asian and Caspian region’s potential to produce and export gas, and about projects designed to establish new pipeline routes, e.g. to Europe and South Asia. The discovery of the South Yolotan (Galkynysh) field in Turkmenistan, now confirmed as one of the world’s largest, has renewed interest in the region. But the reality has confounded many expectations. Apart from traditional export routes to Russia and Iran, the only new corridor opened up has been to China. This detailed survey of the region, focussed mainly on the four main gas producers (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), examines why the presence of considerable resources does not necessarily guarantee rapid development. The political and economic background, the upstream conditions and domestic markets are considered, as well as the export trade. [post_title] => Central Asian and Caspian Gas Production and the Constraints on Export [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => central-asian-and-caspian-gas-production-and-the-constraints-on-export [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-01-23 14:41:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-01-23 14:41:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/central-asian-and-caspian-gas-production-and-the-constraints-on-export/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28219 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2011-07-19 12:19:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-07-19 11:19:39 [post_content] => While the former Soviet Union is usually thought of as a gas producing region, it is also the second-largest regional market behind north America – and that even modest changes in consumption could have big implications for future production in the region, the investment required for it and the availability of gas for export markets. The paper considers the substantial demand reduction that could be achieved with efficiency measures, and the reasons why progress towards these has been painfully slow and the potential largely unrealised. The paper concludes that some efficiency gains have already been made, and more could be achieved quite soon, largely as a result of the long-term trend towards higher gas prices, whereas larger-scale gains, dependent e.g. on power and heat sector reforms, will take much longer. The analysis is underpinned by a detailed study of the statistical information available, with particular reference to consumption by various economic sectors. [post_title] => Elusive Potential: Natural Gas Consumption in the CIS and the Quest for Efficiency [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => elusive-potential-natural-gas-consumption-in-the-cis-and-the-quest-for-efficiency-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-01-25 14:54:50 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-01-25 14:54:50 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/elusive-potential-natural-gas-consumption-in-the-cis-and-the-quest-for-efficiency-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28251 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2010-06-01 00:00:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2010-05-31 23:00:27 [post_content] => An agreement signed on 21 April 2010 by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and his newly-elected Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yanukovich provided for a 30% discount on Russian gas imported to Ukraine, in return for a 25-year extension of the lease to Russia of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol. The agreement came along with declarations from both sides that political and diplomatic relationships would improve after the departure of Yanukovich‟s predecessor Viktor Yushchenko, whose pronounced pro-western foreign policy, centred on NATO accession, was distrusted in Moscow. There followed a flurry of other proposals for deeper Russo-Ukrainian cooperation – in the electricity generation, atomic, aerospace and telecoms sectors, among others. This article considers the significance of the new agreement with Russia, (a) for Ukraine as a gas transit country, and for the European states that rely on Russian imports transported via Ukraine, and (b) for the Ukrainian gas market. [post_title] => The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its implications for Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-april-2010-russo-ukrainian-gas-agreement-and-its-implications-for-europe-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 15:02:30 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 15:02:30 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-april-2010-russo-ukrainian-gas-agreement-and-its-implications-for-europe-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27632 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2009-11-01 00:00:35 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-11-01 00:00:35 [post_content] => This article presents an overview of the impact of the current world economic crisis on natural gas markets in Russia and the CIS. It will discuss two types of changes that reflect broader international trends. First are the initial consequences of the recession that was triggered by the US financial crisis of September 2008: sharp falls in gas consumption, which have produced oversupplied markets and falling prices; cuts in production and investment; and intensified competition between suppliers. Second are deep-going changes that could result over the longer term, as these impacts of the recession combine with other factors. The recovery of demand, however long it takes, will be accompanied by trends such as (i) technological advances, for instance those allowing the economic recovery of unconventional gas reserves, which could in time spread beyond the US; and (ii) changes in market structure, and particularly the increasing availability of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which will have consequences for regional markets for pipeline gas. [post_title] => The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Russian and CIS Gas Markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-impact-of-the-economic-crisis-on-russian-and-cis-gas-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 15:03:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 15:03:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-impact-of-the-economic-crisis-on-russian-and-cis-gas-markets/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27656 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2009-02-01 00:00:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-02-01 00:00:31 [post_content] => The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 was by far the most serious of its kind. The two sides failed to agree a price for Russian gas supply to Ukraine and a tariff for the transit of Russian gas to Europe before previous agreements expired on 31 December 2008. Russian exports to Ukraine were cut off on 1 January. Exports to 16 EU member states and Moldova were drastically reduced on 6 January and cut completely from 7 January. Deliveries to both Ukraine and other European countries restarted on 20 January following the signing of two new ten year contracts. The most seriously affected countries in the Balkans experienced a humanitarian emergency, with parts of the populations unable to heat their homes. Significant economic problems, but not of a humanitarian kind, were also caused in Hungary and Slovakia. [post_title] => The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-russo-ukrainian-gas-dispute-of-january-2009-a-comprehensive-assessment [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-12-04 10:28:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-12-04 10:28:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-russo-ukrainian-gas-dispute-of-january-2009-a-comprehensive-assessment/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27708 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2007-06-01 00:00:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2007-05-31 23:00:18 [post_content] => The paper aims to provide an overview of the Ukrainian gas sector. Public discussion in western Europe has turned to Ukraine as a transit country – through which more than four-fifths of Russian gas exports to Europe pass – when its disputes with Russia have threatened to interrupt supply. Such an occasion was in the first week of January 2006. Pressure was reduced in some pipelines, pending resolution of that year’s particularly bitter dispute. [post_title] => Ukraine’s Gas Sector [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraines-gas-sector [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:12:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:12:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/ukraines-gas-sector/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) ) [post_count] => 27 [current_post] => -1 [before_loop] => 1 [in_the_loop] => [post] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44376 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-12-07 14:10:01 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-07 14:10:01 [post_content] =>

In the last ten years, Ukraine has sharply reduced its dependence on gas imports, and stopped direct purchases from Russia. In the next ten years, the gas sector will be shaped by Ukraine's own policy choices. Key issues include the potential role of gas in electricity generation, as coal is phased out. On the consumption side, heat sector reform could produce significant reductions in gas demand. On production, the challenge in the coming years will be to maintain output at around 20 bcm/year, Ukraine is also faced with managing the decline of its gas transportation business, as continued reduction of east-west flows is the most likely prospect.

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