Jonathan Stern

Distinguished Research Fellow

Jonathan Stern founded the OIES Gas Research Programme in 2003 and was its Director until October 2011 when he became its Chairman and a Senior Research Fellow, he became a Distinguished Fellow in October 2016. He is honorary professor at the Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy, University of Dundee; Fellow of the Energy Delta Institute and a Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (in Tokyo). From 2011-16 he was the EU Speaker of the EU–Russia Gas Advisory Council. He is the author and editor of several books, including: Natural Gas in Asia: The Challenges of Growth in China, India, Japan and Korea, the second edition of which was published by OUP in 2008; co-editor with Bassam Fattouh of Natural Gas Markets in the Middle East and North Africa (OUP, 2011); and editor of, The Pricing of Internationally Traded Gas (OUP, 2012), editor of The Future of Gas in the Gulf: continuity and change (OIES, 2019). He is author of two chapters in: eds. Anne-Sophie Corbeau and David Ledesma, LNG Markets in Transition: the Great Reconfiguration, published by OIES and KAPSARC in 2016. His most recent papers published by the Institute in 2020 and 2022 are: Narratives for Gas in Decarbonising European Energy Markets, Challenges to the Future of LNG: decarbonisation, affordability and profitability; Methane Emissions from Natural Gas and LNG Imports: an increasingly urgent issue for the future of gas in Europe; Measurement, Reporting, and Verification of Methane Emissions from Natural Gas and LNG Trade: creating transparent and credible frameworks; and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from LNG Trade: from carbon neutral to GHG-verified.

Areas of Expertise
Natural gas issues worldwide: development, trade, liberalisation, regulation, security, utility business models, gas and decarbonisation. Methane emissions, measurement reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions from oil and gas.

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Contact

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                    [post_content] => Carbon-neutral LNG has become progressively limited to a relatively small number of trades in Asia and cannot be considered a credible or relevant environmental standard. Cargos should be `greenhouse gas verified’ and should set out the methodologies used to measure, report, and verify emissions. These methodologies should distinguish between assumptions and models for estimating emissions, and empirical measurement of emissions. Owners and operators of assets in the different segments of the supply chain should take responsibility for MRV of emissions from those assets. For sellers this would include emissions from the wellhead to the loading arm of the LNG ship (ie all upstream segments plus liquefaction), and this may also include shipping depending on ownership of that segment. Buyers would normally take responsibility of emissions from regasification, distribution and end-use. Reporting should focus on the degree of accuracy which has been achieved in tracking gas molecules from production through different segments of the supply chain to liquefaction, shipping and end-use. This will be especially important where emissions have been estimated rather than empirically measured. Measurement and reporting should be subject to verification by technically qualified companies which should have the capability to replicate a sample of emissions from the different assets in the supply chain. If offsets are used to claim GHG neutrality, these should be reported in detail along with the MRV of emissions.

In 2022, the attention of the gas and LNG world has been diverted by the security crisis in Europe and by global price levels. However, when this crisis passes, attention will return to climate targets and emission reductions. At that time, the LNG community must be able to credibly document its emissions which will become an increasingly critical part of its social license to operate.
                    [post_title] => Greenhouse Gas Emissions from LNG Trade: from carbon neutral to GHG-verified
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                    [post_content] => A sharp decline in gas flows on Nord Stream to Europe began on June 14, following the news that a gas turbine was “stuck” in Canada for maintenance as a result of western sanctions on Russia, and because further compressors at the Portovaya compressor station were also taken offline. There has been much commentary that this is all part of Russia’s plan to further squeeze the European gas market. But the technical and legal issues are very complex, and must be taken into account. As Nord Stream’s regular annual maintenance period ends on July 21, flows on Nord Stream are a key question. This comment addresses a number of these technical and legal aspects: At what level, if any, will flows return to? When will the roaming gas turbine return to Russia? Will other gas turbines head to Canada for major overhaul and when might they return? How many operational turbines are needed for maximum flows? Gazprom has somewhat belatedly called force majeure on the Nord Stream flows. What impact will this have and when might it end?
                    [post_title] => The Curious Incident of the Nord Stream Gas Turbine
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                    [post_content] => The geopolitical tensions between Russia and Europe over the build-up of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border have generated concerns over the extent of Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, and the possible consequences should the flow of Russian gas to Europe be curtailed, either partially or completely. In this paper, we analyse the potential impact on the UK of such a curtailment of Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe.

We find that while the UK would be unlikely to face a physical shortage of supplies, the ‘ripple effect’ of price increases at hubs in continental Europe would be quickly replicated on the UK trading hub, the National Balancing Point (NBP). There would also be an impact on physical flows of gas both in and out of the UK, as LNG cargoes would be regasified at spare capacity in UK LNG import terminals, but then re-exported to continental Europe via the two interconnectors with Belgium and the Netherlands. This would render the UK a ‘land bridge’ for LNG arriving into North-Western Europe, given that the three terminals in that part of continental Europe (Dunkerque in France, Zeebrugge in Belgium, and Gate Rotterdam in the Netherlands) would all likely be operating at full capacity.

In terms of the existing legal/regulatory frameworks for cooperation and ‘solidarity’ with regard to security of supply, we argue that while the position of the UK relative to neighbouring states remains uncertain with regard to post-Brexit agreements on the application of the solidarity provisions of the EU Security of Supply Regulation, pricing dynamics between the UK and neighbouring continental European markets would be sufficient to cause gas supplies to move from one market to another, albeit with the potential for some infrastructure bottlenecks.

Finally, in terms of impact on UK gas demand, the price spikes that would almost certainly accompany any physical disruption in Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe would be quickly felt in the UK, despite the lack of direct UK dependence on Russian pipeline gas supplies. The first part of UK gas demand to be curtailed by such price spikes – beyond the high levels currently seen on the UK wholesale gas market – would be industrial demand. However, the remainder of UK gas demand (for power generation and heating) is far less elastic, and strongly dependent on seasonal and short-term weather factors. For this reason, concerns over an interruption in Russian supply to Europe whose effects would ripple through to the UK will remain heightened until the end of the winter heating season.
                    [post_title] => The Potential Impact on the UK of a Disruption in Russian Gas Supplies to Europe
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                    [post_content] => The Global Methane Pledge to reduce emissions by at least 30 per cent by 2030, was signed by more than 100 countries at the COP26 Conference in November 2021. Reducing methane emissions from fossil fuel sources by up to 75 per cent by 2030 has been identified as an essential contribution to reducing the rate of global temperature increase. The EU Methane Strategy proposed the establishment of a methane intensity standard for domestically produced and imported fossil fuels, with an initial focus on emissions from natural gas and LNG imports, however no such standard is included in the 2021 legislative proposals.

Of the six major pipeline gas and LNG suppliers to Europe, Norway has progressed MRV and reduced emissions to a much greater extent than other major exporters to Europe. The complexity of the US LNG export supply chain, with huge numbers of production locations and multiple pipelines and processing plants contrasts with the relative simplicity of the Qatari supply chain. In the case of Russia, the focus is on Gazprom’s long transmission pipelines, while Algerian and Nigerian companies are only just beginning to address these issues.

European buyers will need to establish supply chain emission values with exporting companies, and possibly also with governments. Asian importers will need to agree similar values with their LNG suppliers. The SGE and GIIGNL methodologies, published in late 2021, combined with the study of Cheniere’s 2018 cargos and its commitment to provide individual cargo emission tags from 2022, are important milestones in the creation of frameworks for establishing LNG supply chain emission values. By contrast, `carbon-neutral’ LNG cargos lack MRV transparency and therefore environmental credibility.

Transparent MRV of emissions has become a non-negotiable requirement for the international gas community. A lack of this information undermines claims that natural gas can play a significant ongoing role in the low carbon energy transition. The longer it takes to establish such documentation, the more likely it is that countries will adopt alternative energy options.
                    [post_title] => Measurement, Reporting, and Verification of Methane Emissions from Natural Gas and LNG Trade: creating transparent and credible frameworks
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                    [post_date] => 2020-12-11 08:50:17
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                    [post_content] => The role of gases in the energy transition is a different, and much more immediate, issue in the EU, compared with other global regions. Net zero targets for 2050 mean that in order to retain the gas market and the extensive network infrastructure which has been developed, zero carbon gases will need to be developed, and natural gas (methane) will need to be decarbonized. Maximum availability of biomethane and hydrogen from power to gas is estimated at 100–150 billion cubic meters by 2050 (or around 25–30% of gas demand in the late 2010s). Therefore, large scale hydrogen production from reforming methane with carbon capture and storage (CCS), or pyrolysis, will be needed to maintain anything close to current demand levels. Costs of biomethane and hydrogen options are several times higher than prices of natural gas in 2019–2020. Significant financial support for decarbonization technologies — from governments and regulators — will therefore be needed in the 2020s, if they are to be available on a large scale in the 2030s and 2040s. If the EU gas community fails to advance convincing decarbonized narratives backed by investments which allow for commercialization of renewable gas and methane decarbonization technologies; and/or governments fail to create the necessary legal/fiscal and regulatory frameworks to support these technologies, then energy markets will progressively move away from gases and towards electrification.

Jonathan Stern,

`The Role of Gases in the European Energy Transition’, Russian Journal of Economics 6 (2020), 390-405
                    [post_title] => The Role of Gases in the European Energy Transition
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                    [post_content] => Pressure is mounting on the natural gas and LNG community to reduce methane emissions and this is most urgent in EU countries following the adoption of much tougher greenhouse gas reduction targets of 2030 and the publication of the European Commission’s Methane Strategy. With rapidly declining indigenous EU production and therefore rising import dependence, there are increasing calls for emissions from imported pipeline gas and LNG to be quantified and based on actual measurements, as opposed to standard emission factors. The Methane Strategy promises to be a significant milestone in that process. Companies which are supplying (or intending to supply) natural gas to the EU – the largest global import market for pipeline gas and a very significant market for LNG - would be well advised to pay close attention to how the regulation of methane emissions is unfolding, and to make an immediate and positive response. Failure to do so could accelerate the demise of natural gas in European energy balances faster than would otherwise have been the case, and shorten the time available for transition to decarbonised gases – specifically hydrogen – using existing natural gas infrastructure.

This EU initiative will (and arguably already has) attracted attention from non-EU governments and companies involved in global gas and LNG trade. We have already seen deliveries of `carbon neutral’ LNG cargos to Asia, as well as a long-term LNG contract in which the greenhouse gas content of cargos will be measured, reported and verified (MRV) according to an agreed methodology. Natural gas and LNG exports, if based on these standards or those set out in the EU Methane Strategy, may be able to command premium prices from buyers eager to demonstrate their own GHG reduction credentials to governments, customers and civil society.
                    [post_title] => Methane Emissions from Natural Gas and LNG Imports: an increasingly urgent issue for  the future of gas in Europe
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                    [post_content] => Oil and gas markets seem similar, but have become progressively different over the past several decades. Natural monopoly and cyclical booms and busts are common features of their histories. But oil has been a liberalised global market based on regional and global benchmark prices for several decades, while natural gas market liberalisation and a move to spot and hub-based prices is a more recent phenomenon in Europe, and remains at a relatively early stage in Asia. However, substantial increases in global LNG trade in the 2010s, accompanied by an increase in short term trading and spot pricing, have led to observations that a global gas market is developing. The collapse in oil and (to a less extent) gas demand following the coronavirus pandemic has coincided with, and contributed to, record low oil and gas prices. This extreme cyclical event is likely to accelerate the move to market pricing in Asian LNG, but it remains unclear whether its longer-term consequences will hold back or accelerate the transition away from oil and gas and towards a lower carbon economy.
                    [post_title] => A Comparative History of Oil and Gas Markets and Prices: is 2020 just an extreme cyclical event or an acceleration of the energy transition?
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                    [post_date] => 2020-03-23 10:45:49
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                    [post_content] => Gas market liberalisation is at an early stage in Malaysia. Not all of the legal and regulatory framework for third-party access (TPA) was in place at the end of 2019, and there had been no new entrants. Using stakeholder analysis, this paper analyses obstacles to the development of a liberalised and competitive gas market, specifically the existence of long-term sales contracts for large sections of the market which is dominated by incumbents, and a lack of transparent and market-related prices which hinders market entry. The lack of progress during the 2019 TPA pilot phase, highlighted these obstacles and raised questions about how quickly liberalisation could develop in future, and whether additional structural and regulatory measures would be needed. The paper also examines whether the development of global and regional (ASEAN) LNG trading could facilitate competition in the domestic gas market.
                    [post_title] => Gas Industry Reform and the Evolution of a Competitive Gas Market in Malaysia
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                    [post_date] => 2019-10-15 11:07:22
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                    [post_content] => Decarbonisation should be very much on the radar of new LNG projects currently taking FID, commissioning around 2024-25 and planning to operate up to 2050. The LNG community needs to replace an `advocacy’ message - based on the generality of emissions from combustion of natural gas being lower than from other fossil fuels - with certified data on carbon and methane emissions from specific elements of the value chain for individual projects. As carbon reduction targets tighten over the coming decade, LNG cargoes which do not have value chain emissions certified by accredited authorities, or which fail to meet defined emission levels, run the risk of progressively being deemed to have a lower commercial value and eventually being excluded from jurisdictions with the strictest standards. There will be no place in this process for confidentiality; nothing less than complete transparency of data and methodologies will be acceptable.

In relation to affordability, prospects for new projects look much better than they did three years ago. Cost estimates for most new projects suggest that they will be able to deliver profitably to most established and anticipated import markets at or below the wholesale prices prevailing in those markets over the past decade, although affordability in south Asian countries may be challenging. But new projects need to factor in costs related to future decarbonisation requirements in both exporting and importing countries. To the extent that LNG suppliers can meet standards through relatively low-cost offsets – forest projects, low-cost biogas and biomethane – this may not greatly impact their commercial viability. However, any requirement to transform methane into hydrogen with CCS in either the exporting or importing country, would substantially impact project economics and the affordability of LNG relative to other energy choices.
                    [post_title] => Challenges to the Future of LNG: decarbonisation, affordability, and profitability
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                    [ID] => 31938
                    [post_author] => 111
                    [post_date] => 2019-10-07 12:27:23
                    [post_date_gmt] => 2019-10-07 11:27:23
                    [post_content] => The European Union (EU) has adopted ambitious decarbonization targets for 2050.

Renewable electricity and electrification are the key drivers, but are not sufficient on their own to meet the targets. A number of countries expect decarbonized gas (e.g. renewable hydrogen and biomethane) to be part of a future decarbonized energy system.

Within that context, this paper examines proposals, recently issued by Spain’s energy regulator (CNMC), to define the methodology for remunerating gas distribution and transmission networks, and LNG regasification terminals. Their proposals would reduce significantly the remuneration of these activities. Bearing in mind the objective of decarbonization, this paper analyzes key features of the proposals and concludes with recommendations. We suggest:
  • Adoption of a common methodology for remunerating new investment in gas and electricity infrastructure assets. The Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) approach is a suitable methodology, especially for high-risk investment to integrate hydrogen.
  • CNMC reconsideration of its proposals for existing assets. The aim should be to ensure that, even if remuneration is reduced to some extent, investors will still be compensated adequately and that the companies will continue to support the investments needed to digitalize processes, deliver natural gas and eventually deliver renewable gas where it is economic to do so. This is an important signal for current and future investors whose investments will be regulated by the CNMC.
  • Clarification of the methodology for remunerating renewable gas facilities. If renewable gas (especially hydrogen) requires access to regulated gas networks, the CNMC methodology must provide suitable incentives to invest in network expansion and upgrading, as required, as well as to maintain natural gas operations. Even if no decision is made in the short-term regarding hydrogen, it would be prudent to leave the door open, by making the regulation compatible with future decisions involving hydrogen development.
  • Consideration of potentially stranded assets. The CNMC and the Government should coordinate over the remuneration of infrastructure assets when national policy decisions may lead to the stranding of these assets.
  • Decarbonization of the energy system as a whole. The CNMC and the Government should consider how best to promote the decarbonization of the energy system as a whole, rather than its individual parts, and what role is to be played by regulated networks and by unregulated initiatives in competitive markets, especially for the development of hydrogen systems.
  [post_title] => The future of gas infrastructure remuneration in Spain [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-future-of-gas-infrastructure-remuneration-in-spain [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-10-07 12:27:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-10-07 11:27:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31938 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31387 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-02-05 10:15:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-02-05 10:15:31 [post_content] => The advocacy narrative of the European Union gas community which focused on coal to gas switching and backing up renewables has failed to convince governments, NGOs and media commentators that it can achieve post-2030 decarbonisation targets. The gas community therefore needs to develop decarbonisation narratives, showing how it will develop commercial scale projects for biogas, biomethane, and hydrogen from power to gas (electrolysis) and reformed methane. COP21 carbon targets require an accelerating decline in EU methane demand starting around 2030. In 2050, the maximum projected availability of renewable gas is equivalent to 25 per cent of current EU gas demand. Maintaining current demand levels will therefore require very substantial volumes of hydrogen from reformed methane with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Pipeline gas and LNG suppliers will need to progressively decarbonise their product if it is to remain saleable in Europe. However, networks face an existential threat unless they can maintain existing throughput while simultaneously adapting to a decarbonised product. Significant threats and challenges to these narratives include: short term geopolitical concerns stemming from dependence on Russian gas, ‘hydrocarbon rejectionism’, and an inability of companies to invest for a post-2030 decarbonised future. Governments will need to shift current policy and regulatory frameworks from competition to decarbonisation which will require a ‘regulatory revolution’. In addition to government funding and regulatory support, there will need to be very substantial corporate investment in projects for which there is currently no business case. Failure of the gas community to create and deliver credible decarbonisation narratives is likely to result in the adoption of electrification rather than gas decarbonisation options. [post_title] => Narratives for Natural Gas in Decarbonising European Energy Markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => narratives-natural-gas-decarbonising-european-energy-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-02-21 09:50:46 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-02-21 09:50:46 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31387 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30763 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-12-05 09:59:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-12-05 09:59:42 [post_content] => Modelling studies suggest that COP21 targets can be met with global gas demand peaking in the 2030s and declining slowly thereafter. This would qualify gas to be considered a `transition fuel’ to a low carbon economy. However, such an outcome is by no means a foregone conclusion. There are limited numbers of countries outside the OECD which can be expected to afford to pay wholesale (or import) prices of $6-8/MMbtu and above, which are needed to remunerate 2017 delivery costs of large volumes of gas from new pipeline gas or LNG projects. Prices towards the top of (and certainly above) this range are likely to make gas increasingly uncompetitive leading to progressive demand destruction even in OECD countries. The current debate in the gas community is when the `glut’ of LNG will dissipate, and the global supply/demand balance will tighten. The unspoken assumption is that when this happens – generally believed to be around the early/mid 2020s - prices will rise somewhere close to 2011-14 levels, allowing a return to profitability for projects which came on stream since the mid-2010s and allowing new projects to move forward. Should this assumption prove be correct, it will create major problems for the future of gas. The key to gas fulfilling its potential role as a transition fuel up to and beyond 2030, is that it must be delivered to high income markets below $8/MMbtu, and to low income markets below $6/MMbtu (and ideally closer to $5/MMbtu). The major challenge to the future of gas will be to ensure that it does not become (and in many low-income countries remain) unaffordable and/or uncompetitive, long before its emissions make it unburnable. [post_title] => Challenges to the Future of Gas: unburnable or unaffordable? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => challenges-future-gas-unburnable-unaffordable [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-12-05 09:59:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-12-05 09:59:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30763 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30506 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-07-03 15:24:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-07-03 14:24:15 [post_content] => A detailed analysis by Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava of Gazprom’s March 2017 competition commitments in respect of gas sales to Central and Eastern Europe, concludes that the concerns expressed by DG COMP in respect of territorial restrictions, pricing, and infrastructure issues have been addressed, both in form and in substance. Acceptance of these commitments would provide insurance against future abuse by Gazprom of its dominant position in these countries. Most importantly, Gazprom has henceforth agreed to charge average weighted import border prices and/or prices at relevant generally accepted liquid hubs in Continental Europe instead of alternative fuel (oil-linked) prices. This means that if the commitments are accepted, buyers in these countries will be able to buy Russian gas at hub prices before interconnections have been established with these hubs (potentially up to three years hence). The acceptance by Gazprom of competitive, defined as liquid hub, prices has much wider significance, as it signals the end of alternative fuel pricing for gas in EU countries. DG COMPs market test of the commitments elicited a generally positive response with the exception of Poland’s PGNiG which expressed deep dissatisfaction on virtually all issues, in particular the lack of any fine or obligation for Gazprom to pay compensation for its past behaviour. The study suggests that the most likely outcome is the acceptance by DG COMP of the commitments (with minor amendments) and closure of the case with a settlement. Should some member states, specifically Poland, attempt to derail the settlement, causing the case to be referred to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), the commitments are still likely to be implemented but legal proceedings could drag on for several more years. [post_title] => The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom’s Sales to Central and Eastern Europe: a detailed analysis of the commitments and the way forward [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => eu-competition-investigation-gazproms-sales-central-eastern-europe-detailed-analysis-commitments-way-forward [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-16 12:42:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-16 12:42:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30506 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30350 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-04-21 09:47:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-04-21 08:47:16 [post_content] =>

On 13 March 2017 DG COMP announced its satisfaction with Gazprom’s commitments, submitted in response to DG COMP’s concerns in respect of Gazprom’s alleged anti-competitive practices in several central and east European EU member states, relating to territorial restrictions, pricing, and infrastructure. Gazprom’s commitments have addressed all substantiated DG COMP concerns and their acceptance would provide insurance against any future abuse by Gazprom of its dominant position in these countries. Most importantly, Gazprom has henceforth agreed to charge average weighted import border prices in Germany, France and Italy and/or prices at relevant generally accepted liquid hubs in Continental Europe instead of alternative fuel (oil-linked) prices, despite the fact that at present west European border/hub prices do not (yet) accurately represent gas market conditions in either Bulgaria or the Baltics (and only in the past one to two years, and only approximately in Poland). This means that if the commitments are accepted, buyers in these countries will be able to buy Russian gas at prices which otherwise would not have been offered to them until interconnections had been established with north-west European hubs (potentially up to three years hence). Therefore it is reasonable to expect an overall positive response to the commitments during the (ongoing) market test, followed by DG COMP’s acceptance of the commitments and closure of the case with a settlement. However, it cannot be ruled out that some member states, specifically Poland, might attempt to derail such a settlement. Should that happen and the case be referred to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), the whole episode could drag on for several more years.

[post_title] => The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom's Sales to Central and Eastern Europe: a comment on commitments [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => eu-competition-investigation-gazproms-sales-central-eastern-europe-comment-commitments [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-04-21 09:47:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-04-21 08:47:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30350 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30001 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-01-09 10:45:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-01-09 10:45:42 [post_content] =>

The European gas industry has argued that gas can be a bridging fuel in the transition to decarbonised energy markets because of the advantages of switching from coal to gas, and the role of gas in backing up intermittent renewable power generation. While this remains a logical approach for some countries, in others it has proved either not relevant, or generally unsuccessful in gaining acceptance with either policymakers or the environmental community. Policy decisions will be taken in the next 5-10 years which will irreversibly impact the future of gas in the period 2030-50. A paradigm shift in commercial time horizons and gas value chain cooperation will be necessary for the industry to embrace decarbonisation technologies (such as carbon capture and storage), which will eventually be necessary if gas is to prolong its future in European energy markets. To ensure a post-2030 future in European energy balances, the gas community will be obliged to adopt a new message: `Gas can Decarbonise’ (and remain competitive with other low/zero carbon energy supplies). It will need to back up this message with a strategy which will lead to the decarbonisation of methane starting no later than 2030. Failure to do so will be to accept a future of decline, albeit on a scale of decades, and to risk that by the time the community engages with decarbonisation, non-methane policy options will have been adopted which will make that decline irreversible.

Executive Summary       [post_title] => The Future of Gas in Decarbonising European Energy Markets - the need for a new approach [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => future-gas-decarbonising-european-energy-markets-need-new-approach [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-16 13:30:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-16 13:30:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30001 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 29314 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2016-06-06 12:40:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-06-06 11:40:15 [post_content] => The new Japanese LNG Strategy published in May 2016 envisages the creation of a liquid market and an international LNG hub in Japan. This promises to radically change the traditional JCC (crude oil) based pricing system in Japan, but also potentially in the Pacific Basin as a whole. But the path to hub creation and hub pricing in the early 2020s envisaged by the Strategy will not be straightforward. Non-US LNG projects starting up in the 2016-20 period have JCC-linked prices. US projects have offtake agreements which envisaged an Asian `premium’ to Atlantic Basin prices which has now disappeared. In contrast to `international cooperation’ envisaged by the Strategy which would see buyers and sellers agreeing to change the commercial terms of long term contracts, conflict could be a more likely outcome. [post_title] => The new Japanese LNG strategy: a major step towards hub-based gas pricing in Asia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => new-japanese-lng-strategy-major-step-towards-hub-based-gas-pricing-asia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-06-20 11:35:37 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-06-20 10:35:37 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=29314 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27376 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2015-01-21 12:50:05 [post_date_gmt] => 2015-01-21 12:50:05 [post_content] => The cancellation of the South Stream gas pipeline across the Black Sea may signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy. Its replacement by similar pipelines direct to Turkey, and the abandonment of Gazprom’s long time strategy of supplying gas directly to European customers, comes in the wake of financial sanctions and an inability to negotiate the construction of new pipelines within the EU due to Third Energy Package regulation. The signing a first major pipeline export contract with China in 2014, and the possibility of a second contract in 2015, is shifting the emphasis of future Russian gas exports away from Europe and towards Asia. The irony of this change, which has largely been forced on Russia following US and EU measures taken in response to the Ukraine crisis, is that it has pushed Gazprom into a much more logical commercial export strategy and one which it should have adopted some years previously. The principal problem is that financial sanctions may prevent the company from being able to simultaneously finance a number of very large pipeline export projects. [post_title] => Does the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => does-the-cancellation-of-south-stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-russian-gas-export-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-03-01 14:00:24 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-03-01 14:00:24 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/does-the-cancellation-of-south-stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-russian-gas-export-policy/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27385 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-12-01 12:42:14 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-12-01 12:42:14 [post_content] => Hub pricing is dominant in north west European gas markets and is spreading to the south and east of the Continent. A new study by Howard Rogers and Jonathan Stern finds that the most important determinants of European hub prices will be global gas market dynamics. Changes in these dynamics will create price competition between LNG from a variety of sources (including North America) and Russian pipeline gas in Europe. Changes in prices and contracts in the new competitive environment of European gas markets have had significant impacts on the roles and risks of the major groups of European gas market players. Mid-stream energy trading companies have encountered the biggest problems because hub pricing has rendered their traditional business model (at least partially) unworkable, and an urgency to move to a hub-minus/hub-plus commercial model. Should this prove impossible, companies are likely to exit the natural gas sector with significant impacts on security of supply, and the likelihood that many existing long term contracts will be unable to survive into the 2020s. Executive Summary [post_title] => The Dynamics of a Liberalised European Gas Market - Key determinants of hub prices, and roles and risks of major players [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-dynamics-of-a-liberalised-european-gas-market-key-determinants-of-hub-prices-and-roles-and-risks-of-major-players [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 10:58:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 10:58:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-dynamics-of-a-liberalised-european-gas-market-key-determinants-of-hub-prices-and-roles-and-risks-of-major-players/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27389 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-10-27 10:57:52 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-10-27 10:57:52 [post_content] => There is limited scope for significantly reducing overall European dependence on Russian gas before the mid-2020s. Countries in the Baltic region and south eastern Europe which are highly dependent on Russian gas, and hence extremely vulnerable to interruptions, could substantially reduce and even eliminate imports of Russian gas by the early 2020s, by a combination of LNG and pipeline gas from Azerbaijan. Similar measures could reduce (but not eliminate) the dependence of central Europe and Turkey on Russian gas. However, Russian gas will be highly competitive with all other pipeline gas and LNG (including US LNG) supplies to Europe, and Gazprom’s market power to impact European hub prices may be considerable. Countries with strong geopolitical fears related to Russian gas dependence will need to either terminate, or not renew on expiry, their long term contracts with Gazprom. [post_title] => Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas - distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => reducing-european-dependence-on-russian-gas-distinguishing-natural-gas-security-from-geopolitics [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 11:01:21 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 11:01:21 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/reducing-european-dependence-on-russian-gas-distinguishing-natural-gas-security-from-geopolitics/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27436 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2014-02-03 11:33:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2014-02-03 11:33:27 [post_content] => Since 2000, diverging regional gas demand and production trends have induced a wider and more flexible network of trade-flows in an increasingly interconnected gas world, accelerated by unforeseen shocks in both supply and demand. North America and the UK entered the 2000s with liberalised markets and after many years of pro-competition EU regulatory initiatives, the dominance of oil-indexation in continental Europe began to wane in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  In 2013 a combination of base price reductions and rebates brought Russian long term contract prices in competitive markets close to hub levels. The major lesson from North American and European gas markets is that financial distress of major utilities is transformative. This certainly pertains to the situation of Japan’s power generation companies who, excluding TEPCO, are currently losing in excess of $10 billion per year because of the need to import higher quantities of LNG (due to the shutdown of nuclear plant) at prices linked to crude at prices in excess of $100/bbl. Given the scale of the Asian importers existing oil-indexed LNG contracted portfolios (and hence the limited scope for adjusting price dynamics much before 2020) and the oil-indexed pricing expectations of non-US prospective suppliers, there is a developing mismatch in pricing aspirations not just for future, but also possibly for existing, contracts. The prospect of new supplies of US LNG post 2015 offers an alternative to the status quo in terms of pricing models. This paper argues however that rather than basing new contracts on a US price benchmark, Asian buyers should develop a price formation mechanism more attuned to national or regional fundamentals.  The paper concludes that we may move from todays ‘contractual impasse’ scenario to either a ‘smooth contractual transition’ or, less desirable for all parties, a scenario described as the ‘contractual train wreck’. While the growth of an liquid LNG trading hub is seen as a key enabler to move to a more rational pricing reference point for Asian LNG contracts, the paper recognises the not insubstantial challenges in achieving this, calling for institutional and policy change on the part of buyers as well as sellers in this crucial, historically high growth, market segment. [post_title] => Challenges to JCC Pricing in Asian LNG Markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => challenges-to-jcc-pricing-in-asian-lng-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-21 11:01:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-21 11:01:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/challenges-to-jcc-pricing-in-asian-lng-markets/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27496 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2013-02-12 08:22:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2013-02-12 08:22:56 [post_content] => This energy comment is a response to a paper by Sergei Komlev, from the Contract Structuring and Pricing Directorate of Gazprom Export, which challenged the conclusions of previous OIES research on European gas pricing and suggested that we had “refused to engage constructively with those who offer opposing viewpoints.” In this comment, Jonathan Stern and Howard Rogers set out the differences between their research and that of Sergei Komlev and respond to his criticisms. They conclude that contractual linkage of European natural gas prices to oil no longer has any market reality, and is only held in place by existing long-term contracts. By contrast they suggest that Komlev is refusing to recognize that the era of oil-linked gas pricing is drawing to a close in Europe (and is subject to increasingly serious challenge in Asia) and also refuses to accept that such changes represent a secular trend which will not be reversed. This is far from an academic argument: the extent to which Gazprom is willing to change its views on pricing will have a significant impact on Russian gas supplies to Europe, and hence on the future of the entire European gas market. [post_title] => The Transition to Hub-Based Pricing in Continental Europe - A Response to Sergei Komlev of Gazprom Export [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-transition-to-hub-based-pricing-in-continental-europe-a-response-to-sergei-komlev-of-gazprom-export [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 16:54:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 16:54:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-transition-to-hub-based-pricing-in-continental-europe-a-response-to-sergei-komlev-of-gazprom-export/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28231 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2011-03-31 13:11:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-03-31 12:11:41 [post_content] => This paper by Jonathan Stern and Howard Rogers argue that Continental European gas markets are moving inexorably from oil-linked to hub-based pricing. Market prices for gas increasingly reflect a complex combination of national regional and global supply and demand for gas rather than oil products. An increasingly competitive European gas market created by third party access enforced by a combination of EU and national regulations means that any supplier refusing to supply gas at hub prices will lose customers. The commercial risk for utilities which are importing gas at oil-linked prices under long term contracts but forced to sell at market prices has become untenable. The European gas industry is in the early stages of a commercial paradigm shift away from oil-linked and towards hub-based pricing. This is likely to be accompanied by major changes in contractual arrangements including termination of many existing long term contracts probably involving significant litigation. [post_title] => The Transition to Hub-Based Gas Pricing in Continental Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-transition-to-hub-based-gas-pricing-in-continental-europe-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-03-01 15:09:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-03-01 15:09:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-transition-to-hub-based-gas-pricing-in-continental-europe-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28251 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2010-06-01 00:00:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2010-05-31 23:00:27 [post_content] => An agreement signed on 21 April 2010 by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and his newly-elected Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yanukovich provided for a 30% discount on Russian gas imported to Ukraine, in return for a 25-year extension of the lease to Russia of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol. The agreement came along with declarations from both sides that political and diplomatic relationships would improve after the departure of Yanukovich‟s predecessor Viktor Yushchenko, whose pronounced pro-western foreign policy, centred on NATO accession, was distrusted in Moscow. There followed a flurry of other proposals for deeper Russo-Ukrainian cooperation – in the electricity generation, atomic, aerospace and telecoms sectors, among others. This article considers the significance of the new agreement with Russia, (a) for Ukraine as a gas transit country, and for the European states that rely on Russian imports transported via Ukraine, and (b) for the Ukrainian gas market. [post_title] => The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its implications for Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-april-2010-russo-ukrainian-gas-agreement-and-its-implications-for-europe-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-20 15:02:30 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-20 15:02:30 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-april-2010-russo-ukrainian-gas-agreement-and-its-implications-for-europe-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28277 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2009-10-01 00:00:14 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-09-30 23:00:14 [post_content] => Since at least 2006, concern has been expressed by a number of commentators, both western and Russian, that Gazprom has not invested in future production sufficiently to guarantee that it can meet its market obligations and, particularly, its long term contract export obligations to European customers.1 This argument runs that, although Gazprom may have huge reserves, it has not paid enough attention to developing them. Instead, at the behest of the Russian government, it has invested hugely in the Russian oil and electricity sectors, as well as exotic overseas projects in African, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries. [post_title] => Future Gas Production in Russia: is the concern about lack of investment justified? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => future-gas-production-in-russia-is-the-concern-about-lack-of-investment-justified-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 15:02:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 15:02:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/future-gas-production-in-russia-is-the-concern-about-lack-of-investment-justified-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28280 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2009-09-01 00:00:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-08-31 23:00:54 [post_content] => A paper published in April 2007 questioned the continued rationale of the linkage of Continental European long term contract gas prices to oil product prices.1 It concluded that the logic of linking gas prices to those of (mainly) oil products had largely disappeared in the major European gas markets. In the following two years, energy and non-energy events have begun to exert substantial pressure on the oil linkage mechanism. The global economic and financial crisis, which began in late 2008, has significantly depressed European energy and gas demand. Substantial new LNG supply is coming on stream during 2009-10, some of which is seeking markets in Europe. This has caused a substantial short term supply surplus which is increasing the pressure for change in the price-setting mechanism of European long term gas contracts. This paper does not repeat the majority of the material in the 2007 study, but focuses instead on developments over the past two years and the outlook in September 2009. [post_title] => Continental European Long-Term Gas Contracts: is a transition away from oil product-linked pricing inevitable and imminent? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => continental-european-long-term-gas-contracts-is-a-transition-away-from-oil-product-linked-pricing-inevitable-and-imminent-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:54:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:54:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/continental-european-long-term-gas-contracts-is-a-transition-away-from-oil-product-linked-pricing-inevitable-and-imminent-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27656 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2009-02-01 00:00:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-02-01 00:00:31 [post_content] => The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 was by far the most serious of its kind. The two sides failed to agree a price for Russian gas supply to Ukraine and a tariff for the transit of Russian gas to Europe before previous agreements expired on 31 December 2008. Russian exports to Ukraine were cut off on 1 January. Exports to 16 EU member states and Moldova were drastically reduced on 6 January and cut completely from 7 January. Deliveries to both Ukraine and other European countries restarted on 20 January following the signing of two new ten year contracts. The most seriously affected countries in the Balkans experienced a humanitarian emergency, with parts of the populations unable to heat their homes. Significant economic problems, but not of a humanitarian kind, were also caused in Hungary and Slovakia. [post_title] => The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-russo-ukrainian-gas-dispute-of-january-2009-a-comprehensive-assessment [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-12-04 10:28:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-12-04 10:28:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-russo-ukrainian-gas-dispute-of-january-2009-a-comprehensive-assessment/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27661 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2009-01-01 00:00:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-01-01 00:00:07 [post_content] => The dispute between Russia and Ukraine is causing substantial suffering in central and east European countries which have few, if any, other sources of gas, and very limited opportunity to switch to other fuels. Jonathan Stern proposes the resumption of Russian gas deliveries to central and east European countries on humanitarian grounds. [post_title] => Resumption of Russian Gas Deliveries to Central and East European Countries on Humanitarian Grounds: A Proposal [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => resumption-of-russian-gas-deliveries-to-central-and-east-european-countries-on-humanitarian-grounds-a-proposal [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:50:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:50:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/resumption-of-russian-gas-deliveries-to-central-and-east-european-countries-on-humanitarian-grounds-a-proposal/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27677 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2008-03-04 00:00:40 [post_date_gmt] => 2008-03-04 00:00:40 [post_content] => The results of a poll of gas industry professionals at the FLAME Conference in Amsterdam reveal far less concern about dependence on gas imports, and specifically dependence on Russian gas supplies, than is found in most political and media commentary. 60% of respondents were either "not at all" or "a little" worried about Europe's increasing gas import dependence. The same percentage believed that, of the non-European sources of gas, Russia would be the most reliable supplier over the next five years. [post_title] => Security of European Gas Supplies - a survey of gas industry opinion from the FLAME Conference, Amsterdam [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => security-of-european-gas-supplies-a-survey-of-gas-industry-opinion-from-the-flame-conference-amsterdam [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:44:47 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:44:47 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/security-of-european-gas-supplies-a-survey-of-gas-industry-opinion-from-the-flame-conference-amsterdam/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 28355 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2007-04-01 00:00:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2007-03-31 23:00:16 [post_content] => This paper examines the rationale for the continuing linkage of European gas prices to oil product prices. With the passage of liberalisation and competition legislation by the EU and national governments, starting in the late 1990s, it was expected that prices would be determined by gas to gas competition, as happened in both North America and the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. However, in the 2000s, North American and UK gas prices regained a more immediate correlation with oil prices, while Continental European prices in long-term contracts have remained (predominantly) linked to oil products. A number of additional questions arising from the linkage between oil and gas prices – in particular whether prices of the two fuels tend towards a natural correlation irrespective of contractual relationships between market players – are also examined. But the specific question which this paper addresses is whether there is still a rationale for gas prices to be largely indexed to oil product prices in European gas contracts and, if so, what is that rationale? [post_title] => Is There a Rationale for the Continuing Link to Oil Product Prices in Continental European Long Term Gas Contracts? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => is-there-a-rationale-for-the-continuing-link-to-oil-product-prices-in-continental-european-long-term-gas-contracts-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:12:27 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:12:27 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/is-there-a-rationale-for-the-continuing-link-to-oil-product-prices-in-continental-european-long-term-gas-contracts-2/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27763 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2007-02-01 00:00:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2007-02-01 00:00:25 [post_content] => President Putin's comment that Russia will study the possibility of creating a "gas-OPEC" created a wave of newspaper headlines. Jonathan Stern argues that gas-OPEC is a distraction from much more important issues which have recently emerged in gas trade between Russia and Europe. [post_title] => Gas-Opec: A Distraction from Important Issues of Russian Gas Supply to Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gas-opec-a-distraction-from-important-issues-of-russian-gas-supply-to-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:11:06 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:11:06 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/gas-opec-a-distraction-from-important-issues-of-russian-gas-supply-to-europe/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27780 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2006-10-01 00:00:29 [post_date_gmt] => 2006-09-30 23:00:29 [post_content] => In 2006, security of European gas supply became a very topical subject following the cuts in Russian supplies to Ukraine in the first days of the year which had the consequence of restricting the availability of supplies to some European countries. Much of the subsequent discourse has been concerned with ‘the arithmetic of gas security’ expressed as current and projected national or collective dependence of European countries on non-OECD suppliers (or groups of suppliers) over the next 15– 25 years. Increasing dependence is directly correlated with growing insecurity, defined as the likelihood that gas exporting countries will cut off, or threaten to cut off, supplies to importing countries in support of their commercial and political (foreign policy) demands. The European Union (EU) has responded to the prospect of growing import dependence with the publication, since 2000, of two Green Papers and a security of supply Directive. [post_title] => The New Security Environment for European Gas: Worsening Geopolitics and Increasing Global Competition for LNG [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-new-security-environment-for-european-gas-worsening-geopolitics-and-increasing-global-competition-for-lng [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:10:05 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:10:05 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-new-security-environment-for-european-gas-worsening-geopolitics-and-increasing-global-competition-for-lng/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27829 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2006-01-01 00:00:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2006-01-01 00:00:27 [post_content] => Jonathan Stern examines the recent Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis [post_title] => The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-russian-ukrainian-gas-crisis-of-january-2006 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:06:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:06:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/the-russian-ukrainian-gas-crisis-of-january-2006/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27864 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2004-11-01 00:00:52 [post_date_gmt] => 2004-11-01 00:00:52 [post_content] => This presentation was given by Professor Jonathan Stern at the Symposium on the European Natural Gas Market, AER/CPB/ECN, The Hague. [post_title] => Investments and Uncertainty in Liberalised Gas Markets: do projects need Article 22 exemptions? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => investments-and-uncertainty-in-liberalised-gas-markets-do-projects-need-article-22-exemptions [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-02-29 14:04:06 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-02-29 14:04:06 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/investments-and-uncertainty-in-liberalised-gas-markets-do-projects-need-article-22-exemptions/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 27894 [post_author] => 1 [post_date] => 2004-07-01 00:00:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2004-06-30 23:00:37 [post_content] => Using examples of ongoing multi-billion euro investments in projects which will deliver gas to the UK market, Jonathan Stern and Anouk Honoré show that the risks to such projects posed by market liberalisation are being assumed by market players, and are not preventing large scale, long-term supply reaching the UK. [post_title] => Large Scale Investments in Liberalised Gas Markets: The UK Case [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => large-scale-investments-in-liberalised-gas-markets-the-uk-case [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2016-03-01 15:44:44 [post_modified_gmt] => 2016-03-01 15:44:44 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/publications/large-scale-investments-in-liberalised-gas-markets-the-uk-case/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) ) [post_count] => 34 [current_post] => -1 [before_loop] => 1 [in_the_loop] => [post] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45261 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-09-20 10:35:35 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-09-20 09:35:35 [post_content] => Carbon-neutral LNG has become progressively limited to a relatively small number of trades in Asia and cannot be considered a credible or relevant environmental standard. Cargos should be `greenhouse gas verified’ and should set out the methodologies used to measure, report, and verify emissions. These methodologies should distinguish between assumptions and models for estimating emissions, and empirical measurement of emissions. Owners and operators of assets in the different segments of the supply chain should take responsibility for MRV of emissions from those assets. For sellers this would include emissions from the wellhead to the loading arm of the LNG ship (ie all upstream segments plus liquefaction), and this may also include shipping depending on ownership of that segment. Buyers would normally take responsibility of emissions from regasification, distribution and end-use. Reporting should focus on the degree of accuracy which has been achieved in tracking gas molecules from production through different segments of the supply chain to liquefaction, shipping and end-use. This will be especially important where emissions have been estimated rather than empirically measured. Measurement and reporting should be subject to verification by technically qualified companies which should have the capability to replicate a sample of emissions from the different assets in the supply chain. If offsets are used to claim GHG neutrality, these should be reported in detail along with the MRV of emissions. In 2022, the attention of the gas and LNG world has been diverted by the security crisis in Europe and by global price levels. However, when this crisis passes, attention will return to climate targets and emission reductions. At that time, the LNG community must be able to credibly document its emissions which will become an increasingly critical part of its social license to operate. [post_title] => Greenhouse Gas Emissions from LNG Trade: from carbon neutral to GHG-verified [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-lng-trade-from-carbon-neutral-to-ghg-verified [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-18 15:34:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-18 14:34:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45261 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [comment_count] => 0 [current_comment] => -1 [found_posts] => 34 [max_num_pages] => 0 [max_num_comment_pages] => 0 [is_single] => [is_preview] => [is_page] => [is_archive] => 1 [is_date] => [is_year] => [is_month] => [is_day] => [is_time] => [is_author] => [is_category] => [is_tag] => [is_tax] => [is_search] => [is_feed] => [is_comment_feed] => [is_trackback] => [is_home] => [is_privacy_policy] => [is_404] => [is_embed] => [is_paged] => [is_admin] => [is_attachment] => [is_singular] => [is_robots] => [is_favicon] => [is_posts_page] => [is_post_type_archive] => 1 [query_vars_hash:WP_Query:private] => 904a2936186dea6fa9280df797f31e2e [query_vars_changed:WP_Query:private] => [thumbnails_cached] => [allow_query_attachment_by_filename:protected] => [stopwords:WP_Query:private] => [compat_fields:WP_Query:private] => Array ( [0] => query_vars_hash [1] => query_vars_changed ) [compat_methods:WP_Query:private] => Array ( [0] => init_query_flags [1] => parse_tax_query ) )

Latest Publications by Jonathan Stern

Books by Jonathan Stern