Spare Capacity, Oil Prices and the Macroeconomy

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1. The End of Spare Capacity

- The end of spare capacity in oil production, refining and the entire oil supply chain
Gradual Erosion Of Spare Capacity

Year-to-Year change in global oil demand outpaced year-to-year change in non-OPEC oil supply in almost every year (exceptions: 2000 and 2002).

Over the period 1990-2005, the demand for oil increased by around 17.6 million bpd, while the increase in non-OPEC supply amounted only to around 7.9 million bpd.

Source: IEA, Oil Market Report
During 2002-2006 China accounted for almost 40% of the increase in global oil demand.
Russia Growth Key to Non-OPEC Oil Supply Growth

- During 2000-2004, Russia accounted for almost 60% of the annual change in non-OPEC supply
- But Russian oil supply growth has slowed down
  - 250,000 bpd in 2005 and 240,000 bpd in 2006 (IEA estimate)
Increase in Demand Met By OPEC

Over the period 1990-2005, OPEC supplied an additional 10 million bpd with OPEC production increasing from 24.8 in 1990 to 33.9 million bpd in 2005.

This increase in production was possible because of OPEC spare capacity.

Source: IEA; Figures include crude oil condensates, and NGLs
Erosion in OPEC Spare Capacity

- Spare capacity around 2% of global oil demand in 2004 despite increase in OPEC production capacity

Source: IMF; BP
Saudi Arabia Holds the Bulk of Current spare capacity

- Spare capacity in 2006 estimated at 2.3 mbd
- Saudi Arabia holds 55% of OPEC spare capacity
- Production capacity of SA reached 11.3 mm bpd after it began producing from the new Haradh field, which is pumping 300,000 bpd
Cushion of Spare Capacity Declined in All Parts of the Oil Supply Chain

World Refining Spare Capacity

Oil Refining Capacity

Spare Capacity in the Global Refining System Disappeared in 2004

World Petroleum Consumption

Source: EIA

Oil Tanker Capacity

Demand for tankers

Source: Jeff Currie, “The sustainability of higher commodity prices: The revenge of the old economy.”
2. The Impact of Loss of Spare Capacity Cushion on Prices

- Accelerating Global Demand
- Low Non-OPEC Supply Growth
- Cycle of Underinvestment
- OPEC Spare Capacity Reduced
- Bottlenecks in Downstream
- Impact of shocks magnified in absence of spare capacity
- Global oil system’s ability to respond to shocks weakened
- Geopolitical shocks
- Weather shocks
- Refinery fires
- Speculators
- Volatility in oil prices
- Accelerated rise in oil prices
- Occasional spikes in oil prices
Shift Upward in the Distribution of Oil Prices

SPOT WTI 1/1/1991-31/12/2002

SPOT WTI 1/1/2003-11/11/2005
## Shift Upward in the Distribution of Oil Prices

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Can the Spare Capacity Cushion Be Re-established?

Spare capacity not outcome of ‘rational’ investment decision

Few players today able or willing to invest in new spare capacity

Face several years of capacity constraints even if new investments are made today
No short-term relief for oil market

Spare capacity outcome of an historical developments in 1970s & 1980s

International Oil Companies will not hold spare capacity

Who should bare the costs of spare capacity?

Any increase in spare capacity in the coming two years arise mainly due to sharp slowdown in demand rather than increase in production capacity

No short-term relief for oil market
3. Refining Bottlenecks

- Capacity shortage
- Structure of refining plants: limited deep conversion and de-sulfurization facilities
  - Incremental crude oil production is of heavy/sour varieties
  - Strong increase in demand for light end petroleum products such as gasoline
Strong Growth in Consumption for Light Products

Annual Growth in Demand by Product Type

Source: BP Statistical Review

'Gasolines' consists of aviation and motor gasolines and light distillate feedstock (LDF)
'Middle distillates' consists of jet and heating kerosines, and gas and diesel oils (including marine bunkers)
'Fuel oil' includes marine bunkers and crude oil used directly as fuel
'Others' consists of refinery gas, LPGs, solvents, petroleum coke, lubricants, bitumen, wax and refinery fuel and loss
Price Differentials Between Light and Heavy Widened

WTI Spot Cushing / Heavy Iranian Price Differential

Average (Daily Data) 1995-2002: $3.508
Average (daily Data) 2003-2005YTD=$7.58
4. Oil Prices: Short-Term Outlook

The Bullish View

• More supply shocks
• Spare capacity cushion would remain thin
• Refining bottlenecks
• Robust growth demand for oil; Rise in oil prices have not depressed oil demand so far
• Will Russia deliver? Non-OPEC supply?

The Bearish View

• Resolution of any geopolitical factors knock down risk premium
• Mean Reversion: Question is when? To which average?
• China achieving a soft landing is not certain
• Non-OPEC supply will respond to higher oil prices
• Global demand for oil would ultimately decline in response to high oil prices
Oil Price Forecast

Oil price

Nominal

Real (1995 US prices)

Source: OEF

$ / barrel


F'cast
Cycles or New Paradigm?

- New cycle will emerge and prices eventually drop?
- Entered a new paradigm that breaks with the past?
- Both have elements of truth
  - Oil market is cyclical
  - Prices go up, production increases, demand slows and prices come down
  - Market will remain cyclical
- Prices different compared to 1986-2002, when the price per barrel fluctuated between $15 and $25
- Prices fluctuating in a higher range
6. Oil and the Macroeconomy

- Oil price hikes often preceded global recessions
- IMF: a 10% rise in crude prices reduces global growth by 0.1 to 0.5 percentage points
- Asian Development Bank: Escalating oil prices could cut economic growth across Asia by at least 0.6%
- G8: "Overall global growth remains solid and this is expected to continue in 2006. Risks remain, including high and volatile energy prices"
- Samuel Bodman, the U.S. energy secretary
  - "Am I concerned about the impact of high oil prices on the economy? Sure. Having said that, it hasn't happened yet in a meaningful way."
Will oil prices Choke growth this time?

- Past oil shocks resulted from restrictions in supply unlike the current shock which is driven by rapidly growing demand
- Part of the rise in oil price to recover past price declines
- Oil is relatively less important to OECD economies than in the past
- Monetary policy response is different
  - Impact of oil prices on core inflation has been mild relative to previous shocks
  - Central banks have not had to raise the interest to reduce inflationary pressure
Global: Oil intensity

Source: OEF
Oil Price and Inflation

Oil price and OECD CPI

1973-76
1978-81
2002-06

Oil price (LHS)
Consumer prices (RHS)