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[post_content] => All eyes have been on the “Two Sessions”, an important annual political gathering which ended on 11 March, for clues into macroeconomic policy and energy policy this year. But the guidance suggests a status quo of mixed messages. The government is emphasising support for new industries to achieve its “around 5%” GDP growth target again, although it is also planning a fiscal contraction given the dire situation of local government debt. Meeting the 5% growth target will not be easy, but it is not impossible with efforts to stabilise the real estate market, more industrial support and modest increases in consumption.
The outlook for oil demand in 2024 remains solid: We expect a 0.6-0.7 mb/d y/y increase driven by chemicals, with middle distillates providing further support. But LNG in freight poses downside risks to diesel, just as lower LNG prices suggest upside for gas demand. Industrial activity combined with more gas in power suggest over 25 bcm of y/y gas demand growth in 2024, and low LNG prices could favour spot, potentially at the expense of term contracts. We currently expect LNG imports to rise by 10 bcm y/y but there is upside, mostly from spot.
Energy policy guidance suggests an "all of the above" approach, with coal still looming large. Renewable additions will grow strongly again, but will likely slow from the record year in 2023. Meanwhile, China’s emissions trading system (ETS) is expanding and carbon prices are rising but from modest levels. Despite its anticipated expansion to additional sectors this year, and record carbon prices currently, its impact will be limited. Renewable curtailment rates are set to rise again this year because of the coal overcapacity and the recently introduced capacity payment mechanism. The end goal is to encourage coal as back up for renewables, but the short-term impact is a potential drag on their dispatch.
Importantly, mixed policy messages will create confusion at the local level. The Two Sessions issued softer environmental targets, even as the country is not on track to meeting its 2025 goals. There is room to kick the can to 2025, but that also raises the risk of last-minute production cuts.
[post_title] => China’s Two Sessions: Implications for energy markets and policies
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[post_content] => Since the end of 2023, policy documents in China have increasingly highlighted environmental protection and have either set tighter and more specific targets or called out the need for faster progress towards existing goals. 2024 also brings three important catalysts for accelerated environmental policy. First, the 14th Five Year Plan (FYP) interim report, published in late 2023, highlighted that China is not on track to meeting its CO2 and energy intensity targets. Second, as planning gets underway for the 15th Five-Year Plan, this year China will need to revisit its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) climate pledges. Third and related to these, China is expanding its emissions trading scheme (ETS) and is increasing penalties for non-compliance in energy-intensive industries.
But even as policy documents emphasize environmental protection, implementing climate goals remains a challenge. Disagreement between the Ministry of Environment and Ecology (MEE) on one hand and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on the other on carbon accounting guidelines is one case in point. As China looks to balance economic growth—in large part from energy intensive industries—with increased renewable penetration, carbon accounting is an important part of the toolbox. But with the NEA and MEE disagreeing on guidelines and fighting for policy making power, the lack of clarity raises uncertainty for companies, particularly those in the aluminum and cement sectors that will soon need to comply with mandates for both carbon and renewables. At the diplomatic level, the incompatibility of the two measures also complicates China’s response to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
[post_title] => China’s policy pendulum shifts back toward environmental protection, but will bureaucracy get in the way?
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[post_content] => China’s all important “Two Sessions” wrapped up in Beijing on 13 March 2023, setting out the key macroeconomic priorities for the year and suggesting a cautious growth outlook. While Beijing set to deliver its “around 5%” GDP growth target—leading to a recovery in energy consumption—the nature nature of the economic rebound matters: Whether it is more consumer-led, as Q1 2023 data seem to suggest, or infrastructure-heavy will determine oil product use and the strength of gas consumption.
The Two Sessions also emphasized coal and energy security, using new language about coal being the mainstay of the country’s energy system, a departure from previous policy documents that discussed coal’s gradual transition to a supplementary energy source. Despite this, clean energy additions are unlikely to slow so China’s 2030 and 2060 carbon peaking and neutrality goals remain within reach. But the policy stance on coal will limit the space for raising China’s climate ambitions or accelerating the low-carbon transition in industry. Meanwhile, the continued investment in coal infrastructure will make meeting the low-carbon objectives more challenging while raising the absolute quantity of carbon dioxide emissions over time.
In its Two Sessions Work Reports and in subsequent guidance for 2023, the government emphasized energy security and called for an all-of-the above approach to energy supplies, with the exception of gas, where Beijing is limiting coal-to-gas switching for now. And just as the tension between coal and renewables was striking, so is the tension between the role of the State and markets: While markets were discussed at length, market reforms are still on the backburner as the government maintains a strong role in energy sector management.
[post_title] => China’s climate and energy policy after the Two Sessions: More wait and see
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[post_content] => Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to strongly impact international energy markets, posing severe challenges for energy importing countries. Much of the commentary and analysis has been focused on the consequences for, and reactions of, European nations and the European Union. Despite the fact that each region has its own specific dynamics, the global nature of energy markets means that the effects of the conflict in Ukraine are felt around the world, and Asia is no exception.
Most countries in Asia are net importers of fossil energy. International prices of crude oil and LNG were already rising in the later months of 2021, but the war in Ukraine accentuated this rise. While Asian buyers have been picking up discounted cargoes of oil and coal, there have been new costs and complications as energy, food, and other supply chain flows are adapting to sanctions.
The immediate impact of these high energy prices and supply chain disruptions is seen in rising costs across many sectors – whose supply chains were barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. The disruption of grain supplies from Ukraine and Russia has had particularly severe consequences for food prices, posing serious challenges for governments and peoples. Not only could this distract from the need to address climate change, but the growing frequency of extreme weather events may accentuate existing poverty and inequality.
These phenomena provide the context within which this commentary examines the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Asian energy markets, focusing on the direct exposure of Asian countries to Russian energy exports, as well as on the direct and indirect impacts of the short-term price increases.
[post_title] => Asian Energy Markets Following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
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[post_content] => On 11 March 2021, the Chinese government ratified its 14th Five Year Plan and long-term targets for 2035. Since this is the first Five Year Plan (FYP) published following China’s announcement in September 2020 that it would aim to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060, it was expected to be a strong indicator of China’s commitment to this pledge and a first concrete step toward it, although viewing it as a bellwether of China’s ambitions may be misguided. This comment discusses some of the key statements from the Plan regarding energy and the environment, as well as five themes that will be important to watch over the next few years.
The overarching Plan seems weak in terms of its climate ambition and heavy on self-sufficiency, but these are early days, as more details will emerge with sectoral and provincial plans in the coming months. Still, there are a number of inherent policy tensions that will plague the upcoming plan. It will be important to watch whether these are addressed (although they are unlikely to be resolved) in sectoral plans; whether or not the political framework evolves in support of a stronger climate agenda, either through stronger ministries, leading groups, or improved coordination. The development of the emissions trading scheme will also be important, although we argue that even though it is a significant step for China, its near term impact on emissions in the power sector will be limited. Finally, we argue that despite slower oil demand growth, refining additions will continue in the near term, and that even though the decarbonisation agenda may weaken gas demand in the long-term, liberalisation efforts (and potentially some coal to gas switching) will be a boon for gas demand in the near-term.
[post_title] => Key issues for China’s 14th Five Year Plan
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[post_content] => This insight discusses the latest developments in China’s gas-fired power generation, the main challenges, and the road ahead both in the context of the upcoming 14th Five-Year Plan and the recently announced 2060 carbon neutrality goal. It argues that expensive imported gas, costly turbine technology, and the lack of fully competitive electricity markets have been the main obstacles limiting the role of natural gas in China’s power sector. Nevertheless, gas-fired power capacity could see faster growth in the 14th Five-Year Plan, likely adding 40 to 50 GW of new capacity by 2025. The buildout will boost the gas fleet to 140–150 GW, up 50 per cent from current levels, suggesting gas use in the power sector could also double, reaching 75–80 bcm by 2025. The policy framework will likely become more supportive for gas in power, as the government looks to limit coal consumption—in line with its goal of peaking emissions before 2030—and the rising needs of power system flexibility driven by renewables integration. Looking further ahead, however, China’s 2060 carbon neutrality pledge would also mean the country needs to curb all fossil fuel consumption, including that of gas.
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Energy policy guidance suggests an "all of the above" approach, with coal still looming large. Renewable additions will grow strongly again, but will likely slow from the record year in 2023. Meanwhile, China’s emissions trading system (ETS) is expanding and carbon prices are rising but from modest levels. Despite its anticipated expansion to additional sectors this year, and record carbon prices currently, its impact will be limited. Renewable curtailment rates are set to rise again this year because of the coal overcapacity and the recently introduced capacity payment mechanism. The end goal is to encourage coal as back up for renewables, but the short-term impact is a potential drag on their dispatch.
Importantly, mixed policy messages will create confusion at the local level. The Two Sessions issued softer environmental targets, even as the country is not on track to meeting its 2025 goals. There is room to kick the can to 2025, but that also raises the risk of last-minute production cuts.
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14.12.20
Natural gas in China’s power sector: Challenges and the road ahead
This insight discusses the latest developments in China’s gas-fired power generation, the main challenges, and the road ahead both in the context of the upcoming 14th Five-Year Plan and the recently announced 2060 carbon neutrality goal. It argues that expensive imported gas, costly turbine technology, and the lack of fully competitive electricity markets have been […]
By:
Yan Qin
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