Mike Fulwood

Senior Research Fellow

Mike Fulwood joined the OIES in October 2017. Mike has over 40 years of experience in the gas industry. Before joining the OIES, Mike worked as a consultant, with Energy Markets between 1997 and 2008 and then with NexantECA as Director, Global Gas & LNG. Before working as consultant, Mike worked for British Gas from 1979, latterly as a Director at British Gas Transco, in charge of the price control review, and prior to that President of British Gas Americas during which time he oversaw many successful acquisitions and projects including the acquisitions of Metrogas (Argentina), NGC (now Dynegy), the Bolivia – Brazil pipeline and Trinidad LNG project.

While working as a consultant Mike undertook a wide range of projects in all areas of the gas chain, covering regulatory matters, gas pricing and tariffs, gas sales and transportation contracts, market studies and price forecasting, as well as helping develop NexantECA’s World Gas Model. Between 2009 and 2018, Mike was Chairman of the International Gas Union’s Gas Pricing Group, and still undertakes the IGU’s Wholesale Gas Price Survey. He also speaks widely at gas conferences all over the world, particularly on gas markets, gas trading matters and gas pricing.

Contact

Tel: +44 (0)7378 609205
Email: [email protected]

In this third edition of the Gas Quarterly for 2023 we once again review the series of signposts that we outlined as key indicators of the global gas market during the year and also draw some conclusions about the outlook for prices and the supply-demand balance.

In summary, we conclude that gas prices in Europe and Asia of $10-12/MMBtu in recent months reflect a relatively benign current market state, influenced by the continuing impact of warm weather, a modest recovery in Asian LNG demand, the continued availability of Russian pipeline gas and LNG, albeit at low levels, and European storage stocks that ended Q2 2023 around 20 Bcm high year-on-year. These positive factors have been tempered by curtailments in Norwegian pipeline supply due to maintenance and global LNG supply (as measured when regasified at LNG import terminals) not growing as quickly in the year-to-date as previously anticipated.

Looking ahead, while the rate of year-on-year growth in LNG supply may pick up, we could also see Chinese LNG imports begin to rise (as they had begun to do so in June). In Europe, the current high storage stocks mean that even with injection rates lower than last year, we could still see storage being full before the start of the winter heating season, putting downward pressure on prices in late summer.

Despite this relatively benign recent history and rest-of-summer outlook, the European market remains tight, with prices reacting to news that impacts expectations of supply. Looking ahead to winter, any surge in demand or unplanned curtailment of supply is likely to result in a sharp price reaction. As such, volatility is likely to remain the main feature of the market during the rest of 2023.

In addition to this market analysis, we include an essay on another interesting dynamic in the global LNG market, namely imports to South America. Ieda Gomes, a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at OIES, reviews the supply and demand balances in Brazil, Argentina and Chile over the past few years and highlights the dramatic swings in LNG imports that have been mainly caused by hydro availability but which have also resulted from the changing fortunes of gas production from the Vaca Muerta field in Argentina and from the gradual decline in gas supply from Bolivia. This latter trend could lead to more LNG imports in the short term, but increased indigenous supply in Argentina and Brazil, plus the completion of key pipeline infrastructure, could ease pressure in the medium term.

[post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 22 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gas-quarterly-review-issue-22 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-07-25 10:54:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-07-25 09:54:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46380 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 46070 [post_author] => 974 [post_date] => 2023-04-17 10:59:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-04-17 09:59:56 [post_content] =>

In this latest edition of the Gas Quarterly we review the first quarter of 2023 against the signposts that we outlined at the start of the year. The overarching theme is that the outturn for Europe has been much more benign than could have been expected at the start of winter. A combination of warm weather, aggressive demand response to high gas prices and changing consumer behaviour, as well as the increased availability of LNG to Europe, have led to a situation where the market seems well balanced. However, although prices have fallen sharply from their 2022 highs, they still remain well above the 5-year average level, underlining the point that although the outlook for 2023 looks relatively calm it would not take much of a shift in supply or demand to cause a sharp rebound.

In this Quarterly we also look at one of the big questions in the global gas market, namely how the unwinding of the COVID lockdown in China would impact energy markets. With the economy now fully re-opened, it is expected that growth will resume and with it energy demand growth, including demand for pipeline gas and LNG imports. Much depends on what route to growth the Chinese leadership decides to take, and also on the policy concerning energy security, which tends to favour gas over coal. In addition, the drive to increase domestic gas production and to optimise imports via pipeline means that the need for spot LNG purchases could be minimal in 2023, albeit that LNG supply under long-term contracts is set to grow. As a result, a low level of competition with Europe over spare LNG cargoes again points to a benign scenario for gas prices this year.

[post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 21 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-21 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-17 11:29:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-17 10:29:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=46070 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45781 [post_author] => 974 [post_date] => 2023-01-30 11:28:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-01-30 11:28:32 [post_content] => In this first Gas Quarterly of 2023 we review some of the key events in the global gas market in 2022 and outline a number of important signposts that we will be looking out for in 2023 as we continue to monitor the main implications of the Russia-Ukraine war. At the time of writing in January 2023 the gas prices in Europe and Asia would seem to indicate a level of calm after the volatile storm that engulfed the global gas market in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, we highlight that although prices are currently well below their mid-2022 highs they nevertheless reflect a tight market within which a number of potential triggers for a sharp upward spike in prices still exist. We review six key signposts - gas prices in Europe and Asia, the future of Russian gas supply to Europe, the availability of LNG supply, the outlook for Asian gas and LNG demand, storage levels in Europe and also implied demand in the region. Finally, we also look at the key trends in gas use in the power sector, reviewing the key drivers in 2022 and highlighting some key trends for 2023. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 20 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-20 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-17 11:39:41 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-17 10:39:41 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45781 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45609 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-12-16 14:30:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-12-16 14:30:28 [post_content] =>

This edition of the Quarterly Gas Review focuses particularly on supply-side dynamics in Europe in recent months, including the decline in Russian pipeline supply, the rise in European LNG imports and sendout, and the record net storage injections. This supply-side analysis is complemented by an analysis of the global LNG market, from the perspective of supply available to Europe, and an analysis of European gas demand in recent months. Finally, these complementary analyses are used as the basis for the development of a scenario for the European gas market for the period December 2022 to March 2023 (‘Winter’) and April to October 2023 (‘Summer’), with the target of returning European gas storage stocks to 99 Bcm by 1 November 2023 (the same as 1 November 2022).

Looking ahead to the rest of winter, on the supply side, with European production and pipeline imports unlikely to rise significantly in the coming months, LNG imports will play a vital role. While regasification capacity will rise in Germany and Finland at the end of 2022/start of 2023, LNG supply will be strongly influence by trends in global LNG supply and LNG demand outside Europe. On the demand side, temperature-driven gas demand for space heating and the performance of non-thermal power generation assets (influencing gas demand for power generation) will significantly influence overall gas demand. As our scenario suggests, the dynamics of the coming months will have significant implications for European storage stocks – and market sentiment – for summer 2023 and winter 2023/24.

[post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 19 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-19 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-04-17 11:41:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-04-17 10:41:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45609 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45403 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-10-31 10:11:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-10-31 10:11:55 [post_content] => The President of the European Commission has made a number of statements in recent months on what might be done to limit the impact of high gas prices on EU markets. There is a belief, amongst EU political leaders, that the TTF wholesale gas price is no longer an appropriate benchmark price for EU gas, largely because it is at a higher price than other hubs and also the LNG price into Northwest Europe. The price differentials are due to congestion in the import infrastructure, so a cap on TTF will not resolve these issues, nor is a cap likely to be effective. But the focus of this Comment is to discuss the consequences of a cap on TTF if it were implemented. The various documents from the European Commission have clearly struggled with the concept of actually capping the TTF price. The latest Communique from the Commission has rowed back somewhat on a comprehensive cap on TTF prices and appears to allow exemptions for the OTC market and wants to protect the derivative market. This does beg the question of whether the price cap could be effectively implemented. However, if an effective cap could actually be implemented, the consequences, both financial and physical could be severe for the EU gas market. The high level of trading interdependency at TTF and other hubs would likely be severely compromised if the cap was set at levels below the price in the market. Multiple trades might then not be honoured, possibly bringing down the whole market structure at a huge cost. In addition, on the physical side, the most likely outcome of a price cap is that less gas would be delivered to the EU gas market and more gas would remain in storage and would not get withdrawn. In summary, if a price cap on TTF cannot be effectively implemented then it is a waste of time trying to put one in place, and if it can be effectively implemented, Europe is likely to receive less gas and also precipitate a global financial crisis. [post_title] => The Consequences of Capping the TTF Price [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-consequences-of-capping-the-ttf-price [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-10-31 10:11:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-10-31 10:11:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45403 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45287 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-09-28 12:20:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-09-28 11:20:41 [post_content] => Low, or no, Russia pipeline flows to the EU are precipitating an infrastructure and supply crisis. The impact is not Europe wide on flows, with potentially the five most impacted countries being Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary, being totally dependent on pipeline imports from Norway and connections to Belgium and the Netherlands – in turn relying on LNG and imports from the UK. For 2023, with pipe flows from Russia via Ukraine and Turkstream at current levels (80 mmcmd), this region will be short of gas even in a mild winter, and with all the new LNG import terminals in Germany. In a cold winter demand rationing would need to be imposed and storage largely emptying. Come the summer there isn’t enough supply to get even halfway towards the EU’s target of filling storage to 90% of capacity. The prospects for winter 2023/24 are looking catastrophic, whatever the weather. [post_title] => Europe’s Infrastructure and Supply Crisis [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => europes-infrastructure-and-supply-crisis [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-09-28 12:20:41 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-09-28 11:20:41 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45287 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45147 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-08-08 11:20:40 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-08-08 10:20:40 [post_content] => Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to strongly impact international energy markets, posing severe challenges for energy importing countries. Much of the commentary and analysis has been focused on the consequences for, and reactions of, European nations and the European Union. Despite the fact that each region has its own specific dynamics, the global nature of energy markets means that the effects of the conflict in Ukraine are felt around the world, and Asia is no exception. Most countries in Asia are net importers of fossil energy. International prices of crude oil and LNG were already rising in the later months of 2021, but the war in Ukraine accentuated this rise. While Asian buyers have been picking up discounted cargoes of oil and coal, there have been new costs and complications as energy, food, and other supply chain flows are adapting to sanctions. The immediate impact of these high energy prices and supply chain disruptions is seen in rising costs across many sectors – whose supply chains were barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. The disruption of grain supplies from Ukraine and Russia has had particularly severe consequences for food prices, posing serious challenges for governments and peoples. Not only could this distract from the need to address climate change, but the growing frequency of extreme weather events may accentuate existing poverty and inequality. These phenomena provide the context within which this commentary examines the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Asian energy markets, focusing on the direct exposure of Asian countries to Russian energy exports, as well as on the direct and indirect impacts of the short-term price increases. [post_title] => Asian Energy Markets Following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => asian-energy-markets-following-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-08-10 11:52:21 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-08-10 10:52:21 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45147 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45135 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-08-04 11:01:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-08-04 10:01:12 [post_content] =>

The second quarter of 2022 has been a dramatic one for the European gas market. On the supply side, relatively modest increases in European production and pipeline imports from Norway and Azerbaijan have been overshadowed by two significant shifts: the decline in pipeline flows from Russia and the high level of LNG, both of which are continuations of trends seen in Q1. Last year, China’s LNG imports of 107 Bcm were greater than those of all European importers (excluding Turkey) combined (89 bcm). The fact that LNG imports into China have been substantially lower year-on-year in both Q1 and Q2 has enabled a greater volume to flow to Europe. Both of these dynamics are examined in this review.

We begin this edition of our OIES Quarterly Gas Review, as always, with our review of gas prices, and in doing so, we assess the impact of the present market situation on LNG margins, as a motivator for LNG project FIDs, and inter-fuel dynamics in Europe. We then take a deeper dive into the supply-demand balance on the European market in recent months and the key factors in that balance. Finally, we present two special sections: Firstly, ‘In the Bleak Midwinter’ considers the EU proposal to reduce gas consumption during the coming winter and the impact of a complete curtailment of Russian flows to the EU. Secondly, we present the near-term outlook for China. Given that the extent to which Chinese LNG demand rises or falls has a significant impact on the availability of LNG for Europe, we examine the economic context behind China’s current LNG demand dynamics.

[post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 18 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-18 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-08-04 11:01:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-08-04 10:01:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45135 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45095 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-07-20 14:58:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-20 13:58:25 [post_content] => A sharp decline in gas flows on Nord Stream to Europe began on June 14, following the news that a gas turbine was “stuck” in Canada for maintenance as a result of western sanctions on Russia, and because further compressors at the Portovaya compressor station were also taken offline. There has been much commentary that this is all part of Russia’s plan to further squeeze the European gas market. But the technical and legal issues are very complex, and must be taken into account. As Nord Stream’s regular annual maintenance period ends on July 21, flows on Nord Stream are a key question. This comment addresses a number of these technical and legal aspects: At what level, if any, will flows return to? When will the roaming gas turbine return to Russia? Will other gas turbines head to Canada for major overhaul and when might they return? How many operational turbines are needed for maximum flows? Gazprom has somewhat belatedly called force majeure on the Nord Stream flows. What impact will this have and when might it end? [post_title] => The Curious Incident of the Nord Stream Gas Turbine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-curious-incident-of-the-nord-stream-gas-turbine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-26 16:13:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-26 15:13:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45095 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 45059 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-07-07 13:30:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-07 12:30:18 [post_content] => The May 18 documents from the EU (REPowerEU) suggested that Russia pipe imports to the EU could fall by 70 bcm this year. With Nordstream flows being at 40 percent of capacity ostensibly due to compressor issues, a 70 bcm reduction looks to be a possible outcome if flows don’t recover after the annual Nordstream maintenance this month. A few months ago this would have spelt disaster for the European gas market, but gas demand in Europe is already down 11 percent this year and further declines are expected. Europe is also able to attract a lot of LNG from Asia, with China demand being down sharply this year. If LNG supply keeps up – despite the Freeport issues – then with a mild winter, Europe might just be able to muddle through with storage filling to 80 percent and with no rationing of gas – high prices have done much of the work in reducing gas demand. 2023 could be problematic though if Asia demand picks up, especially in China, making it much harder for Europe to attract additional LNG cargoes. [post_title] => REPowerEU and the Short-Term Outlook for the European Gas Market [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => repowereu-and-the-short-term-outlook-for-the-european-gas-market [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-07 13:30:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-07 12:30:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=45059 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44936 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-05-26 10:00:24 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-05-26 09:00:24 [post_content] => Since our previous edition of the Quarterly Gas Review, the Russian build-up of troops around Ukraine’s border has erupted into a full-scale invasion. European gas prices, which were already high, surged. In response to the invasion, the European Commission and various European governments announced their intention to reduce dependency on Russian gas imports. In response, the Russian government passed new legislation, requiring Gazprom’s European counterparties to pay for their gas supplies in Roubles, rather than Euros. While it remained unclear whether or not the new payment procedure would be in breach of sanctions against Russia, several companies refused to follow the new procedure, and had their supplies cut off by Gazprom. At the same time, Gazprom effectively disowned its European subsidiaries (Gazprom Germania in particular). In this issue of the Quarterly Gas Review, we analyse the flow of Russian gas to Europe in this geopolitical context. In related sections, Mostefa Ouki and Mike Fulwood, respectively, analyse the geopolitics of Algerian gas supply to Europe and dynamics on the global LNG market, with particular focus on the extent to which they can offset lower flows from Russia. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review: Issue 17 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-short-and-medium-term-outlook-for-gas-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-08-04 10:52:52 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-08-04 09:52:52 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44936 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44773 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-04-11 11:14:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-04-11 10:14:37 [post_content] => The gas market in Europe is in a state of real uncertainty as to whether Russia will cut off gas supplies to Europe, or whether the EU should sanction imports of gas on the grounds that their payments are fuelling the Russian war machine in Ukraine. The current situation of uncertainty and not knowing whether flows from Russia will be curtailed is the worst of all worlds, and is keeping prices high and, as a consequence, keeping Russian revenues from gas at record levels. The EU has a binary choice – full sanctions on Russian gas with an immediate impact on revenues or a clear statement that contracts will be fully abided by and contract volumes will continue to be nominated, increasing supply and significantly reducing prices – and revenues – to Russia. The latter course of action would not remove the uncertainty that Russia may choose to curtail flows, but it would at least provide certainty to the market from the perspective of the EU and European buyers. [post_title] => Russian gas to the EU: to sanction or not to sanction [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => russian-gas-to-the-eu-to-sanction-or-not-to-sanction [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-04-11 11:14:37 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-04-11 10:14:37 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44773 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44696 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-03-18 15:26:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-18 15:26:08 [post_content] => On 8 March 2022, the European Commission published the outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030, starting with gas, in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Commission noted that EU gas imports from Russia in 2021 (pipeline and LNG combined) totalled 155 billion cubic metres (bcm), and stated that this could be reduced by two-thirds (101.5 bcm) before the end of 2022. At the same time, Commission stated its intention to present by April a legislative proposal requiring underground gas storage across the EU to be filled up to at least 90 per cent of its capacity by 1 October each year. This OIES Insight analyses the component parts of this plan, and their implications. Specifically, the plan envisages increased non-Russian gas supply by 63.5 bcm through a combination of additional non-Russian LNG and pipeline imports and an increase in biomethane production. This supply increase is to be complemented by a 38 bcm reduction in EU gas demand, to be achieved through a combination of large-scale wind and solar power generation, rooftop solar power generation, heat pumps, and “EU-wide energy saving”. Between the reduction in gas demand and increase in non-Russian supply, the Commission hopes to reduce EU imports of Russian gas by two-thirds by the end of 2022. We conclude that while some parts of the proposal are eminently achievable, others are more ambitious. On the supply side, an extra 50 bcm per year of LNG imports would not only absorb the forecast growth in global LNG supply in 2022, but also require a redirection of cargoes from Asia to Europe, which implies that European prices need to remain high to attract such cargoes. The increase in non-Russian pipeline imports seems realistic, subject to current import levels being sustained throughout the summer. On the demand side, the proposed reduction in gas demand appears to be feasible on paper, but reaching the target will be challenging. A combination of market drivers, specific measures, favourable external conditions (such as good availability of wind and hydro in the power sector and a warm winter) as well as more coal/nuclear in the generation mix will be needed for any target to be met. The broader implications of the Commission proposals are their impacts on the global gas market (with prices likely higher than previously forecast for the remainder of the 2020s) and additional impetus provided to the energy transition, given the increased urgency of decreasing European fossil gas demand. [post_title] => The EU plan to reduce Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of 2022: Practical realities and implications [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-eu-plan-to-reduce-russian-gas-imports-by-two-thirds-by-the-end-of-2022-practical-realities-and-implications [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-18 15:30:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-18 15:30:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44696 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44610 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-03-04 16:36:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-03-04 16:36:07 [post_content] =>

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces has led to sharp rises in gas prices in Europe and around the world with real concerns about the possible curtailment of gas flows from Russia to Europe.
Pipeline imports from Russia began falling in the last quarter of 2021 and declined even further in January and most of February 2022. Gazprom are seemingly only meeting the nominations under long-term contracts and not offering any volumes on their Electronic Sales Platforms. European buyers significantly reduced their nominations in January and most of February as the monthly prices under their contracts with Gazprom were much higher than the day-ahead hub prices, reducing the incentive to take contract volumes. As soon as the invasion began, day-ahead prices jumped sharply making the price under the monthly contracts look very attractive. As a consequence, European buyers increased their nominations, especially on the Ukraine route.
LNG imports into Europe have surged in the last three months, but they largely offset the lower Russian flows in the same period so overall supply to the market was relatively stable, hence the firm prices in the market.
As a consequence, pressure on gas storage stocks was maintained and the poor injection rates in the summer of 2021 meant that stocks are at historically low levels, although not as low as they might have been if we had had a cold winter.
Under a scenario where Russian flows on Nord Stream 1, the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and the Ukraine routes are stopped for the period between April 1 2022 and March 31 2023, the ability of Europe to refill its storage is severely compromised. Europe might just about be able to get through the summer by emptying what remains of its stocks in storage, but that would lead to significant demand destruction in the winter. In the absence of any mitigation measure some 40 per cent of Central and Western Europe winter demand could be lost.
There is the potential for some mitigation, through diversions of LNG to Europe from other countries, more production from Groningen in the Netherlands and additional pipeline imports from Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan. Together with some demand side responses, including more nuclear power, as suggested in the IEA’s Ten Point Plan, these could maybe reduce the impact by half, but this still leaves a substantial amount of unmet demand in the power and industrial sectors, if the heating load is to be protected.
While the impact of shortages would mainly be felt in Central and Western Europe, gas prices would clearly be extremely high, leading to further large increases in end-consumers’ bills all over Europe and in many other countries around the world who rely on imported gas.

[post_title] => Ukraine Invasion: What This Means for the European Gas Market [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-invasion-what-this-means-for-the-european-gas-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-03-08 12:10:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-03-08 12:10:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44610 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44562 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_content] => The geopolitical tensions between Russia and Europe over the build-up of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border have generated concerns over the extent of Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, and the possible consequences should the flow of Russian gas to Europe be curtailed, either partially or completely. In this paper, we analyse the potential impact on the UK of such a curtailment of Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe. We find that while the UK would be unlikely to face a physical shortage of supplies, the ‘ripple effect’ of price increases at hubs in continental Europe would be quickly replicated on the UK trading hub, the National Balancing Point (NBP). There would also be an impact on physical flows of gas both in and out of the UK, as LNG cargoes would be regasified at spare capacity in UK LNG import terminals, but then re-exported to continental Europe via the two interconnectors with Belgium and the Netherlands. This would render the UK a ‘land bridge’ for LNG arriving into North-Western Europe, given that the three terminals in that part of continental Europe (Dunkerque in France, Zeebrugge in Belgium, and Gate Rotterdam in the Netherlands) would all likely be operating at full capacity. In terms of the existing legal/regulatory frameworks for cooperation and ‘solidarity’ with regard to security of supply, we argue that while the position of the UK relative to neighbouring states remains uncertain with regard to post-Brexit agreements on the application of the solidarity provisions of the EU Security of Supply Regulation, pricing dynamics between the UK and neighbouring continental European markets would be sufficient to cause gas supplies to move from one market to another, albeit with the potential for some infrastructure bottlenecks. Finally, in terms of impact on UK gas demand, the price spikes that would almost certainly accompany any physical disruption in Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe would be quickly felt in the UK, despite the lack of direct UK dependence on Russian pipeline gas supplies. The first part of UK gas demand to be curtailed by such price spikes – beyond the high levels currently seen on the UK wholesale gas market – would be industrial demand. However, the remainder of UK gas demand (for power generation and heating) is far less elastic, and strongly dependent on seasonal and short-term weather factors. For this reason, concerns over an interruption in Russian supply to Europe whose effects would ripple through to the UK will remain heightened until the end of the winter heating season. [post_title] => The Potential Impact on the UK of a Disruption in Russian Gas Supplies to Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => the-potential-impact-on-the-uk-of-a-disruption-in-russian-gas-supplies-to-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-02-11 14:28:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44562 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44534 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-02-01 11:00:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-02-01 11:00:41 [post_content] => The recent geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West over the Russian build-up of troops close to the Ukrainian border have renewed public debate over Europe’s dependence on hydrocarbons imported from Russia, and natural gas in particular. There is particular concern over the security of pipeline gas deliveries to Europe via Ukraine. In this special edition of the Quarterly Gas Review, we begin by explaining the level of European dependence on gas imported by pipeline from Russia, before setting out several scenarios under which supplies from Russia might be disrupted. We then analyse how Europe might substitute those Russian supplies with supplies from other sources. Finally, using the NexantECA World Gas Model, we lay out three scenarios covering – a partial curtailment of supplies from Russia, a complete cessation of supplies from Russia, and the ‘base case’ but with Nord Stream 2 approval being permanently withheld – and how these scenarios would impact Europe’s gas balance in 2022 and 2023. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 16 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-16 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-02-01 11:07:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-02-01 11:07:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44534 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44442 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2022-01-12 11:30:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-01-12 11:30:25 [post_content] => This Comment discusses the surge in gas prices in Europe in 2021, breaking down the various drivers in three phases. In Q1 the cold northern hemisphere winter weather and supply constraints from European production tightened the market, but the impact on TTF prices was muted since European storage was in good shape and could relatively easily accommodate the increased withdrawals. In the summer, strong Asian, as well as Central and South American demand for LNG combined with continued supply constraints for LNG and European production meant that Europe was unable to restock at anywhere near a normal rate. Upward pressure began to build on TTF prices. The real shock to the market, however, came in Q4 when gas flows from Russia along the Yamal Europe route dropped sharply to less than a third of normal levels. The lower Yamal Europe flows tipped the market over the edge and rather than TTF prices being in the $15 to $20 per MMBtu range – still very high by historical standards – they rose to $30 or above and averaged almost $27/MMBtu for the whole of Q4. [post_title] => Surging 2021 European Gas Prices – Why and How? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => surging-2021-european-gas-prices-why-and-how [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-01-12 09:26:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-01-12 09:26:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44442 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44340 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-11-22 12:48:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-11-22 12:48:41 [post_content] => On 16 November 2021 the German regulatory authority (BNetzA) suspended the procedure to certify Nord Stream 2 AG (NS2 AG) as an operator of the NS2 pipeline. BNetzA’s decision has triggered an avalanche of questions about its potential impact on the length and outcome of the certification process of the NS2 pipeline operator, and about the timing of the start of gas flows via the NS2 pipeline – the most frequent of which this short comment aims to answer. [post_title] => German regulator’s decision to suspend certification of Nord Stream 2 AG: F.A.Q. [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => german-regulators-decision-to-suspend-certification-of-nord-stream-2-ag-f-a-q [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-11-22 12:48:41 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-11-22 12:48:41 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44340 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 44157 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-09-27 14:24:02 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-09-27 13:24:02 [post_content] => International gas prices have experienced a roller coaster ride in the past year, from historic lows to unprecedented highs. In this OIES Comment, we analyse the drivers behind this pricing fluctuation, and offer an outlook for the coming winter. In order to avoid the distorting effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, we compare the year to date (January-August) 2021 with the same period in 2019. On the global LNG market, the supply-side increase in nameplate export capacity was offset by outages at a number of export plants. By contrast, LNG demand outside Europe surged. This meant that growth in supply simply did not keep pace with the increase in demand. With Europe as the ‘balancing market’ for global LNG, its role as the absorber of excess volumes in 2019 was reversed in 2021, as European LNG imports declined. On the European market, the decline in LNG imports was accompanied by a decline in European production and pipeline imports from regional suppliers, most notably Russia. Yet demand remained at the same level as 2019, and the gap was met by net storage withdrawals. Therefore, we conclude that with both the global LNG market in general and the European market in particular noticeably tighter, the ongoing price rally is driven by fundamentals, with an added ‘fear premium’ that the forthcoming winter could be as cold as that in 2020/21. If that proves to be the case, the current price levels will persist, and even rise, while a milder winter could see the market turn slightly more bearish. [post_title] => Why are Gas Prices So High? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => why-are-gas-prices-so-high [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-09-27 14:24:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-09-27 13:24:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=44157 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43924 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-08-04 10:58:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-08-04 09:58:44 [post_content] => In our latest Gas Quarterly, we review the gas price rally in Europe, supported by rising coal and carbon prices within Europe and LNG prices in Asia. Looking forward, the market sentiment – as expressed in the forward curve - seems to be that the current high prices will continue, as storage injections remain sluggish and Europe looks set to enter the winter with storage stocks well below the levels of recent years. Gazprom, as the largest external supplier to Europe, has dramatically scaled back its spot sales via its own Electronic Sales Platform, and is flowing slightly less gas to Europe via Ukraine than last year, and significantly less than in 2019. We address the question of whether Gazprom is ‘holding back’ volumes from Europe, in support of the current high prices. Finally, we analyse the surge in Chinese gas demand that is drawing LNG cargoes away from Europe and could make China the world’s largest LNG importer by volume in 2021. [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 14 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-14 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-08-05 15:36:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-08-05 14:36:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43924 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43895 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-07-22 11:53:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-07-22 10:53:00 [post_content] => Ghana could be the first Sub Saharan African country to import LNG with the facilities at Tema, near Accra, being readied to receive cargoes. However, the country already imports pipeline gas from Nigeria, although that supply has been unreliable in the past, and domestic production is growing. Now that the producing fields in the west of the country are connected to the largest demand centre around Accra via the West African Gas Pipeline, increasing domestic production should be able to supply rising demand. The need for LNG as well, therefore can be questioned, especially as it looks more expensive than both domestic production and pipeline imports from Nigeria. However, increased domestic production requires not only the timely negotiation of commercial agreements, but also realistic expectations on price by both buyers and sellers. [post_title] => Does Ghana need LNG? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => does-ghana-need-lng [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-07-22 11:53:00 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-07-22 10:53:00 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43895 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43849 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-07-05 12:04:01 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-07-05 11:04:01 [post_content] => In the debate about the impact of the Energy Transition on the current global energy system it is becoming increasingly clear that there are multiple pathways, technologies and outcomes that can help the world to decarbonize. The two scenarios prepared by the OIES are designed to limit the global temperature rise to well below 2 °C, one scenario which is favourable to natural gas and one which is less favourable. The favourable scenario has gas demand slightly higher than current levels in 2050, but with significant levels of abatement and carbon capture, while the unfavourable scenario has gas demand in 2050 at some 60% of today’s levels, but still with significant levels of abatement. The need to switch from coal to gas in the Asian markets leads to rapid growth in LNG trade in the 2020s, sustained at least through 2040. In the unfavourable case LNG trade declines rapidly in the 2030s, giving rise to potential stranded assets. Both scenarios involve natural gas to a much greater degree than the IEA’s Net Zero pathway but are still consistent with limiting the global temperature rise. We do not suggest that this is “the” answer, but it does offer an alternative view of the future which may be considered more achievable given current infrastructure in place and the important role that gas can clearly play in many regions as an agent of decarbonisation. [post_title] => Energy Transition: Modelling the Impact on Natural Gas [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => energy-transition-modelling-the-impact-on-natural-gas [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-07-05 12:04:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-07-05 11:04:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43849 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43694 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-05-13 12:35:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-13 11:35:18 [post_content] => After a supply-long 2019 and COVID-impacted 2020, the first quarter of 2021 saw European gas demand surge due to a sharp spell of cold weather. As similarly cold conditions in NE Asia drew away LNG cargoes, European storage stocks were rapidly drawn down to balance the global market. This depleted the substantial stocks that had accumulated over the past two mild winters. Looking forward, the TTF forward curve, and the Asian prices as well, may well be incorporating a “fear” premium based on the events of the winter just gone when Asian buyers were caught by the very cold weather. In the absence of sufficiently strong Asian LNG demand in 2021 and/or a failure of European pipeline imports to materialise, it seems rather more likely that prices during the summer will fall below those of the forward curve. This would prompt both greater injections into European storage and the stimulation of greater LNG imports into the most price-sensitive markets, which could reduce the likelihood of LNG shut-ins this summer [post_title] => Quarterly Gas Review - Issue 13 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => quarterly-gas-review-issue-13 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-13 13:47:30 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-13 12:47:30 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43694 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 43454 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2021-02-17 11:15:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-17 11:15:16 [post_content] => The big jump in Asian LNG prices in January as a result of very cold weather in Northeast Asia and supply issues at some export plants together with a seeming lack of spare LNG tanker capacity, led to the conclusion that a perfect storm had hit the LNG market. However, other factors were also at play which meant that the price spike may have been an accident waiting to happen. The lack of any meaningful gas storage in the region, especially in a country like Japan, means the market does not have the back-up flexibility that Europe has. This is compounded in Japan by the nature of its fragmented market with few pipeline interconnections between the main cities and regions. The other missing piece in Asia is the lack of a liquid physical trading market, as operates in Europe and North America. The price spike may also have implications for the possible use of benchmarks such as JKM, in contracts, whether short, medium or even long-term, if the market is not seen as having enough liquidity. To avoid a repeat, there seems to be no option other than for the right policies to be put in place to create a deep and liquid hub market where risks can be hedged, combined with additional short-term storage capacity. [post_title] => Asia LNG Price Spike: Perfect Storm or Structural Failure? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => asia-lng-price-spike-perfect-storm-or-structural-failure [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-17 11:15:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-17 11:15:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=43454 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 41859 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-10-16 11:08:46 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-10-16 10:08:46 [post_content] => The forward curve for TTF gas prices is suggesting a significant rise in prices in 2021 over 2020. With gas demand in Europe not falling as much this year as earlier thought, an increase in demand next year may be limited. With a likely rebound in pipeline imports in 2021, especially from Russia, this will increase the pressure on LNG imports into Europe, which have remained at high levels this year. Rising Asian LNG demand in 2021 can absorb some of the LNG which would be diverted away from Europe as well as the increasing LNG supply from the US trains ramping up to full capacity. However, the global gas market may only be able to balance at the forward curve prices in the $4 to $5 per MMBtu range if gas supply is again curtailed, with the onus in 2021 falling mostly on the LNG market. A cold northern hemisphere winter, curtailments in Russia pipe flows to Europe and/or a very large rise in Asia LNG demand could conspire to tighten the balance and support prices at the level of the forward curve. Alternatively, European storage could again absorb the surplus LNG but this would likely require TTF prices to be below $3 again in the summer of 2021, to balance the market, repeating the events of this year. [post_title] => $2 Gas in Europe: Groundhog Day? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => 2-gas-in-europe-groundhog-day [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-10-16 11:18:00 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-10-16 10:18:00 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=41859 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 40863 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-09-10 12:01:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-10 11:01:54 [post_content] =>

Since the birth of the LNG industry, Asia has been the key market, providing high value, reliable demand. The 3 foundation markets of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been joined more recently by China and India to form the “big 5” which is often the focus for much analysis and comment. However, it would be wrong to ignore the smaller, emerging Asian LNG markets. By considering the 10 most significant emerging Asian markets, this report demonstrates that when combined, they have potential LNG demand over the next 2 decades as the combination of India and China. Like all demand forecasts, whether that potential is achievable is, however, depends on overcoming some significant challenges, as discussed in the report.

In addition, these smaller countries offer a diversity of analytical interest. Malaysia and Indonesia are LNG exporters, now looking to become significant importers. Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines all see LNG as needed to supplement declining domestic gas production. Myanmar started LNG imports to address a power crisis, and Hong Kong and Singapore are largely driven by environmental and security of supply concerns.

With a chapter on each country and detailed breakdown of the forecasts generated by our World Gas Model, the document provides a useful reference of current perceptions of future prospects in those emerging LNG markets.

Latest Publications by Mike Fulwood

01.02.24

What next for US LNG Exports?

The Biden administration has been coming under increasing pressure from environmental groups and the left of the Democratic Party to stop new US LNG export projects on “environmental” grounds. The pause on non-FTA LNG export approvals, hastily announced on January 26, suggest they have succumbed to this pressure. The practical impact of this is that […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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07.12.23

European Gas Market Supply & Demand: Winter Outlook 2023/24

European gas balances look comfortable heading into the winter on the back of record storage levels. European hub prices have stabilized since April and absent a major supply outage, 100 Bcm of storage stocks at the start of December means there is no prospect of any physical shortage this winter. We expect gas demand to […]

By: Bill Farren-Price Mike Fulwood Anouk Honoré Jack Sharples

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30.10.23

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 23

In this fourth edition of the Gas Quarterly for 2023 we once again review the series of signposts that we outlined as key indicators of the global gas market during the year and also draw some conclusions about the outlook for prices and the supply-demand balance. In the first half of Q3, a number of […]

By: Jack Sharples Mike Fulwood

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21.07.23

A New Global Gas Order? (Part 1): The Outlook to 2030 after the Energy Crisis

The energy crisis, catalysed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has disrupted the global gas market. This analysis out to 2030 assesses the impact of the crisis and considers whether this may lead to a fundamental change in the global gas market or whether it my just be a slight blip in the otherwise continued […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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18.07.23

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 22

In this third edition of the Gas Quarterly for 2023 we once again review the series of signposts that we outlined as key indicators of the global gas market during the year and also draw some conclusions about the outlook for prices and the supply-demand balance. In summary, we conclude that gas prices in Europe […]

By: Jack Sharples Ieda Gomes Mike Fulwood

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17.04.23

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 21

In this latest edition of the Gas Quarterly we review the first quarter of 2023 against the signposts that we outlined at the start of the year. The overarching theme is that the outturn for Europe has been much more benign than could have been expected at the start of winter. A combination of warm […]

By: Jack Sharples Mike Fulwood Michal Meidan

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30.01.23

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 20

In this first Gas Quarterly of 2023 we review some of the key events in the global gas market in 2022 and outline a number of important signposts that we will be looking out for in 2023 as we continue to monitor the main implications of the Russia-Ukraine war. At the time of writing in […]

By: Jack Sharples Anouk Honoré Mike Fulwood

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16.12.22

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 19

This edition of the Quarterly Gas Review focuses particularly on supply-side dynamics in Europe in recent months, including the decline in Russian pipeline supply, the rise in European LNG imports and sendout, and the record net storage injections. This supply-side analysis is complemented by an analysis of the global LNG market, from the perspective of […]

By: Jack Sharples Mike Fulwood Anouk Honoré

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31.10.22

The Consequences of Capping the TTF Price

The President of the European Commission has made a number of statements in recent months on what might be done to limit the impact of high gas prices on EU markets. There is a belief, amongst EU political leaders, that the TTF wholesale gas price is no longer an appropriate benchmark price for EU gas, […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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28.09.22

Europe’s Infrastructure and Supply Crisis

Low, or no, Russia pipeline flows to the EU are precipitating an infrastructure and supply crisis. The impact is not Europe wide on flows, with potentially the five most impacted countries being Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary, being totally dependent on pipeline imports from Norway and connections to Belgium and the Netherlands – […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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08.08.22

Asian Energy Markets Following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to strongly impact international energy markets, posing severe challenges for energy importing countries. Much of the commentary and analysis has been focused on the consequences for, and reactions of, European nations and the European Union. Despite the fact that each region has its own specific dynamics, the global nature of […]

By: Michal Meidan Mohua Mukherjee Philip Andrews-Speed Yan Qin Mike Fulwood Andreas Economou

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04.08.22

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 18

The second quarter of 2022 has been a dramatic one for the European gas market. On the supply side, relatively modest increases in European production and pipeline imports from Norway and Azerbaijan have been overshadowed by two significant shifts: the decline in pipeline flows from Russia and the high level of LNG, both of which […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Michal Meidan

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20.07.22

The Curious Incident of the Nord Stream Gas Turbine

A sharp decline in gas flows on Nord Stream to Europe began on June 14, following the news that a gas turbine was “stuck” in Canada for maintenance as a result of western sanctions on Russia, and because further compressors at the Portovaya compressor station were also taken offline. There has been much commentary that […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Jonathan Stern Katja Yafimava

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07.07.22

REPowerEU and the Short-Term Outlook for the European Gas Market

The May 18 documents from the EU (REPowerEU) suggested that Russia pipe imports to the EU could fall by 70 bcm this year. With Nordstream flows being at 40 percent of capacity ostensibly due to compressor issues, a 70 bcm reduction looks to be a possible outcome if flows don’t recover after the annual Nordstream […]

By: Mike Fulwood Anouk Honoré Jack Sharples

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26.05.22

Quarterly Gas Review: Issue 17

Since our previous edition of the Quarterly Gas Review, the Russian build-up of troops around Ukraine’s border has erupted into a full-scale invasion. European gas prices, which were already high, surged. In response to the invasion, the European Commission and various European governments announced their intention to reduce dependency on Russian gas imports. In response, […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Mostefa Ouki

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11.04.22

Russian gas to the EU: to sanction or not to sanction

The gas market in Europe is in a state of real uncertainty as to whether Russia will cut off gas supplies to Europe, or whether the EU should sanction imports of gas on the grounds that their payments are fuelling the Russian war machine in Ukraine. The current situation of uncertainty and not knowing whether […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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18.03.22

The EU plan to reduce Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of 2022: Practical realities and implications

On 8 March 2022, the European Commission published the outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030, starting with gas, in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Commission noted that EU gas imports from Russia in 2021 (pipeline and LNG combined) totalled 155 billion cubic metres (bcm), […]

By: Mike Fulwood Anouk Honoré Jack Sharples Marshall Hall

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04.03.22

Ukraine Invasion: What This Means for the European Gas Market

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces has led to sharp rises in gas prices in Europe and around the world with real concerns about the possible curtailment of gas flows from Russia to Europe. Pipeline imports from Russia began falling in the last quarter of 2021 and declined even further in January and most […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples James Henderson

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11.02.22

The Potential Impact on the UK of a Disruption in Russian Gas Supplies to Europe

The geopolitical tensions between Russia and Europe over the build-up of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border have generated concerns over the extent of Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, and the possible consequences should the flow of Russian gas to Europe be curtailed, either partially or completely. In this paper, we analyse the potential […]

By: Jack Sharples Katja Yafimava Jonathan Stern Mike Fulwood

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01.02.22

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 16

The recent geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West over the Russian build-up of troops close to the Ukrainian border have renewed public debate over Europe’s dependence on hydrocarbons imported from Russia, and natural gas in particular. There is particular concern over the security of pipeline gas deliveries to Europe via Ukraine. In this special […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Katja Yafimava

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12.01.22

Surging 2021 European Gas Prices – Why and How?

This Comment discusses the surge in gas prices in Europe in 2021, breaking down the various drivers in three phases. In Q1 the cold northern hemisphere winter weather and supply constraints from European production tightened the market, but the impact on TTF prices was muted since European storage was in good shape and could relatively […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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22.11.21

German regulator’s decision to suspend certification of Nord Stream 2 AG: F.A.Q.

On 16 November 2021 the German regulatory authority (BNetzA) suspended the procedure to certify Nord Stream 2 AG (NS2 AG) as an operator of the NS2 pipeline. BNetzA’s decision has triggered an avalanche of questions about its potential impact on the length and outcome of the certification process of the NS2 pipeline operator, and about […]

By: Katja Yafimava Mike Fulwood

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27.09.21

Why are Gas Prices So High?

International gas prices have experienced a roller coaster ride in the past year, from historic lows to unprecedented highs. In this OIES Comment, we analyse the drivers behind this pricing fluctuation, and offer an outlook for the coming winter. In order to avoid the distorting effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, we compare the […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples

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04.08.21

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 14

In our latest Gas Quarterly, we review the gas price rally in Europe, supported by rising coal and carbon prices within Europe and LNG prices in Asia. Looking forward, the market sentiment – as expressed in the forward curve – seems to be that the current high prices will continue, as storage injections remain sluggish […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples

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22.07.21

Does Ghana need LNG?

Ghana could be the first Sub Saharan African country to import LNG with the facilities at Tema, near Accra, being readied to receive cargoes. However, the country already imports pipeline gas from Nigeria, although that supply has been unreliable in the past, and domestic production is growing. Now that the producing fields in the west […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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05.07.21

Energy Transition: Modelling the Impact on Natural Gas

In the debate about the impact of the Energy Transition on the current global energy system it is becoming increasingly clear that there are multiple pathways, technologies and outcomes that can help the world to decarbonize. The two scenarios prepared by the OIES are designed to limit the global temperature rise to well below 2 […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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13.05.21

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 13

After a supply-long 2019 and COVID-impacted 2020, the first quarter of 2021 saw European gas demand surge due to a sharp spell of cold weather. As similarly cold conditions in NE Asia drew away LNG cargoes, European storage stocks were rapidly drawn down to balance the global market. This depleted the substantial stocks that had […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples

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17.02.21

Asia LNG Price Spike: Perfect Storm or Structural Failure?

The big jump in Asian LNG prices in January as a result of very cold weather in Northeast Asia and supply issues at some export plants together with a seeming lack of spare LNG tanker capacity, led to the conclusion that a perfect storm had hit the LNG market. However, other factors were also at […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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16.10.20

$2 Gas in Europe: Groundhog Day?

The forward curve for TTF gas prices is suggesting a significant rise in prices in 2021 over 2020. With gas demand in Europe not falling as much this year as earlier thought, an increase in demand next year may be limited. With a likely rebound in pipeline imports in 2021, especially from Russia, this will […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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10.09.20

Emerging Asia LNG Demand

Since the birth of the LNG industry, Asia has been the key market, providing high value, reliable demand. The 3 foundation markets of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been joined more recently by China and India to form the “big 5” which is often the focus for much analysis and comment. However, it would […]

By: Mike Fulwood James Henderson Ieda Gomes Martin Lambert Jack Sharples

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16.06.20

$2 Gas in Europe (Part III): Down, Down, Deeper and Down

Gas prices in Europe have crashed through the $2 range discussed in two previous OIES comments. The June TTF monthly price closed below $2 and, for the next few months, the forward curve suggests this will continue. The amount of gas in storage in Europe has played a crucial role in pricing movements, absorbing a […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples

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12.03.20

$2 gas in Europe is here: who will blink first?

In October last year the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) published an Energy Comment which considered the possibility of $2 gas in Europe during 2020. Remarkably we now have $2 gas before the winter has ended. The month ahead index for March for TTF is $2.91 per MMBtu and for NBP was $2.88 per […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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30.01.20

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 8

The OIES Natural Gas Quarterly aims to provide a regular insight into the thoughts of Research Fellows on topical issues as well as providing a different angle on trends in global gas pricing. In the pricing section, the Quarterly reviews the LNG Tightness measure, looks at the Russian gas export price to Europe versus the […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Anouk Honoré Marshall Hall Martin Lambert James Henderson Michal Meidan Patrick Heather

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22.10.19

Could we see $2 gas in Europe in 2020?

Europe has long been regarded as the balancing market for global LNG and has performed this function extremely well in the last twelve months, with total imports of 105 bcm – a 75 per cent rise year on year. In this period spot prices collapsed averaging less than $4 in the third quarter of this […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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20.05.19

Are Asian LNG Spot Prices Finally Decoupling from Oil?

LNG spot prices in Asia have fallen sharply in the last 6 months as the supply coming on to the market has outstripped demand. With oil prices remaining above $70/b this has opened up a wide gap with oil linked long term contract prices. Are we seeing the beginning of a systematic decoupling of spot […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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12.04.19

New Players New Models

The LNG business is in a period of considerable change as it moves from a structured to a traded market. The entry of new players has resulted in a more flexible value chain model, where the bilateral linkages between suppliers and buyers are no longer ‘fixed’. The increase in spot purchases and short-term trading has […]

By: David Ledesma Mike Fulwood

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07.01.19

Opportunities for Gas in Sub-Saharan Africa

Gas demand in Sub-Saharan Africa has largely been based on domestic production in specific countries such as Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Outside South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe there is little or no coal-fired power generation for gas to compete with, as power generation is dominated by oil and hydro. This Insight considers the opportunities for […]

By: Mike Fulwood

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31.01.18

Future prospects for LNG demand in Ghana

With energy demand in Africa forecast to grow quickly in the coming decades, the prospects of LNG imports have been talked up by many commentators, with Ghana being thought of as one of the brightest prospects. Ghana first began developing its gas market by importing pipeline gas from Nigeria, along the West African Gas Pipeline, […]

By: Mike Fulwood Thierry Bros

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Mike Fulwood

Senior Research Fellow

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Latest Publications by Mike Fulwood

What next for US LNG Exports?

European Gas Market Supply & Demand: Winter Outlook 2023/24

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 23

A New Global Gas Order? (Part 1): The Outlook to 2030 after the Energy Crisis

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 22

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 21

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 20

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 19

The Consequences of Capping the TTF Price

Europe’s Infrastructure and Supply Crisis

Asian Energy Markets Following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 18

The Curious Incident of the Nord Stream Gas Turbine

REPowerEU and the Short-Term Outlook for the European Gas Market

Quarterly Gas Review: Issue 17

Russian gas to the EU: to sanction or not to sanction

The EU plan to reduce Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of 2022: Practical realities and implications

Ukraine Invasion: What This Means for the European Gas Market

The Potential Impact on the UK of a Disruption in Russian Gas Supplies to Europe

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 16

Surging 2021 European Gas Prices – Why and How?

German regulator’s decision to suspend certification of Nord Stream 2 AG: F.A.Q.

Why are Gas Prices So High?

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 14

Does Ghana need LNG?

Energy Transition: Modelling the Impact on Natural Gas

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 13

Asia LNG Price Spike: Perfect Storm or Structural Failure?

$2 Gas in Europe: Groundhog Day?

Emerging Asia LNG Demand

$2 Gas in Europe (Part III): Down, Down, Deeper and Down

$2 gas in Europe is here: who will blink first?

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 8

Could we see $2 gas in Europe in 2020?

Are Asian LNG Spot Prices Finally Decoupling from Oil?

New Players New Models

Opportunities for Gas in Sub-Saharan Africa

Future prospects for LNG demand in Ghana

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