Katja Yafimava

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Katja Yafimava is Senior Research Fellow on the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Gas Research Programme. She holds a D.Phil. in Geography and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European Studies from Oxford University. She has been an expert at the UNECE Group of Experts on Gas since January 2015 and was an expert at the EU-Russia Gas Advisory Council during 2012-16. Her main research areas include EU pipeline gas and LNG regulation, regulation of decarbonisation, transit security of Russian gas exports to Europe.

Dr Yafimava is the author of The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (OUP 2011) and the author and co-author of chapters in other books, including The Russian Gas Matrix: how markets are driving change (OUP 2014), Research Handbook on International Energy Law (Edward Elgar 2014), The Pricing of Internationally Traded Gas (OUP 2012), Russian and CIS Gas Markets and their Impact on Europe (OUP 2009). She is also the author and co-author of several working papers on Russia-Ukraine, Russia-Belarus, and Russia-Moldova gas transit disputes, the latest in this series is a co-authored OIES paper ‘Implications of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal for alternative pipeline routes and the Ukrainian and European markets’ (2020). At present, Dr Yafimava’s main area of research is EU regulation, including regulation of pipeline gas and LNG as well as regulation of decarbonisation, reflected in many OIES publications, including ‘Nord Stream 2: on the verge of sending gas to Europe’ (2021), ‘The OPAL Exemption Decision: a comment on the Advocate General’s Opinion on its annulment and its implications for the Court of Justice judgement and OPAL regulatory treatment’ (2021), ‘Finding a home’ for global LNG in Europe: understanding the complexity of access rules for EU import terminals’ (2020), ‘EU hydrogen strategy: regulatory opportunities and challenges’ (2020), ‘Gas Directive Amendment: implications for Nord Stream 2’ (2019), ‘Building New Gas Transportation Infrastructure in the EU – what are the rules of the game?’ (2018), ‘The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom’s sales to central and eastern Europe: a detailed analysis of the commitments and the way forward’ (co-authored) (2017), ‘German regulator’s decision to suspend certification of Nord Stream 2 AG: F.A.Q.’ (co-authored) (2021), ‘The potential impact on the UK of a disruption in Russian gas supplies to Europe’ (co-authored) (2022). Her most recent paper is ‘The EC guidance on the Russian ‘gas for rubles’ decree: all things to all people?’ (2022).

Twitter: @katyafimava

For selected non-OIES publications click please click here

Areas of Expertise

EU pipeline gas and LNG regulation: Third Energy Package, EU Network Codes; Gas Target Model; EU regulation of gas decarbonisation (focus on European gas networks); transit security of Russian gas exports to Europe; Russia’s gas relations with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova; Russian gas issues: transportation, regulation, exports.

Contact

Tel: +44 (0)1865 889129
Fax: +44 (0)1865 310527
Email: [email protected]

[post_title] => EU Hydrogen Vision: regulatory opportunities and challenges [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => eu-hydrogen-vision-regulatory-opportunities-and-challenges [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-08-23 14:31:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-08-23 13:31:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=40973 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 35732 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_content] => In our previous Insight, The Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal: opening a new chapter, we examined how the recent Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement was reached, and analysed the terms of the deal. This follow-up Insight analyses broader question of Russian gas transit to Europe, and the impact of the Russia-Ukraine deal on other routes that bring Russian gas to Europe. This includes longstanding routes, and two new pipeline projects, TurkStream and Nord Stream 2. It also examines the impact of the deal on the Ukrainian gas market, and the likely short-term price effects in the European market. In doing so, this Insight analyses the broader context surrounding the Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement. [post_title] => Implications of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal for alternative pipeline routes and the Ukrainian and European markets [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => implications-of-the-russia-ukraine-gas-transit-deal-for-alternative-pipeline-routes-and-the-ukrainian-and-european-markets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-02 12:32:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=35732 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 34596 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2020-01-17 12:58:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-01-17 12:58:45 [post_content] => Entering the 2020s, LNG sellers are operating in an increasingly oversupplied global market, thus facing the problems of whether and where they will be able to ‘find a home’ for their cargoes. Given that the EU is the only liquid gas market with regulated third party access (TPA) to LNG import terminals, the sellers will always be able to place a cargo in the EU for which no other market can be accessed unless the owner/buyer agrees, and hence will need to know and understand the TPA rules for EU LNG import terminals. As no dedicated LNG-specific EU regulation exists and the Third Gas Directive and Gas Regulation 715 left a significant degree of discretion to the regulated terminal operators in respect of capacity allocation mechanisms, UIOLI procedures, and tariffs, enabling the operators to choose different ways of compliance, or apply for an exemption. This has resulted in a situation where the LNG import terminals in the EU are governed by a patchwork of terminal codes developed by their operators, the NRA guidance, and the exemptions, thus making it extremely difficult for an LNG seller to understand the rules. This paper concludes that the development of a dedicated stand-alone LNG-specific regulatory framework at the EU level, which could build on and bring together the LNG-related provisions of the Third Gas Directive and Gas Regulation 715, differing terminal codes and exemptions, would establish a level playing field and simplify the sellers’ task of accessing the terminals. Further legislative initiatives on the part of the EC to amend the regulatory framework for LNG import terminals cannot be ruled out, as well as further actions by NRAs in respect of already granted (and new) exemptions. These could take the form of either developing a new LNG network code, amending the existing CAM NC (which does not apply to LNG terminals at present), and/or amending the existing exemption decisions. [post_title] => ‘Finding a home’ for global LNG in Europe: understanding the complexity of access rules for EU import terminals [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => finding-a-home-for-global-lng-in-europe-understanding-the-complexity-of-access-rules-for-eu-import-terminals [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-10 15:03:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-10 15:03:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=34596 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31471 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2019-03-15 11:35:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-03-15 11:35:34 [post_content] => In February 2019, the EU reached a political agreement to amend the Gas Directive to extend its scope to apply to pipelines from third countries to the EU. The proposal is aimed primarily at Nord Stream 2 – a pipeline which would bring Russian gas to Germany and has been under construction across the Baltic Sea since August 2018. This Insight analyses several options under which Nord Stream 2 could proceed once the amended Directive enters into force in July 2019 and is transposed into member states’ law within the subsequent nine months. It argues that the option leading to the least possible regulatory change and uncertainty for Nord Stream 2 is the one under which the German regulatory authority would confirm Nord Stream 2 compliance with the amended Directive, subject to inter alia a transfer of ownership and/or operatorship of the entire pipeline or its German section to an existing or a new TSO, with subsequent certification. On the other hand, the option under which Nord Stream 2 could be granted an exemption from some of the Directive’s requirements would cause a significant amount of regulatory uncertainty and operational delays due to the significant discretion of the EC over the conditions that could be imposed on it as part of the exemption. The option of concluding intergovernmental (between Germany and Russia) or international (between the EC and Russia) agreement on Nord Stream 2 operation is unlikely to be at all workable. While the amended Directive is unable to halt construction of Nord Stream 2 – as some EU member states hoped it would – it is capable of delaying or suspending its operation. The amendment has created significant regulatory uncertainty about the degree of utilization of Nord Stream 2, and consequently of the EUGAL pipeline in Germany, to which it is planned to be connected. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that a significant cap – that is higher than the 20 per cent reservation quotas already applied in respect of EUGAL capacity – would be imposed on Gazprom’s utilization of capacity in Nord Stream 2 due to significant legal constraints. [post_title] => Gas Directive amendment: implications for Nord Stream 2 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => gas-directive-amendment-implications-nord-stream-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-03-15 11:46:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-03-15 11:46:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31471 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 31122 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2018-07-19 13:25:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-07-19 12:25:36 [post_content] =>

Although the EU has called over the past decade for gas pipeline promoters to ‘respect EU rules’, these rules had either not been established or were not clear. It was not until March 2017 that a legally binding regulatory framework for the development of incremental (new) pipeline capacity was established, in the form of the Capacity Allocation Mechanisms Network Code (CAM NC). However, the CAM NC did not resolve all the problematic issues fully, as prior to its adoption many new pipelines had been developed under a patchwork of TEP exemptions, Open Season procedures, and Intergovernmental Agreements. In addition, the CAM NC left important regulatory specificities for the TSOs and NRAs to decide, thus enabling them to develop capacity allocation methods which differ across the EU. Thus, the problem of the regulatory treatment of incremental capacity – created under diverse frameworks with varying degrees of consistency – has not been fully resolved at the EU level and uncertainty remains in respect of its future treatment. This problem has been exacerbated by the ongoing politicization of the EU regulation, particularly in respect of all Russian pipelines but especially Nord Stream 2.

This paper concludes that those pipeline projects initiated prior to the CAM NC’s entry into force should proceed under the rules which were in place at the time of their initiation. Although the EC and the regulatory authorities might be tempted to request some changes in respect of their regulatory treatment – particularly where this differs from what would have been required under the CAM NC – this temptation should be resisted, as further changes would unnecessarily increase (already very significant) uncertainty and complexity. This complexity, together with the lack of clarity associated with the regulatory framework for incremental capacity, suggests that very few major new pipelines will be built in the EU in the future, apart from TAP and EUGAL and the Baltic Pipe, as well as those pipelines needed for connecting the second string of Turkish Stream with European markets. This is because it will be much easier for those wishing to bring additional gas to Europe to do so via LNG import terminals.

[post_title] => Building New Gas Transportation Infrastructure in the EU - what are the rules of the game? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => building-new-gas-transportation-infrastructure-eu-rules-game [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-07-23 10:44:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-07-23 09:44:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=31122 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30690 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-10-24 13:37:26 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-10-24 12:37:26 [post_content] => On 12 June 2017 the European Commission (EC) asked the Council of the European Union (EU) (Council) for a mandate to negotiate an agreement with the Russian government on the operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. On 27 September 2017 the Council’s legal service delivered an opinion, which stated that there is no legal rationale for granting the mandate and that the decision would be a matter of political choice for which the consent of all member states would be required. By rejecting the applicability of the EU energy acquis (specifically the Third Gas Directive) to Nord Stream 2, the Council’s legal service destroyed the main premise of the EC’s argument that the mandate – and the agreement – is necessary to avoid a ‘conflict of laws’ and a ‘legal void’. The weakness of its legal position led the EC to seek amendments to the Directive to make it applicable to offshore pipelines from third countries, with a view of creating a legal rationale for a Nord Stream 2 mandate. This suggests that the EU, uncomfortable with the idea of explicitly political decisions being made in respect of energy, is determined to continue using the legal/regulatory framework by amending it to achieve its political objectives. This Insight analyses several scenarios illustrating ways in which Nord Stream 2 could proceed depending on whether or not the mandate is granted. It argues that as there is no legal basis either for the EU or the member states to stop construction of Nord Stream 2, it is likely to be built under any scenario. At most, should some member states try to argue that there is a basis for rejecting the project on environmental and foreign policy/security grounds, the project could be delayed beyond 2020. [post_title] => The Council Legal Service's assessment of the European Commission's negotiating mandate and what it means for Nord Stream 2 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => council-legal-services-assessment-european-commissions-negotiating-mandate-means-nord-stream-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-21 11:10:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-21 11:10:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30690 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30605 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-09-05 10:08:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-09-05 09:08:27 [post_content] => In June 2009 the European Commission (EC) adopted an exemption decision which prevented Gazprom from being able to utilise more than 50 per cent of capacity in the OPAL pipeline (one of Nord Stream 1 onshore extensions). This led to a situation when OPAL capacity remained underutilised due to a lack of demand from third parties. In October 2016 the EC revised its decision and allowed Gazprom to bid for the remaining 50 per cent of OPAL capacity alongside third parties at PRISMA auctions. First auctions were held in December 2016 but were halted later in the month, following the decision by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to grant a provisional suspension of the revised exemption decision due to complaints filed by Poland and its 100 per cent state-owned gas company, PGNiG, which called for the decision to be annulled. However, in July 2017 the President of the General Court of the CJEU issued an Order, which rejected the suspension. This means that the revised exemption decision will continue to apply at least until 2019 when the CJEU is expected to make its final judgement on annulment. The auctions restarted in August 2017, leading to a sharp increase in Gazprom’s utilisation of OPAL capacity. This Insight analyses the Order, focusing in particular on the CJEU’s rationale for rejecting the suspension and its implications for final judgement. The Insight argues that the CJEU is likely to consider the following factors when making its final judgement in 2019: contractual arrangements that might replace the existing contracts under which Gazprom’s gas is supplied to, and transited across, Poland; the impact of Gazprom’s commitments made in the course of DG COMP investigation into its sales in central and eastern Europe, and the progress reached on the construction of Nord Stream 2 pipelines. The Insight concludes that the CJEU is unlikely to annul the revised exemption decision. [post_title] => The OPAL Exemption Decision: a comment on the CJEU's ruling to reject suspension [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => opal-exemption-decision-comment-cjeus-ruling-reject-suspension [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-21 11:09:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-21 11:09:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30605 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30506 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-07-03 15:24:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-07-03 14:24:15 [post_content] => A detailed analysis by Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava of Gazprom’s March 2017 competition commitments in respect of gas sales to Central and Eastern Europe, concludes that the concerns expressed by DG COMP in respect of territorial restrictions, pricing, and infrastructure issues have been addressed, both in form and in substance. Acceptance of these commitments would provide insurance against future abuse by Gazprom of its dominant position in these countries. Most importantly, Gazprom has henceforth agreed to charge average weighted import border prices and/or prices at relevant generally accepted liquid hubs in Continental Europe instead of alternative fuel (oil-linked) prices. This means that if the commitments are accepted, buyers in these countries will be able to buy Russian gas at hub prices before interconnections have been established with these hubs (potentially up to three years hence). The acceptance by Gazprom of competitive, defined as liquid hub, prices has much wider significance, as it signals the end of alternative fuel pricing for gas in EU countries. DG COMPs market test of the commitments elicited a generally positive response with the exception of Poland’s PGNiG which expressed deep dissatisfaction on virtually all issues, in particular the lack of any fine or obligation for Gazprom to pay compensation for its past behaviour. The study suggests that the most likely outcome is the acceptance by DG COMP of the commitments (with minor amendments) and closure of the case with a settlement. Should some member states, specifically Poland, attempt to derail the settlement, causing the case to be referred to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), the commitments are still likely to be implemented but legal proceedings could drag on for several more years. [post_title] => The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom’s Sales to Central and Eastern Europe: a detailed analysis of the commitments and the way forward [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => eu-competition-investigation-gazproms-sales-central-eastern-europe-detailed-analysis-commitments-way-forward [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-16 12:42:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-16 12:42:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?post_type=publications&p=30506 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publications [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 30350 [post_author] => 111 [post_date] => 2017-04-21 09:47:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-04-21 08:47:16 [post_content] =>

On 13 March 2017 DG COMP announced its satisfaction with Gazprom’s commitments, submitted in response to DG COMP’s concerns in respect of Gazprom’s alleged anti-competitive practices in several central and east European EU member states, relating to territorial restrictions, pricing, and infrastructure. Gazprom’s commitments have addressed all substantiated DG COMP concerns and their acceptance would provide insurance against any future abuse by Gazprom of its dominant position in these countries. Most importantly, Gazprom has henceforth agreed to charge average weighted import border prices in Germany, France and Italy and/or prices at relevant generally accepted liquid hubs in Continental Europe instead of alternative fuel (oil-linked) prices, despite the fact that at present west European border/hub prices do not (yet) accurately represent gas market conditions in either Bulgaria or the Baltics (and only in the past one to two years, and only approximately in Poland). This means that if the commitments are accepted, buyers in these countries will be able to buy Russian gas at prices which otherwise would not have been offered to them until interconnections had been established with north-west European hubs (potentially up to three years hence). Therefore it is reasonable to expect an overall positive response to the commitments during the (ongoing) market test, followed by DG COMP’s acceptance of the commitments and closure of the case with a settlement. However, it cannot be ruled out that some member states, specifically Poland, might attempt to derail such a settlement. Should that happen and the case be referred to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), the whole episode could drag on for several more years.

Latest Publications by Katja Yafimava

15.04.24

From natural gas to hydrogen: what are the rules for European gas network decarbonisation and do they ensure flexibility and security of supply?

On 11 April 2024 the European Parliament adopted the Renewable and Natural Gases and Hydrogen (RNGH) Directive and the RNGH Regulation – otherwise known as the Decarbonised Gas and Hydrogen Package – and published both documents on 12 April 2024. Once approved by the Council and published in the EU Official Journal – expected by […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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06.02.23

EU solidarity at a time of gas crisis: even with a will the way still looks difficult

Helped by anomalously warm winter temperatures, the EU appears increasingly likely to get through the current winter relatively unscathed. But next winter could be significantly more challenging if Russian gas supplies were to decrease further or stop altogether, especially if accompanied by rising China LNG demand, interruptions of other supplies, and cold winter temperatures. In […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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01.08.22

The TEN-E Regulation: allowing a role for decarbonised gas

The original TEN-E Regulation, adopted in 2013, established the regulatory framework for the development of cross-border energy infrastructure within the EU. Following the publication of the EU Green Deal in 2019, the EC proposed to revise the Regulation to facilitate the access of renewable and low carbon gases to the energy system by enabling hydrogen […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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20.07.22

The Curious Incident of the Nord Stream Gas Turbine

A sharp decline in gas flows on Nord Stream to Europe began on June 14, following the news that a gas turbine was “stuck” in Canada for maintenance as a result of western sanctions on Russia, and because further compressors at the Portovaya compressor station were also taken offline. There has been much commentary that […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Jonathan Stern Katja Yafimava

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10.05.22

The EC guidance on the Russian ‘gas for rubles’ decree: all things to all people?

On 21 April 2022, the European Commission published its guidance for EU Member States and their gas buyers on the Russian Presidential decree, which requested payment for Russian (pipeline) gas, delivered after 1 April 2022, in rubles. The decree and its implications for gas supply contracts have been analysed in a previous OIES publication. This comment […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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11.02.22

The Potential Impact on the UK of a Disruption in Russian Gas Supplies to Europe

The geopolitical tensions between Russia and Europe over the build-up of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border have generated concerns over the extent of Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, and the possible consequences should the flow of Russian gas to Europe be curtailed, either partially or completely. In this paper, we analyse the potential […]

By: Jack Sharples Katja Yafimava Jonathan Stern Mike Fulwood

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01.02.22

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 16

The recent geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West over the Russian build-up of troops close to the Ukrainian border have renewed public debate over Europe’s dependence on hydrocarbons imported from Russia, and natural gas in particular. There is particular concern over the security of pipeline gas deliveries to Europe via Ukraine. In this special […]

By: Mike Fulwood Jack Sharples Katja Yafimava

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22.11.21

German regulator’s decision to suspend certification of Nord Stream 2 AG: F.A.Q.

On 16 November 2021 the German regulatory authority (BNetzA) suspended the procedure to certify Nord Stream 2 AG (NS2 AG) as an operator of the NS2 pipeline. BNetzA’s decision has triggered an avalanche of questions about its potential impact on the length and outcome of the certification process of the NS2 pipeline operator, and about […]

By: Katja Yafimava Mike Fulwood

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03.11.21

Nord Steam 2: on the verge of sending gas to Europe

Both lines of Nord Stream 2 have been built, and the first line is filled with gas at pressure sufficient to start flows. The project has faced many obstacles before reaching this stage, and some of these obstacles, related to technical and regulatory certification, are analysed in this Insight. With the technical certification challenge apparently […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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29.03.21

The OPAL Exemption Decision: a comment on the Advocate General’s Opinion on its annulment and its implications for the Court of Justice judgement and OPAL regulatory treatment

In October 2016 the European Commission (EC) adopted an exemption decision, which exempted 50% of capacity in OPAL (one of the onshore pipelines connecting to Nord Stream 1) from third party access. It also prescribed non-discriminatory access to another 50% of capacity via auctions where both Gazprom and third parties were able to participate, guaranteeing […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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14.09.20

EU Hydrogen Vision: regulatory opportunities and challenges

This Insight provides an overview of the recent EU Commission Hydrogen Strategy, Energy System Integration Strategy and Industrial Strategy, focusing on regulatory issues impacting hydrogen. It looks at the proposed classification and preferences for different sources of hydrogen, financial and regulatory support for development of hydrogen supply, demand, and infrastructure, as well as potential regulation […]

By: Alex Barnes Katja Yafimava

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02.03.20

Implications of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal for alternative pipeline routes and the Ukrainian and European markets

In our previous Insight, The Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal: opening a new chapter, we examined how the recent Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement was reached, and analysed the terms of the deal. This follow-up Insight analyses broader question of Russian gas transit to Europe, and the impact of the Russia-Ukraine deal on other routes that bring […]

By: Simon Pirani Jack Sharples Katja Yafimava Vitaly Yermakov

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17.01.20

‘Finding a home’ for global LNG in Europe: understanding the complexity of access rules for EU import terminals

Entering the 2020s, LNG sellers are operating in an increasingly oversupplied global market, thus facing the problems of whether and where they will be able to ‘find a home’ for their cargoes. Given that the EU is the only liquid gas market with regulated third party access (TPA) to LNG import terminals, the sellers will […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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15.03.19

Gas Directive amendment: implications for Nord Stream 2

In February 2019, the EU reached a political agreement to amend the Gas Directive to extend its scope to apply to pipelines from third countries to the EU. The proposal is aimed primarily at Nord Stream 2 – a pipeline which would bring Russian gas to Germany and has been under construction across the Baltic […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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19.07.18

Building New Gas Transportation Infrastructure in the EU – what are the rules of the game?

Although the EU has called over the past decade for gas pipeline promoters to ‘respect EU rules’, these rules had either not been established or were not clear. It was not until March 2017 that a legally binding regulatory framework for the development of incremental (new) pipeline capacity was established, in the form of the […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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24.10.17

The Council Legal Service’s assessment of the European Commission’s negotiating mandate and what it means for Nord Stream 2

On 12 June 2017 the European Commission (EC) asked the Council of the European Union (EU) (Council) for a mandate to negotiate an agreement with the Russian government on the operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. On 27 September 2017 the Council’s legal service delivered an opinion, which stated that there is no legal […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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05.09.17

The OPAL Exemption Decision: a comment on the CJEU’s ruling to reject suspension

In June 2009 the European Commission (EC) adopted an exemption decision which prevented Gazprom from being able to utilise more than 50 per cent of capacity in the OPAL pipeline (one of Nord Stream 1 onshore extensions). This led to a situation when OPAL capacity remained underutilised due to a lack of demand from third […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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03.07.17

The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom’s Sales to Central and Eastern Europe: a detailed analysis of the commitments and the way forward

A detailed analysis by Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava of Gazprom’s March 2017 competition commitments in respect of gas sales to Central and Eastern Europe, concludes that the concerns expressed by DG COMP in respect of territorial restrictions, pricing, and infrastructure issues have been addressed, both in form and in substance. Acceptance of these commitments […]

By: Jonathan Stern Katja Yafimava

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21.04.17

The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom’s Sales to Central and Eastern Europe: a comment on commitments

On 13 March 2017 DG COMP announced its satisfaction with Gazprom’s commitments, submitted in response to DG COMP’s concerns in respect of Gazprom’s alleged anti-competitive practices in several central and east European EU member states, relating to territorial restrictions, pricing, and infrastructure. Gazprom’s commitments have addressed all substantiated DG COMP concerns and their acceptance would […]

By: Jonathan Stern Katja Yafimava

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23.01.17

The OPAL Exemption Decision: past, present, and future

Since the OPAL pipeline started operating, more than five years ago, Gazprom has been unable to use more than 50 per cent of its capacity – even if such was not required by third parties – due to a regulatory cap imposed by the European Commission (EC) in June 2009. In October 2016 the EC […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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29.02.16

Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine Post-2019 – pipeline scenarios, gas flow consequences, and regulatory constraints

The future of the transportation of Russian gas to Europe is wide open. The role of Ukraine, historically the main transit corridor, will change after the current transit contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy expires on 31 December 2019. Gazprom has already substantially reduced the volumes of gas it transits across Ukraine, and expressed its […]

By: Simon Pirani Katja Yafimava

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23.03.15

Evolution of gas pipeline regulation in Russia – Third party access, capacity allocation and transportation tariffs

Executive Summary Russia has been reforming its domestic gas transportation regime since the mid-2000s and achieved significant progress through an introduction of legal unbundling, establishment of a legal/regulatory framework for non-discriminatory access and a new zonal tariff methodology. However the existing framework remains insufficiently developed both in scope (e.g. non-applicability to non-UGS systems, storage and […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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21.01.15

Does the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy?

The cancellation of the South Stream gas pipeline across the Black Sea may signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy. Its replacement by similar pipelines direct to Turkey, and the abandonment of Gazprom’s long time strategy of supplying gas directly to European customers, comes in the wake of financial sanctions and an inability […]

By: Jonathan Stern Simon Pirani Katja Yafimava

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27.10.14

Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas – distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics

There is limited scope for significantly reducing overall European dependence on Russian gas before the mid-2020s. Countries in the Baltic region and south eastern Europe which are highly dependent on Russian gas, and hence extremely vulnerable to interruptions, could substantially reduce and even eliminate imports of Russian gas by the early 2020s, by a combination […]

By: Jonathan Stern Katja Yafimava Howard Rogers Simon Pirani Laura El-Katiri Anouk Honoré James Henderson Elham Hassanzadeh Ralf Dickel

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10.03.14

What the Ukrainian crisis means for gas markets

The change of government in Kyiv, the Russian military action in Crimea, the diplomatic reaction by the western powers, and the perceived danger of war, clearly have implications for all economic relations between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, especially in the energy sphere. Russia supplies about 30% of Europe’s natural gas, and more than half of […]

By: Simon Pirani James Henderson Anouk Honoré Howard Rogers Katja Yafimava

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16.04.13

The EU Third Package for Gas and the Gas Target Model: major contentious issues inside and outside the EU

The general provisions introduced by the Third Package (which became law in March 2011) and the detailed provisions to be outlined in the pan-European network codes for cross-border issues (currently under development) are set to fundamentally change the architecture of the EU gas market heralding a transition to a new model. Ensuring that the transition […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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01.07.10

The June 2010 Russian-Belarusian Gas Transit Dispute: a surprise that was to be expected

In June 2010 Belarus – the former Soviet country that does not feature too often in European media – attracted many headlines because of its transit dispute with Russia’s Gazprom. Presented with an ultimatum to repay its gas debt it five days or face supplies cuts, Belarus confronted Gazprom with a counter-demand to pay the […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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01.06.10

The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its implications for Europe

An agreement signed on 21 April 2010 by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and his newly-elected Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yanukovich provided for a 30% discount on Russian gas imported to Ukraine, in return for a 25-year extension of the lease to Russia of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol. The agreement came along with declarations […]

By: Simon Pirani Katja Yafimava Jonathan Stern

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01.02.09

The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment

The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 was by far the most serious of its kind. The two sides failed to agree a price for Russian gas supply to Ukraine and a tariff for the transit of Russian gas to Europe before previous agreements expired on 31 December 2008. Russian exports to […]

By: Jonathan Stern Simon Pirani Katja Yafimava

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01.01.07

The 2007 Russia-Belarus Gas Agreement

After prolonged negotiations, the 2007 Russia-Belarus Agreement was signed two minutes before the previous contract expired, with Europe wondering whether there would be a repetition of last year’s Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. Fortunately, a crisis was avoided but not without renewed speculation and adverse commentary on the reliability of Russian gas (and oil) supplies. Our comment […]

By: Katja Yafimava

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Katja Yafimava

Senior Research Fellow

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Latest Publications by Katja Yafimava

From natural gas to hydrogen: what are the rules for European gas network decarbonisation and do they ensure flexibility and security of supply?

EU solidarity at a time of gas crisis: even with a will the way still looks difficult

The TEN-E Regulation: allowing a role for decarbonised gas

The Curious Incident of the Nord Stream Gas Turbine

The EC guidance on the Russian ‘gas for rubles’ decree: all things to all people?

The Potential Impact on the UK of a Disruption in Russian Gas Supplies to Europe

Quarterly Gas Review – Issue 16

German regulator’s decision to suspend certification of Nord Stream 2 AG: F.A.Q.

Nord Steam 2: on the verge of sending gas to Europe

The OPAL Exemption Decision: a comment on the Advocate General’s Opinion on its annulment and its implications for the Court of Justice judgement and OPAL regulatory treatment

EU Hydrogen Vision: regulatory opportunities and challenges

Implications of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal for alternative pipeline routes and the Ukrainian and European markets

‘Finding a home’ for global LNG in Europe: understanding the complexity of access rules for EU import terminals

Gas Directive amendment: implications for Nord Stream 2

Building New Gas Transportation Infrastructure in the EU – what are the rules of the game?

The Council Legal Service’s assessment of the European Commission’s negotiating mandate and what it means for Nord Stream 2

The OPAL Exemption Decision: a comment on the CJEU’s ruling to reject suspension

The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom’s Sales to Central and Eastern Europe: a detailed analysis of the commitments and the way forward

The EU Competition Investigation into Gazprom’s Sales to Central and Eastern Europe: a comment on commitments

The OPAL Exemption Decision: past, present, and future

Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine Post-2019 – pipeline scenarios, gas flow consequences, and regulatory constraints

Evolution of gas pipeline regulation in Russia – Third party access, capacity allocation and transportation tariffs

Does the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy?

Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas – distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics

What the Ukrainian crisis means for gas markets

The EU Third Package for Gas and the Gas Target Model: major contentious issues inside and outside the EU

The June 2010 Russian-Belarusian Gas Transit Dispute: a surprise that was to be expected

The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its implications for Europe

The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment

The 2007 Russia-Belarus Gas Agreement

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