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[post_content] => System security is a critical component of power system operation. The objective of operational security is to manage grid stability and to limit the interruption to customer service following a disturbance. The integration of inverter-based renewable generation technologies such as solar and wind in the generation mix has introduced new challenges for managing operational security. First, the intermittency inherent in renewable resources can impact on key power system parameters such as frequency and voltage. Second, renewables interface with the grid through power electronics rather than turbines, which means that the physical characteristics of turbine generation that have historically supported the stability of the grid are becoming scarce as the power system transitions away from fossil‑fuel based thermal generation. In this paper, using public good theory, we provide an economic characterisation of the system services necessary for power system security. The analysis illustrates that, as opposed to a standard ‘public goods’ characterisation, system security products are better viewed as a basket of goods with differing economic characteristics that can also vary over space and time. The implications of these classifications for market design is analysed, including the inseparability of certain products, the binary or unit-commitment based nature of certain products, and the interactions between procurement mechanisms, network access rights and investment. Finally, we highlight five emerging models of market design for system security that reflect the nuances of economic characterization while respecting the physical characteristics of the grid.
[post_title] => Market design for system security in low-carbon electricity grids: from the physics to the economics
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[post_content] => Resource adequacy challenges in energy-only markets have often led to the adoption of centralized capacity mechanisms. However, centralized approaches are problematic due to misalignment of incentives in central agency decision-making, difficulty inferring consumer preferences for reliability, lack of economic protection for consumers against reliability outages, and the challenge of allocating reliability costs through volumetric tariffs. This paper proposes a new model, the insurer-of-last-resort that works as a risk overlay on existing energy-only design. It unbundles energy and reliability, incorporates insurance-based risk management concepts to align incentives for centralized decisions, and allows revealed consumer preferences to guide new capacity deployment.
Billimoria, F. and Poudineh, R. (2019). ‘Market design for resource adequacy: an insurance overlay on energy-only electricity markets’, Utilities Policy, 59, 100935.
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[post_content] => Australia’s National Electricity Market is an important global test case of the impacts of electricity sector transition in a large-scale liberalized energy-only market. The integration of variable and distributed energy resources has provided opportunities for clean, low-cost generation, but has also challenged existing market frameworks and resulted in a debate about the necessity for new designs. The market’s delayed and insufficient response to disorderly retirement and the need for certain system services have resulted in government and system operator intervention to bridge the gap. There are difficulties in securing timely new investment under policy uncertainty and integrated capital models. Furthermore, contributions to system services that were previously provided as a consequence of energy provision are not inherently provided by many new-generation technologies. A range of solutions have been proposed to address these challenges, although none to date have harnessed the potential of comprehensive alignment between operational requirements and economic signals. For example, the government’s flagship National Energy Guarantee, while providing a new framework for emissions intensity and reliability, did not address the ‘missing markets’ in energy security. Measures such as forward markets may provide hedging options, but are limited to energy. Centralized commitment could provide operating robustness, but might not be able to provide sufficient transparency of the various electricity value streams, as the experience of international markets shows. Furthermore, while reliability has taken centre stage in the policy discourse, system security is as important in managing a large-scale complex grid with a significant share of asynchronous generation. We argue that an efficient and transparent real-time energy market must reflect the comprehensive operational requirements of electricity dispatch. This necessitates an extension of energy-only design to an ‘energy+services’ model in which efficient price signals are provided for the ‘missing products’ necessary for operational security. Clear service specifications provide transparent signals that enable clear price discovery and facilitate competition from new providers and technologies.
[post_title] => Electricity Sector Transition in the National Electricity Market of Australia: Managing Reliability and Security in an Energy-Only Market
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[post_content] => In the face of challenges to energy-only market design under the electricity sector transition, an option considered by many jurisdictions is to incorporate some form of centralized capacity mechanism to respond to shortfalls in the market provision. For example, the UK government has already introduced a formal capacity market. In Germany and Belgium, strategic reserve mechanisms have already been approved and will be introduced shortly. Other markets, such as the National Electricity Market of Australia, are also considering enhancing their existing strategic reserve mechanisms, which would see more standardized and continual procurement of capacity by a noncommercial central agency. Under a market transition where generation is increasingly stochastic and decentralized, two key issues emerge with the above approaches. First, centralized mechanisms put increased focus on the efficiency of central authority decision making and the alignment between performance outcomes for reliability and agency incentives. Second, existing capacity mechanisms require the central agency to infer consumer preferences for reliability, something that is very challenging in practice. This is especially relevant in markets where the value of lost load is increasingly differentiated among different consumers. In this paper, we propose a new model for electricity market design—the insurer-of-last-resort model—that works as a risk overlay on an existing energy-only market. This model unbundles energy and reliability and incorporates insurance-based risk management concepts with the aims of (1) aligning incentives for centralized decision making and (2) allowing revealed consumer preferences to guide new capacity deployment.
[post_title] => Decarbonized Market Design: An Insurance Overlay on Energy-Only Electricity Markets
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